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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Administrative Law-Constitutionality of Statutes Licensing
Occupations
It has now been eighteen years since this Law Review published an
article entitled Haphazard Regin.entation Under Licensing Statutes.'
This article criticised the practice of using licensing as a device to regu-
late professions, trades, and other such occupations when no substantial
relation to the police power could be demonstrated. The recent decision
in Roller v. Allen2 holding the licensing of tile contractors 3 unconstitu-
tional as an improper exercise of the police power makes timely a review
of recent developments of the North Carolina law in this field.
In 1938, when the above article was written, there were fifty-three
statutes providing for the licensing of occupations. 4 Some of these
statutes, such as those regulating doctors, 5 lawyers, 6 and dentists,7 were
and still are considered by all authorities to be well within the scope
of the police powers." Other statutes, such as those applying to barbers9
and cosmetologists'0 (beauty operators), were often questioned but gen-
erally have been accepted by the courts." However, the article took a
skeptical view as to whether any public purpose warranted the licensing
of such occupations as photography, dry cleaning, and tile contracting.' 2
The writers of this article also pointed out that this entire system
of regulation by licensing was springing up in a haphazard, piecemeal
fashion. The licensing statutes differed in such important matters as
the powers of the boards to make regulations, the extent of the judicial
review afforded a person whose license was revoked, and the extent of
the punishment provided for operating without a license. These serious
inconsistencies at least partly resulted from special interest groups "pres-
suring" for the adoption of their own drafts of proposed legislation. The
1 Hanft and Hamrick, Haphazard Regimentation Under Licensing Statutes, 17
N. C. L. Rav. 1 (1938).
"245 N. C. 516, 96 S. E. 2d 851 (1957).
3 N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 87-28 to -38 (1950 and Supp. 1955).
'See Hanft and Hamrick, supra note 1, at 2.
* N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-1 to -21 (1950 and Supp. 1955).
N. C. GEa. STAT. §§ 84-15 to -38 (1950 and Supp. 1955).
N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-22 to -48 (1950 and Supp 1955).
8 11 Am. JuR., Constitutional Law, § 289 (1937).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 86-1 to -25 (1950 and Supp. 1955).10N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 88-1 to -29 (1950 and Supp. 1955).
117 Am. JUR., Barbers and Beauty Specialists, § 2 (1937) states that the courts
are generally agreed that barbers and beauty specialists may be regulated in the
interests of the public health and welfare, but there is a wide divergence in the
allowable extent of this regulation.
12 Hanft and Hamrick, supra note 1, at 3-8.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
article presented this challenge: "Squarely on the legislature rests the
responsibility to choose whether we are to have a policy of licensing
ordinary occupations. If such a policy is adopted it is time for orderly,
consistent, systematic development of such a policy. If we are to have
regimentation, let us at least have better regimentation."'
The legislature recognized the wide difference in the practices of these
examining boards and in 1947 passed Resolution 31 which called on the
Governor to appoint a commission of five members to study the prob-
lem.14 In 1953, after approximately fifteen years of receiving reports
and recommendations dealing with uniform administrative procedure,
the General Assembly adopted the present far-reaching legislation.'5
This legislation consisted of an act setting out a uniform procedure for
.most of the licensing boards of the state,'" and an act to provide for
judicial review of certain decisions made by administrative agencies other
than licensing boards.1 7
A stricter attitude toward the licensing of occupations appeared in
the North Carolina decisions. In 1940 in State v. Harris'8 the court
held the licensing of dry cleaners to be unconstitutional, stating that:
"[T]he rule will still hold good that regulation of a business or occupa-
tion under the police power must be based on some distinguishing feature
in the business itself or in the manner in which it is ordinarily conducted,
the natural and probable consequence of which, if unregulated, is to pro-
duce substantial injury to the public peace, health, or welfare."' 9
Nine years later the court in State v. Ballance20 overruled a former
decision 2 1 which had sustained the licensing of photographers, and held
this to be unconstitutional. Again the court emphasized lack of con-
nection between the occupation licensed and the objects of the police
power, namely health, order, morals, safety, and general welfare.
This year in Roller v. Allen the court struck down the licensing of
tile contractors. Here the court sets forth the following guide for the
legislature:
"From what this Court has said, in the cases cited, it may be
concluded that the police power in seeking to extend its field of
control, must not invade personal and property rights guaranteed
and protected by Article I, Sections 1, 7, 17 and 31 of the Con-
13 Id. at 18.
See Statutory Changes, 25 N. C. L. REv. 376, 377-79 (1947).
See, for a discussion of the changes accomplished, Statutory Changes, 31
N. C. L. Rzv. 375, 378-85 (1953).
'
0 N. C. GEN. STAr. §§ 150-9 to -34 (Supp 1955).
' N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-306 to -316 (Supp. 1955).
18216 N. C. 746, 6 S. E. 2d 854 (1940).
State v. Harris, 216 N. C. 746, 758, 6 S. E. 2d 854, 863 (1940).229 N. C. 764, 51 S. E. 2d 731 (1949).
21 State v. Lawrence, 213 N. C. 674, 197 S. E. 586 (1938).
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stitution of North Carolina. The Act in question here has as its
main and controlling purpose not health, not safety, not morals,
not welfare, but a tight control of tile contracting in perpetuity
by those already in the business....
"This Court, in the cases cited, has surveyed and marked the
dividing line betweeen the professions and skilled trades which
in the public interest permit of regulation by licensing under the
police power, and those ordinary lawful and innocuous occupa-
tions and trades which are protected from regulation by consti-
tutional guarantees. The occupations and trades in the latter
category constitute off-limits ground on which trespassing in for-
bidden by the Constitution. The police power of the State must
stop at the line." 22
The decision is a far reaching one because it was made despite the fact
that the tile contractor involved had failed to pass the examination and
there was evidence that he had been discharged on one job for unsatis-
factory work, and evidence that tile contracting required special skill,
and despite the lower court's conclusion that the licensing act was reason-
able and necessary to prevent fraud and incompetence, and to promote
public health.
While the court has eliminated some of the licensing statutes on
constitutional grounds, the legislature has added others. Some of the
acts appear to be on sound constitutional ground. Practical nurses,23
dispensing opticians,24 and physical therapists 25 are all in occupations
which have a substantial relation to the public health. Other occupations
recently subjected to licensing have a questionable connection with the
public purposes included in the police power. This group includes scale
mechanics 26 and refrigeration contractors. 27  Finally, it can be argued
that the act licensing motor vehicle dealers 28 has no substantial relation
to the police power. The act states that one of its primary purposes is
"... to prevent frauds, impositions and other abuses upon its [North
Carolina's] citizens."29  The opinion in State v. Harris would seem to
"
2Roller v. Allen, 245 N. C. 516, 525, 96 S. E. 2d 851, 859 (1957).
"N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-171.1 to -171.12 (1950 and Supp. 1955) adopted in
1947.
24N . C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-234 to -255 (Supp. 1955) adopted 1951; Statutory
Changes, 29 N. C. L. REv. 352, 360-65 (1951).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-256 to -270 (Supp. 1955) adopted 1951.
26'N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 81-52 to -58 (1950) adopted 1941; see, Statutory
Clumges, 19 N. C. L. REv. 435, 447-49 (1941) for critical comment.
21N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 87-52 to -64 (Supp. 1955) adopted 1955; Statutory
Changes, 33 N. C. L. REv. 513, 520-21 (1955).
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-285 to -308 (Supp. 1955) adopted 1951. Licensing
statutes for automobile dealers and various provisions of such statutes are discussed
in Note, 5 OHio ST. L. J. 377 (1939).
-' N. C. GEN. STAT. § 20-285 (Supp. 1955).
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render it doubtful whether this act will be declared constitutional on the
basis of preventing fraud. The court quoted from a Kentucky decision
involving licensing of real estate brokers as follows:
"'If occasional opportunity for fraud is to be the test, then
there is no reason why every grocer, every merchant, every auto-
mobile dealer, every keeper of a garage, every manufacturer, and
every mechanic who deals more frequently with the public in gen-
eral, and whose opportunities for fraud are far greater than those
of a real estate agent or salesman, may not be put on the same
basis. . . . In our opinion, the right to earn one's daily bread
cannot be made to hang on so narrow a thread. Broad as is the
police power, its limit is exceeded when the State undertakes
to require moral qualifications of one who wishes to engage or
continue in a business which, as usually conducted, is no more
dangerous to the public than any other ordinary occupation of
life.' ,0 (Emphasis added.)
The court in cases including Roller v. Allen has now clearly estab-
lished that there is a large category of innocuous occupations the licens-
ing of which will not come within the police power of the state. This
attitude, combined with the growing public awareness of the situation,
should result in better considered and more appropriate licensing legis-
lation in the future.
HERBERT T. MITCHELL, JR.
Bankruptcy-International Jurisdictional Problems Arising Between
the United States and Canada
Since World War II there has been an expanding international de-
velopment in the economy of the United States.' This will give rise to
a problem which has been little considered heretofore :2 the bankruptcy
of an individual or corporation engaged in international operations. Since
it is with Canada that our most important economic expansion has
taken place,3 this paper will seek to point out some of the jurisdictional
30 State v. Harris, 216 N. C. 746, 761, 6 S. E. 2d 854, 864 (1940) quoting from
Rawls v. Jenkins, 212 Ky. 287, 292, 279 §. W. 350 (1925).
1 "Since the war, total investments in new foreign plants and facilities amounted
to more than $12 billion, or more than 170% of the investment at the end of World
War II." THE AMERICANA, Foreign Investments 267 (Annual 1956).
2 "Probably in no branch of the law is information in foreign law lacking to such
a degree as in the matter of bankruptcy.. . ." Nadelmann, Recognition of American
Arrangements Abroad, 90 U. PA. L. R1v. 780, 783 (1942).
1 "Canada continued as the most important area for new direct investments, with
an indicated volume of $600 million during 1955, two thirds of which was new
United States capital.... As a result, American direct investments in that country
(Vol. 35
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problems that will arise in the bankruptcy adjudication of one doing
business, having assets, or creditors located in either Canada, the United
States, or both. •
There is at the present time no treaty or other international agree-
ment dealing with the problem of bankruptcy in effect between these
two countries.4 Although there has- been some modification of the
United States Bankruptcy Act 5 to clarify the international aspects of the
Act,' the sufficiency of the present law to cover an international bank-
ruptcy is to be questioned.
It would appear that both the Canadian and the United States courts
of bankruptcy have jurisdiction over foreigners, both individual and
corporate. It is also apparent that it is possible and indeed feasible in
many situations to have'concurrent bankruptcies in the two countries.
The jurisdiction of the United States bankruptcy courts is conferred
by section 2a of the Bankruptcy Act, which establishes the District
Courts of the United States as courts of bankruptcy7 with authority to
exercise original jurisdiction in proceedings under the act.8 That section
specifically empowers those courts to:
"(1) Adjudge persons bankrupt [1] who have had their prin-
cipal place of business, resided or had their domicile within their
respective territorial jurisdictions for the preceding six months, or
for a longer portion of the preceding six months than in any other
jurisdiction, or [2] who do not have their principal place of busi-
ness, or reside, or have their domicile within the United States,
but have property within their jurisdictions, or [3] who have been
adjudged bankrupts by courts of competent jurisdiction without
the United States, and have property within their jurisdictions, or
[4] in any cases transferred to them pursuant to this Act.. ..9
(Numbers in brackets added.)
There is at the present time some conflict as to whether the provisions
of section 2a (1) are jurisdictional or venue requirements. It is con-
cluded in a well-known text that this is only a venue provision,10 and
were estimated to be in excess of $6.5 billion at the end of 1955." The Americana,
op. cit. supra note 1.'
' For discussions of bankruptcy treaties, see Busier, Bankruptcy Reciprocity: A
Study as to a Treaty with Canada, 33 A. B. A. J. 1026 (1947) ; Nadelmann, Bank-
ruptcy Treaties, 93 U. PA. L. REv. 59 (1944).
'Bankruptcy Act, 30 STAT. 544 (1898), as amended 11 U. S. C. §§ 1-1103
(1952). Here after footnote references to sections and subsections of this act will
be cited as "Bankruptcy Act § -. "
Act of July 7, 1952, c. 579, 66 STAT. 420 (codified in scatttered sections of 11,
24U. S. C.).
'Bankruptcy Act §1 (10).8Id. § 2a.
8Id. § 2a (1).
10 1 COLLiER, BAN RUPTCY 12.14 (14th ed. 1948).
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this argument is strengthened by the addition in 1952 of provision [4]"
providing for adjudication of transferred cases. This is the terminology
of a venue provision rather than of a jurisdictional one, and it was so
argued in a recent district court case. 12  It is, however, submitted by
the writer that, as to aliens and nonresidents, only where one of the
provisions of section 2a (1) [1], "[2], [3] were fulfilled would the court
have any jurisdiction.
It will be noted that there is an overlapping in the situations enu-
merated by section 2a (1). All cases of original jurisdiction will be
covered by one of the first two classifications. However, the importance
of the third provision is now mainly historical. Although it was not
enumerated as such when the Bankruptcy Act was first enacted, 13 an
adjudication of bankruptcy or an insolvency proceeding abroad is now
to be considered as an act of bankruptcy.14 However, the inclusion of
this third provision originally was needed to make it clear that an adjudi-
cation abroad did not prevent the courts of the United States from
entertaining a bankruptcy proceedings also.15  The provision was also
helpful in getting around the requirement that the bankrupt be within
the territorial limits of the court for the preceding six months. The
amendment of 193816 has lessened the importance of this at the present
time.
A survey of the case law shows that through the application of the
various provisions of section 2a (1) the courts of the United States have
taken jurisdiction over aliens and nonresidents. In applying provision
[1) to an alien the court held that the hotel room of a prize fighter, lo-
cated within the territorial limits of the court, was his principal place
of business and that he was thus amenable to the jurisdiction of the
court.1.7 Residence at the hotel was not enough for jurisdiction in that
case as the debtor did not meet the six month requirement. Today since
the 1938 amendment to the Act, both of these provisions could be applied
to give the court jurisdiction.'8
The most important of the provisions of section 2a (1) in the inter-
national situation is number [2], which provides for adjudication on the
" 66 SAT. 420, 11 U. S. C. § 11 a (1) (1952).
" Saper v. Long, 131 F. Supp. 795 (S. D. N. Y. 1955).
"Act of Feb. 5, 1903, c. 487, § 2, 32 STAT. 797, 11 U. S. C. § 21 (1952) amended
the original act.
"' Bankruptcy Act § 3a (5).
"Bankruptcy Act § 2a (1) [3], originally enacted 30 STAT. 545 (1898) ; see
In re Neidecker, 82 F. 2d 263 (2d Cir. 1936).
"The Chandler Act, 52 STAT. 842 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 11 (1952) changing
the time requirement by inserting "or for the longer portion of the preceding six
months than in any other jurisdiction," thus doing away with the strict six months
requirement.
"In re Camera, 6 F. Supp. 267 (S. D. N. Y. 1933).
"See note 16 supra.
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basis of property located within the territorial limits of the court. This
provision has been applied and discussed in several international situ-
ations before the courts. In Matter of San Antonio Land & Irrigation
Co.,'0 the court was faced with a very complex international jurisdiction
situation. A Texas receiver attempted to have a New York district
court vacate its order adjudicating a Canadian corporation bankrupt.
The Canadian charter of the company stated that the principal place of
business was Toronto, but on the receiver's motion the New York court
looked behind this and found as a fact that the principal place of business
was in Texas where the corporation was doing business through the
operation of two wholly-owned companies. The jurisdiction of the
New York trustee had been based on property located within the terri-
torial limits of the New York court. Since it was found that Texas
was the principal place of business, it was held that the New York ad-
judication would be vacated. The court, however, in a dictum discussed
the natur.e of property that is required to bring one under provision [2]
"... I will say that I think that the meaning of the word
'property' under the Bankruptcy Act should be much the same as
that under judicial decisions relating to matters of taxation and
attachment. In other words, a bankruptcy proceeding is a kind
of equitable attachment, which should be held to reach what ever
assets any available judicial process can reach. Consequently, the
situs of property is not to be determined by general doctrines.
such as 'mobilia sequuntur personam' which may be well applicable
in matters like the law of inheritance, but by power of efficient
control. Such a view is advantageous, in order to protect credi-
tors. .... -20
The court did point out that if, as originally assumed, the company
had not had its principal place of business within the United States, there
would have been grounds for jurisdiction in New York on the basis of
property located there. The nature of this property is important. One
asset consisted of the company's equity in bonds which it had delivered
as a pledge to a trust company located in New York; the other a bank
account of $8.06. Either property interest was said to be sufficient as a
basis of jurisdiction. The other asset of the company in New York
was a deposit to meet bond coupons which were unpaid; this was ruled
a trust deposit and not to be considered as property within the district.
A similar principle was applied in a later case in which it was ruled
that as long as the court can, by the use of judicial process, reach the
assets of the foreign debtor located within the United States it can
"o 228 Fed. 984 (S. D. N. Y. 1916).
20 Id. at 990.
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exercise jurisdiction over him.21  An English debtor had executed in
London as assignment for the benefit of creditors by which he purported
to pass to the English trustee certain property of his which was then
located in the United States. The court ruled that the transfer to the
foreign trustee was a preference,22 and that the petition of bankruptcy
in this country brought within four months would defeat the title of the
trustee. The basis of this holding was that although the debtor had pur-
ported to transfer his property to a foreign trustee, it was still amenable
to the process of the court.
Once the court finds a basis for jurisdiction, must it in all cases
exercise jurisdiction or may it refuse to do so? There is no definitive
holding on this question. Since the court of bankruptcy is a court of
equity, it has been suggested that the court through the exercise of its
equitable powers could refuse to exercise jurisdiction in any case that
might be inequitable.2 The use of the doctrine of forum tion conviens
has been advocated in the situation where all the parties to the proceed-
ing are foreigners and the basis for jurisdiction is merely property
located in the United States.2 4 Just how far the court's discretion
should extend or does extend is not clear, but the court should in all
events protect the local creditors. 25
A slightly different set of problems arise in Canada when its courts
encounter bankruptcy cases with foreign elements. The Canadian Bank-
ruptcy Law26 has provisions that would clearly vest the courts of that
country with jurisdiction over the foreign or nonresident debtor. There
is no single provision in the recent Canadian Bankruptcy Act 27 which
corresponds with section 2a (1) of the United States Act. In the
Canadian act, definitions of the various terms used are so worded that
2" In re Berthood, 231 Fed. 529 (S. D. N. Y.), appeal dismissed 238 Fed. 797
(2d Cir. 1916).2' See Bankrupty Act § 60.
23 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY ff 2.09 (14th ed. 1948).
"In re Berthood, 231 Fed. 529, 534 (S. D. N. Y. 1916): "[I]t must not be
understood that the court will necessarily take jurisdiction if the creditors, as well
as the alleged bankrupt, are all aliens residing abroad." The court then cites
analogous admiralty cases in which all the parties were aliens and in which the
courts had chosen not to exercise jurisdiction: Belgeland v. Jensen, 114 U. S. 355
(1884) ; Watts, Watts & Co. v. Unione Austriaca di Navigazione, 224 Fed. 188
(E. D. N. Y. 1915), aff'd, 229 Fed. 136 (2d Cir. 1916), rev'd, 248 U. S. 9 (1918)
(reversed as an abuse of the discretion on facts of this case).
23 Nadelmann, The National Bankruptcy Act and the Conflicts of Laws, 59
HARV. L. REV. 1025, 1041 (1946).
" Reference to the Canadian Bankruptcy Law is generally taken to include two
distinct statutory provisions: (1) The Bankruptcy Act, CAN. REv. STAT. c. 14
(1952); (2) The Winding Up of Insolvent Companies Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c.
296 (1952). These were enacted by the Parliament of Canada under the authority
vested in it by The British North American Act, 1867, 30 Vicr. c. 3, § 91.
'CAN. REV. STAT. c. 14 (1952); Enacted by Parliament 1949, 2d Sess. c. 7
(1949).
[Vol. 35
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the foreign or nonresident debtor will apparently be included within
the scope of the act. A debtor is defined as:
"(i) 'debtor' includes an insolvent person and any person who, at
the time an act of bankruptcy was committed by him, resided
or carried on business in Canada and where the context re-
quires includes the bankrupt .... ,,28
A corporation is defined as:
"(f) 'corporation' includes any company incorporated or author-
ized to carry on business by or under an Act of the Parlia-
ment of Canada or any of the provinces of Canada, and any
incorporated company, wheresoever incorporated that has
an office in or carries on business within Canada .... -29
The Canadian Winding Up Act3 0 is also couched in terms that are broad
enough by definition to include foreign corporations. 31 The petition in
bankruptcy, under the Canadian Bankruptcy Act, is to be filed in "the
locality of the debtor,"32 which is defined as the principal place:
"(i) where the debtor has carried an business during the year im-
mediately preceding his bankruptcy,
"(ii) where the debtor has resided during the year immediately
preceding his bankruptcy,
"(iii) in cases not coming within subparagraph (i) or (ii), where
the greater portion of the property of such debtor was lo-
cated. .... ,,33
The writer has not found any definitions or other provisions in the
Canadian Bankruptcy Law to limit the operation of their law in the
international situation.
It would appear to be clear that the Canadian court could exercise
jurisdiction over a bankruptcy proceeding brought there even after one
had been started in the courts of the United States. Section 20(1) (a)
of the Canadian Act 34 specifies that the bankrupt's making an assignment
of his property for the benefit of creditors generally, whether the assign-
ment is authorized by the act or not, will be considered an act of bank-
" CAN. RaV. STAT. c. 14, § 2(i) (1952).
2
-1d. § 2(f).
CO CAN. Rzv. STAT. c. 296 (1952).
3"Id. § 2(i) (1952) "(i) 'trading company' means any company except railway
and telegraph company, carrying on business similar to that carried on by ...
[forty-four different types of business listed.]" (The list would appear to be all
inclusive except for the ones excepted above.)
'2 CAN. Ray. STAT. c. 14, § 21 (1952).
83Id. § 2(k).
"Id. § 20(1) (a).
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ruptcy. Thus, as the instituting of proceedings in one country will be
basis for proceedings in the other,8 5 the concurrent bankruptcy situation
is indeed possible under the laws of the United States and Canada at
the present time.
No direct holding has been found under Canada's recently revised
Bankruptcy Act declaring that jurisdiction over foreigners and non-
residents will be taken. However, a United States creditor has been
allowed to petition the Canadian court for the adjudication of a Canadian
.debtor as bankrupt, thus taking part in the Canadian proceeding. 0 In
the past, the Canadian courts, applying similar provisions to those now
in effect, have taken jurisdiction over United States debtors. A Dela-
ware corporation doing business in Canada was adjudged bankrupt upon
proof that the corporation had committed an act of bankruptcy. 7 Sim-
ilarly, the Canadian Winding Up Act has been applied in the interna-
tional situation.38 The Canadian court also has taken jurisdiction over
a corporation which was in liquidation in a foreign country at the time
that the Canadian proceedings were instituted.8 9 Another case had
clearly pointed out that the jurisdiction which the court exercised in such
situations was not ancillary to that of the foreign court but was a sep-
arate action under the Canadian law and fully independent.40
Since the new Canadian Act, unlike the Bankruptcy Act in this
country, does not confer jurisdiction solely on the basis of property lo-
cated within the territorial limits of the court,41 the question is raised
whether the Canadian creditors of a foreign debtor will be able to reach
the debtor's Canadian property if that is his only connection with Cana-
da. Would it be possible to extend the carrying-on-business provision42
of the Canadian Act to cover this? If this could be done then the
Canadian courts' jurisdiction would appear to be similar to that of the
United States courts.
Thus there would appear to be sufficient basis for taking jurisdiction
over the foreign or nonresident debtor under both the United States' and
" United States act: Bankruptcy Act § 3a (5) ; Canadian act: CAN. REV. STAT. c.
14, § 20(1) (a) (1952).
"a Re Flora Flocks Ltd., [1952] 0. W. N. 383, 3 D. L. R. 392 (1952).
17 In re National Shipbuilding Corp., 1 C. B. R. 430 (Que. 1921).
38 Re Stewart River Gold Dredging Co., 22 W. L. R. 315, 7 D. L. R. 736 (1912)
a and as the company is a foreign corporation doing business in Canada under
a license of the Dominion Government, it is a Canadian company, in my opinion,
under federal control, and subject to the provisions of the Dominion Winding Up
Act .... "
"Re Breakwater Co., 33 ONT. L. R. 65, 22 D. L. R. 294 (1914).
40 Allen v. Hanson, 18 Can. Sup. Ct. 667 (1890) ; for United States case in ac-
cord see: Fincham v. Income from Certain Trust Funds of Cobbam, 193 Misc. 363,
81 N. Y. S. 2d 365 (Sup. Ct. Spe. T. 1948).
"Bankruptcy Act § 2a(1).
2 CA r. Rav. STAT. c. 14, §§ 2(i), (f) (1952).
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the Canadian law. However, the complete scope of these provisions
have not been determined.
HENRY W. CONNELLY
Constitutional Law-Injunction to Prohibit Use in State Courts of
Evidence Illegally Obtained by Federal Agents
A federal narcotics agent seized petitioner's marihuana under a search
warrant improperly issued under Rule 41(c) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The United States District Court granted a pre-
trial motion to suppress this evidence under Rule 41 (e), and on the Gov-
ernment's later motion dismissed the federal indictment. The federal
agent then swore to a complaint before a New Mexico State judge and
caused a warrant for the petitioner's arrest to issue. Petitioner was
charged with being in possession of marihuana in violation of New
Mexico law. In the United States District Court, petitioner sought to
enjoin the federal agent from testifying in the state prosecution and to
direct the agent to reacquire the evidence and destroy it or transfer it to
other agents. The injunction was denied and the Court of Appeals
affirmed.1 Certiorari being granted, the United States Supreme Court,
by five to four decision, reversed and directed that the injunction be
granted by the United States District Court. Rea v. United States.2
The federal rule excluding evidence illegally obtained by federal
officers was originally declared in the case of Weeks v. United States.3
Under the Weeks decision, evidence obtained by illegal search and
seizure in violation of the fourth amendment to the U. S. Constitution
is not admissible in federal courts -when obtained by the federal govern-
ment or its agents. Since the fourth amendment protects the right of
privacy only from invasion by the federal government, this exclusionary
rule does not bar the use in federal courts of evidence illegally obtained
by private citizens or state officers who were not acting in collaboration
with federal officers. Although many states have adopted the ex-
clusionary rule as applied to evidence illegally obtained by state agents
for use in state courts,4 the federal constitution does not compel them
to do so.5
The states adopting the exclusionary rule as a means of suppressing
' 218 F. 2d 237 (10th Cir. 1954).
" 350 U. S. 214 (1956) ; noted in 24 TENN. L. IEv. 605 (1956).
232 U. S. 383 (1914).
'A list of states adopting the exclusionary rule may be found in Annot. 50
A. L. R. 2d 531 at 536 (1956).
'Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1944). The due process clause of the 14thAmendment is not violated by the states' use of illegally obtained evidence provided
the method of acquisition is not so harsh as to violate the basic concepts of such
clause. Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952).
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illegal search and seizure by state officers follow the federal government
in admitting evidence illegally acquired by private citizens.0 The ad-
missibility in state proceedings of evidence illegally obtained by federal
officers not cooperating with state agents is a subject on which there are
divergent views. Among the states having the exclusionary rule, the
majority of those which have acted on the question have held such
evidence inadmissible.7  The rationale of this majority is that the state
judiciary is obligated by the Constitution to effectively give force to the
fourth amendment's protection against the invasion of the right of
privacy by the federal government; and as the most effective means of
discharging this duty, the majority excludes such evidence. This is not
to say that these states construe the fourth amendment as requiring the
adoption of such an. exclusionary rule.
How does the Rea decision affect the question of admissibility in
state courts of evidence illegally acquired by federal officers? In per-
mitting the injunction against the use of such evidence, the majority
opinion stated that no constitutional issue is involved and declared that
the Court's power to enjoin the federal officer from testifying stems from
its power to police and enforce the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
As to the Court's power to control the possession of the contraband,
the Court cited a federal statute which provides that: "All property taken
or obtained under any revenue law of the United States shall not be
repleviable, but shall be deemed to be in the custody of the law and
subject only to the orders and decrees of the courts of the United States
having jurisdiction thereof."8  The majority opinion further stated that
Wolf v. Colorado9 is in no way affected, and carefully pointed out that
no injunction was sought against a state official. Reliance on the Court's
supervisory powers over federal law enforcement agencies seems to be
the sole ground for the decision, and McNabb v. United States0 was
cited as authority for this view. The McNabb case declared inadmissible
in a federal prosecution a confession obtained during a period of illegal
detention in violation of a federal statute. The Court stated that in de-
'Chapman v. Commonwealth, 206 Ky. 439, 264 S. W. 181 (1924); Gilliam v.
Commonwealth, 263 Ky. 342, 92 S. W. 2d 346 (1936) ; Hampton v. State, 132 Miss.
154, 96 So. 165 (1923) ; State v. Wilkerson, 349 Mo. 205, 159 S. W. 2d 794 (1942);
State v. Barrett, 121 Or. 57, 254 P. 198 (1927).
" State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 254 P. 788 (1927) ; Walters v. Commonwealth,
199 Ky. 182, 250 S. W. 839 (1923) ; Ingram v. Commonwealth, 200 Ky. 284, 254
S. W. 894 (1923); Little v. State, 171 Miss. 819, 159 So. 103 (1935) ; State v.
Rebasti, 306 Mo. 336, 267 S. W. 858 (1924) ; State v. Horton, 312 Mo. 202, 278
S. W. 661 (1925); State v. Hiteshew, 42 Wyo. 147, 292 P. 2 (1930). Conlra,
State v. Gardner, 77 Mont. 8, 249 P. 574 (1926) ; State ex rel. Kuhr v. District
Court, 82 Mont. 515, 268 P. 501 (1928); Johnson v. State, 155 Tenn. 628, 299 S. W.
800 (1927).
'62 STAT. 974 (1948), 28 U. S. C. § 2463 (1953).
9 See Note 5 supra.
1- 318 U. S. 332 (1943).
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termining exclusionary rules of evidence the federal courts are not re-
stricted to those powers derived solely from the Constitution.
The Rea dissenting opinion rejected the McNabb case as the basis
for such extensive judicial power of supervision over federal law enforce-
ment agencies and would have confined the Court's supervisory power
over the admission of evidence to federal cases. In substance, the dissent
takes the view that under the majority opinion the judiciary has invaded
the executive responsibility for supervising law enforcement activities.
In support of this position, the following was quoted from the McNabb
decision: ". . we confine ourselves to our limited function as the Court
of ultimate review of the standards formulated and applied by the federal
courts in the trial of criminal cases. W¥e are not concerned with the law
enforcement practices except in so far as the courts themselves become
instruments of the law."'
1
Because of the strong dissenting opinion, it seems likely that the Rea
decision may later be construed so narrowly as to reconcile the majority
and minority opinions. It is submitted that since the federal court was
an instrument of the law in issuing the invalid search warrant, such a
reconciliation might be effected by narrowly construing the majority's
position to mean that the federal court can control that which was ob-
tained through federal judicial action. The dissent apparently antici-
pated this possible construction for it questions whether the Court's
decision would have been different had the evidence been obtained with-
out a search warrant.
The dissenting opinion further urged that the present decision violates
federal policy as established by Stefanelli v. Minard.1' In that case the
Court refused to enjoin the use of evidence illegally seized by the state
in a state prosecution on the grounds that the federal intervention in state
criminal proceedings would be violative of the ". . . special delicacy of the
adjustment to be preserved between federal equitable powers and the
State administration of its own laws.' 3 The minority in the Rea de-
cision argued that while in the instant case the injunction was against
the federal agent's testifying, it was in effect enjoining state criminal pro-
ceedings since the state's case appeared to depend wholly on the evidence
in question. This criticism, like that against the Court's reliance on the
McNabb case, can be reconciled with the majority decision by arguing
that the federal judiciary's connection with the illegality was sufficient to
justify the federal interference in this area of delicate adjustment.
The dissent also pointed out that since under the Wolf decision a
conviction in state courts under evidence illegally obtained would not
be reversed because of the illegality per se, the federal interference in the
" Id. at 347. "342 U. S. 117 (1951).18 Id. at 120.
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present case would seem to be justified only if the federal injunction pro-
ceeding can be completed prior to the use of the evidence in the state
prosecution.
In view of the fact that the injunction would seem to be of value only
if issued prior to the use of the evidence in the state prosecution, and
since the Rea decision could be narrowly construed to permit an in-
junction against the use in state courts of evidence illegally obtained
by federal agents only where the federal judiciary was connected with
the illegality, it would appear that the question of admissibility in state
prosecutions of evidence illegally obtained by federal officers is still
worthy of attention by state courts.
Assuming the issue remains one of importance, it might be well to
consider the possible bases for the exclusion of such evidence in North
Carolina. While no case has been found which indicates the position that
our Court would take on this question, it would seem that there are
three grounds upon which such evidence could be declared inadmissible.
The first argument which could be made in favor of excluding such
evidence is that such a result is required by G. S. § 15-27 which reads
as follows: "Any officer who shall sign or issue or cause to be signed
and issued a search warrant without first requiring the complainant or
other person to sign an affidavit under oath and examining said person
or complainant in regard thereto shall be guilty of a misdemeanor; and
no facts discovered by reason of the issuance of such illegal search war-
rant shall be competent as evidence in the trial of any action: Provided,
no facts discovered or evidence obtained without a legal search warrant
in the course of any search, made under conditions requiring the issuance
of a search warrant, shall be competent in the trial of any action.' 4
The conclusion that this statute renders inadmissible in North Caro-
lina courts evidence unlawfully obtained by federal officers would require
that the word officer be construed to include both state and federal
agents, and would further require an interpretation to the effect that
the statute applies to all situations involving illegal acquisition of evi-
dence.
This liberal construction appears to be unlikely. Prior to the statute,
the common law rule admitting illegal evidence prevailed in North
Carolina,' 5 and since its adoption, the statute has received a strict con-
struction. As originally enacted in 1937, the statute did not contain the
proviso in the last sentence, and before the addition of the proviso by
" N. C. GEx. STAT. § 15-27 (1953), noted in 15 N. C. L. Rav. 343 (1937), 29
N. C. L. REv. 396 (1951).
" State v. Wallace, 162 N. C. 622, 78 S. E. 1 (1913).
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amendment in 1951, it was interpreted as not rendering incompetent
evidence illegally obtained through a search without a warrant., 6
This history of strict construction would favor a finding that the
word officer as used in the statute included only state agents. Further-
more, since the statute declares incompetent only evidence obtained under
an invalid warrant or obtained without a warrant where the acquisition
was made under conditions requiring the same, a narrow construction
might render admissible evidence illegally obtained where a legal method
of acquisition not requiring a search warrant existed. For example, the
use of a stomach pump, employed by force, as a means of carrying out a
search incident to an arrest might render the method of acquiring evi-
dence illegal. Such evidence might be admissible under the statute, how-
ever, because the search, being incident to the arrest, would not be one
made under conditions requiring the issuance of a search warrant.
In addition, in North Carolina search warrants apparently may be
issued only as authorized by statute, and it might be held that condi-
tions requiring issuance of a warrant are confined to those circum-
stances in which a warrant is authorized ofi the theory that unless a
warrant is authorized it can never be required17 As an example of
the application of this possible construction, consider a search and
seizure, made without a warrant and not incidental to arrest, under
which liquor was obtained which was illegally possessed solely for the
purpose of consumption. Since search warrants apparently may be
issued only where authorized by statute, the absence of such a statute
covering this situation prevents the existence of conditions requiring the
issuance of a search warrant. It might be held, therefore, that the
search was not made under conditions requiring the issuance of a war-
rant, and the evidence so obtained is not excluded by the terms of the
statute. This last construction would confine the exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence to those situations where a legal method acquisition
exists by a search warrant. Because of these possible narrow con-
structions of G. S. § 15-27, it would seem that even if the statute applied
to federal officers, only a limited character of illegally obtained evidence
might be held inadmissible.
1" State v. Shermer, 216 N. C. 719, 6 S. E. 2d 529 (1940) ; State v. McGee, 214
N. C. 184, 198 S. E. 616 (1938).
'7 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-25'(1953) authorizes issuance of warrants for: (1)
stolen property; (2) false or counterfeit coins, notes, bills, or bonds, and instru-
ments used for counterfeiting them; (3) any personal property, tickets, books,
papers, and documents used in connection with and in the operation of lotteries,
gaming, and gambling. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 18-3 (1953) provides for search war-
rants for liquor illegally possessed for the purpose of sale. N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-351 (1953) authorizes search warrants for deserting seamen. N. C. GEN.
STAT. § 13-91 (d) (1953) provides for search warrants for game taken in violation
of the game law. N. C. GEa. STAT. § 80-28 (1950) authorizes search warrants
for re-used beverage bottles.
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As a second ground for the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained
by federal officers, it could be argued that the Court should adopt a
judicial policy barring all evidence illegally obtained by state or federal
officers as a means of suppressing illegal search and seizure within the
state. Such a policy might be deemed warranted on the basis of modern
developments in this area and on the basis of G. S. § 15-27 as indicative
of legislative intent in this direction. This would go further than the
federal rule which excludes only evidence illegally obtained by federal
agents.
As a third basis for declaring inadmissible in North Carolina evi-
dence unlawfully obtained by federal officers, it could be urged that a
rule excluding the same should be adopted as the most effective means
by which the Court can discharge its obligation to uphold the fourth
amendment. As has been mentioned previously, this argument has been
adopted by some of the courts which have acted on the question.
Without regard to the alternative merits of the bases suggested
above for declaring inadmissible in the state courts evidence unlawfully
acquired by federal officer's, it is to be hoped that North Carolina will
exclude such evidence should the question arise. The suppression of
illegal search and seizure by federal agents can be rendered truly
effective only by making it known in advance that any evidence taken
in an illegal manner will be inadmissible in proving the guilt of the ac-
cused in either state or federal criminal proceedings.
JAMES C. Fox.
Constitutional Law-Requisites of Notice of Governmental Action
The United States- Supreme Court cast new light on the requisites of
notice under the due process clause of the Constitution in the recent
decision of Walker v. City of Hutchinson.' The defendant city, in the
exercise of its statutory power of eminent domain,2 condemned property
of the plaintiff for purposes of street widening. In accordance with the
provision of the statute, the property owners were notified by publication
that the hearing was to be held to determine compensation.3 The Court
found that the notice provided by the act was not reasonably calculated
to inform a known resident landowner of condemnation proceedings
against his property, and, therefore, that Fourteenth Amendment require-
quirements of due process of law were not met. "Even a letter," it was
'352 U. S. 112 (1956).
-K.A. GEN. STAT. § 26-202 (1949).
'In accordance with the statute, there was one published notice given in the
official city newspaper ten days before the hearing. The Court, however, laid no
stress on this point, but based its decision upon the inadequacy of notice by publica-
tion generally when some better means of giving notice is readily available.
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said, "would have apprised him that his property was about to be
taken." 4
Upon the rationale of Justice Miller's widely cited dicta in Davidson
v. New Orleans,5 the Court has repeatedly sanctioned notice by publica-
tion in actions growing out of the powers of government. 6 This was a
lower standard of notice than that imposed on others in comparable ac-
tions, but was considered justified and necessary for the expeditous
handling of state business.7 On this basis, notice by publication has
been approved where the state was exercising its powers of eminent
domain or taxing functions.8 The Walker opinion, however, states
broadly and unmistakably that there is nothing peculiar about govern-
mental actions which justify depriving citizens of the right to be heard.0
In discussing this proposition, Justice Black observed that often notice
published in a newspaper is no notice at all, and that a more stringent
requirement will prevent one-sided fixing of compensation by govern-
ment officials. Answering Justice Miller's argument, the Court said
it did not believe that compliance with this requirement would interfere
with orderly condemnation proceedings.
Further indication of a policy change in notice requirements was
given in Covey v. Town of Somers.10 The Court held invalid that part
of a New York statute" which provided that written notice to any tax-
payer, including minors and incompetents, was sufficient for judicial
foreclosure of tax liens in all cases. The authorities, it was said, knew
'Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U. S. 112, 115 (1956).
96 U. S. 97, 104 (1878). "That whenever by the laws of a State, or by State
authority, a tax, assessment, servitude, or other burden is imposed upon property
for the public use, whether it be for the whole State or of some more limited portion
of the community, and those laws provide for a mode of confirming or contesting the
charge thus imposed, in the ordinary courts of justice, with such notice to the
person, or such proceeding in regard to the property as is appropriate to the nature
of the case, the judgment in such proceedings cannot be said to deprive the owner
of his property without due process of law, however obnoxious it may be to other
objections."
' Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U. S. 241 (1907) (tax foreclosure where statute pro-
vided for personal service on residents and notice by publication as to nonresi-
dents) ; Leigh v. Green, 193 U. S. 79 (1904) (tax foreclosure where owner miss-
ing) ; Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316 (1890) (judicial tax sale after notice by
publication to nonresident owner); Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry. and Improvement
Co., 130 U. S. 559 (1889) (condemnation of property of nonresident).1 Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry. and Improvement Co., 130 U. S. 559 (1889) ; Del
Castillo v. McConnico, 168. U. S. 674, 677 (1898) (dictum).
'North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U. S. 276 (1925) (eminent do-
main) ; Leigh v. Green, 193 U. S. 79 (1903) (taxation). See North Laramie Land
Co. v. Hoffman, supra at 283: "All persons are charged with knowledge of statutes
and must take note of the procedure adopted by them and when that procedure is
not unreasonable or arbitrary there are no constitutional limitations relieving them
from conforming to it. This is especially the case with respect to those statutes
relating to the taxation or condemnation of land."
'Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U. S. 112, 114 (1956).
10351 U. S. 141 (1956).
"N. Y. TAx LAW § 165-h.
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the property owner to be an unprotected incompetent and unable to
understand the nature of the proceedings. 12 Thus a subjective standard
of due process was used in an area in which it had formerly been con-
sidered necessary to have a fixed a minimum standard of notice for pur-
poses of certainty and efficiency in governmental operation.
Despite what appears to be an important change in the Supreme
Court's attitude toward notice requirements, neither the Walker nor the
Covey decision expressly overruled prior decisions. In the former case the
Court went to some length to distinguish a similar eminent domain case,
Hiding v. Kaw Valley Ry. and Improvement Co.,'3 which had approved
published notice. There the landowner whose property was condemned,
was a nonresident,1 4 and the Court in the Walker opinion used this as
the basis for distinquishing this previous case. It is significant, however,
that the Walker opinion itself raises the question of the effect which
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company15 may have had
on the validity of this distinction, suggesting that the earlier holdings
may have been "undermined."' 6
The Mullane case arose under a New York act 17 providing for notice
by newspaper publication of judicial settlements of common trust fund
accounts. The Court in deciding the case made no distinction between
residents and nonresidents, but held published notice sufficient as to
beneficiaries of the trust whose names and addresses were not known.
However, as to those whose names and addresses were listed on trust
company records, this notice was considered insufficient to satisfy the
requirements of due process of law. Publication, it was said, is not
likely to apprise anyone of the pendency of an action, but the mails, on
the other hand, are an efficient and inexpensive means of informing
those persons who are known to have an interest.'8
The Mullane opinion was also notable for the Court's refusal to
designate the proceeding as one either in personam or in rem. Even
though there had been no clear holding of the United States Supreme
Court to affirm the doctrine, it was generally considered that any action
which could be classified as an in rem proceeding was one in which
" Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U. S. 141, 146 (1956).
130 U. S. 559 (1889).
14 The Supreme Court had indicated a reason for a different standard of notice
as to nonresidents in Huling v. Kaw Valley Ry. and Improvement Co., supra note
13: "It is therefore the duty of the owner of real estate, who is a nonresident, to
take measures that in sofne way he shall be represented when his property is callea1
into requisition; and if he fails to do this, and fails to get notice by the ordinary
publications which have usually been required in such cases, it is his misfortune,
and he must abide the consequences." See Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U. S. 241, 248(1906).
1339 U. S. 306 (1950).
10 Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U. S. 112, 114 (1956).
'
7 N. Y. BANKING LAw § 100-c(12).
M ullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 310 (1950).
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constructive service of process would suffice.' 9 Yet because the classifica-
tion of actions as in rem or in personam is based on confused and elusive
standards which vary from state to state, the Court in the Mullane case
felt that the power of the state to resort to constructive service should
no rest on this scheme.
2 0
Justice Jackson, in writing the opinion, carefully noted that the
Court did not commit itself to any formula for "determining when con-
structive notice may be utilized or what test it must meet."21 Neverthe-
less, twice in the past year, in the Covey and Walker cases, the Court
has called up the Mullane case as authority in its examination of statutory
notice requirements. Thus it appears that the present court has estab-
lished the criterion "that if feasible, notice must be reasonably calcu-
lated to inform parties of proceedings which may directly and adversely
effect their legally protected interests. '22
Reading the Mullane, Covey and Walker cases together, it appears
that the elements of notice satisfactory to due process of law are to be
determined by the peculiar facts of each individual case, and that set
rules in the field of constructive notice will no longer be given recogni-
tion. As in other areas,23 it seems that the Court is substituting a sub-
jective standard of due process for the prior standards which, on the
surface at least, embodied greater objectivity and certainty.
The Mullane case in 1950 started a rash of speculation 24 that the
" In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1878), Justice Field drew a distinction
between the notice required for in personam and in rem actions. The Court said
that in personam judgments based upon publication of process would be "instru-
ments of oppression," and suggested by way of dictum that constructive service by
publication "may answer in all actions which are substantially in rem." Id. at
727. Leigh v. Green, 193 U. S. 79 (1903), sustained a Nebraska statute providing
for notice by publication of in rem proceedings to forclose tax liens, and discussed
the classification at length: "When proceedings are in personam . . .the person
must be served with process; in proceeding to reach the thing, service upon it and
such proclamation by publication as gives opportunity to be heard upon application
is sufficient to enable the Court to render judgment." Id. at 85. And, Grannis v.
Ordean, 234 U. S. 380, 384 (1913), noted that in determining what is due process
"a distinction is to be observed between actions in personam and actions in rem or
quasi in rem." The distinction however, was not germane to the holding in this
instance. See Fraser, Actions in Rein, 34 CoRN. L. Q. 29, 40 (1948), where this
authority explained: "Notice in actions in rem is to be distinguished from service
of process in actions in personam because notice may be given a person even
though he is outside the territorial limits of the court, since jurisdiction over the
person is not necessary in actions in rem." See also 1 NIcHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN§ 4.103[2] (1950).
20 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 312 (1950).21 Id. at 314.2 Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U. S. 112, 114 (1956).
23 E.g., the manner in which the Court determines if due process of law has
been satisfied in criminal cases: Breithaupt v. Abram, 77 Sup. Ct. 408 (1957);
Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128 (1954); Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165
(1951) ; Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401 (1944). The Court in these cases
said that under the Due Process Clause, it may nullify a state law if its application
"shocks the conscience," or offends "a sense of justice."
2 Fraser, Jurisdiction by Necessity-An Analysis of the Mullane Case, 100 U.
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validity of state statutes and court rules relating to notice by publication
would be limited, especially as applied in probate proceedings and other
actions similar to common trust settlements. This was followed by
statutory changes2 5 varying considerably in their provisions and in the
scope of their coverage. The Walker decision calls for a close reexamina-
tion of notice requirements in all of the states, and for provision to be
made for at least a letter in all cases where an address is available.2 0
JOHN L. DAVIDSON.
Credit Transactions-Deficiency Judgment Statute-Suit on the Note
In Fleishel v. Jessup,1 plaintiff was holder of promissory notes se-
cured by deed of trust executed by defendant for the purchase price of-
land, equipment, and machinery. After sale, plaintiff sued for deficiency
judgment. The trial court excluded defendant's evidence bearing on the
question of whether certain structures were real or personal property.
Judgment for plaintiff was reversed on appeal on the ground that de-
fendant was entitled to have the jury decide the question of what pro-
portion of the value of all the property was realty.2 As to such pro-
portion plaintiff was not entitled to deficiency judgment under G. S.
§ 45-21.38.3
PA. L. REV. 305 (1952); Hayward, The Effect of Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank and Trust Company Upon Publication of Notice in Iowa, 36 IoWA L. REV.
47 (1950); Tilley, The Mullane Case: New Notice Requirements, 30 MicH. ST.
B. J. 12 (1951).
-1 IowA RULES Civ. P., Rule 60 (1943) (revised in 1951 so that now in all cases
of service of original notice upon known persons by publication, a copy of the notice
must be sent by ordinary mail to such person) ; ME. REV. STAT. 114 § 7 (1954)
(common trust fund statute whose notice provisions were influenced by the Mullane
case) ; MICH. STAT. ANO. § 27.3178(32) (1943) (revised in 1951 to require mail-
ing of all probate and other legal notices) ; OKLA. STAT. ANxO. TITLE 60 § 162
(Supp. 1951) (common trust fund statute).
". Quaere the validity of N. C. GEx. STAT. § 105-377 (1950), which states:
"All persons who have or may acquire any interest in any property which may or
may become subject to a lien for taxes are hereby charged with notice .... Such
notice shall be conclusively presumed, whether such persons have actual notice or
not." Also, N. C. GEN. STAT. § 160-219 (1952), providing for notice by publication
as to property owners who are nonresidents of the state when condemnation pro-
ceedings are brought by a municipal corporation.
1244 N. C. 451, 94 S. E. 2d 308 (1956).
2 The court points out that as between vendor and vendee, personal property
affixed to land passes by a conveyance of the land unless expressly excepted. Horne
v. Smith, 105 N. C. 322, 11 S. E. 373 (1890) (engine and boiler connected to main
building of saw mill); Moore v. Valentine, 77 N. C. 188 (1877) (mining ma-
chinery) ; Bryan v. Lawrence, 50 N. C. 337 (1858) (planks laid down, but not
nailed, on the upper floor of gin house). As between landlord and tenant, fixtures
placed on the land for purposes of trade are removable by the tenant at the expira-
tion of the term without provision in the lease for removal. Springs v. Atlantic
Refining Co., 205 N. C. 444, 171 S. E. 635 (1933), Note, 12 N. C. L. REV. 273
(1934).
'Cf. CALIF. CODE Civ. PROC. § 580 (b) (1955), which provides that where both
a chattel mortgage and real estate deed of trust are given to secure payment of the
balance of the combined purchase price of real and personal property, no deficiency
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constructive service of process would suffice. 19 Yet because the classifica-
tion of actions as in rem or in personam is based on confused and elusive
standards which vary from state to state, the Court in the Mullane case
felt that the power of the state to resort to constructive service should
no rest on this scheme. 2
0
Justice Jackson, in writing the opinion, carefully noted that the
Court did not commit itself to any formula for "determining when con-
structive notice may be utilized or what test it must meet." 21 Neverthe-
less, twice in the past year, in the Covey and Walker cases, the Court
has called up the Mullane case as authority in its examination of statutory
notice requirements. Thus it appears that the present court has estab-
lished the criterion "that if feasible, notice must be reasonably calcu-
lated to inform parties of proceedings which may directly and adversely
effect their legally protected interests.322
Reading the Mullane, Covey and Walker cases together, it appears
that the elements of notice satisfactory to due process of law are to be
determined by the peculiar facts of each individual case, and that set
rules in the field of constructive notice will no longer be given recogni-
tion. As in other areas, 23 it seems that the Court is substituting a sub-
jective standard of due process for the prior standards which, on the
surface at least, embodied greater objectivity and certainty.
The Mullane case in 1950 started a rash of speculation 24 that the
"' In Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1878), Justice Field drew a distinction
between the notice required for in personam anil in rem actions. The Court said
that in personam judgments based upon publication of process would be "instru-
ments of oppression, and suggested by way of dictum that constructive service by
publication "may answer in all actions which are substantially in rem." Id. at
727. Leigh v. Green, 193 U. S. 79 (1903), sustained a Nebraska statute providing
for notice by publication of in rem proceedings to forclose tax liens, and discussed
the classification at length: "When proceedings are in personam . . . the person
must be served with process; in proceeding to reach the thing, service upon it and
such proclamation by publication as gives opportunity to be heard upon application
is sufficient to enable the Court to render judgment." Id. at 85. And, Grannis v.
Ordean, 234 U. S. 380, 384 (1913), noted that in determining what is due process
"a distinction is to be observed between actions in personam and actions in rem or
quasi in rem." The distinction however, was not germane to the holding in this
instance. See Fraser, Actions in Rein, 34 CORN. L. Q. 29, 40 (1948), where this
authority explained: "Notice in actions in rem is to be distinguished from service
of process in actions in personam because notice may be given a person even
though he is outside the territorial limits of the court, since jurisdiction over the
person is not necessary in actions in rem." See also 1 NicHoLs, EMINENT DOMAIN§ 4.10312] (1950).
"0 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 312 (1950).21 1d. at 314.
" Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U. S. 112, 114 (1956).
2'3 E.g., the manner in which the Court determines if due process of law has
been satisfied in criminal cases: Breithaupt v. Abram, 77 Sup. Ct. 408 (1957)-
Irvine v. California, 347 U. S. 128 (1954) ; Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165
(1951) ; Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401 (1944). The Court in these cases
said that under the Due Process Clause, it may nullify a state law if its application
"shocks the conscience," or offends "a sense of justice."
24 Fraser, Jurisdiction by Necessity-An Analysis of the Mullane Case, 100 U.
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validity of state statutes and court rules relating to notice by publication
would be limited, especially as applied in probate proceedings and other
actions similar to common trust settlements. This was followed by
statutory changes25 varying considerably in their provisions and in the
scope of their coverage. The Walker decision calls for a close reexamina-
tion of notice requirements in all of the states, and for provision to be
made for at least a letter in all cases where an address is available. 20
JOHN L. DAVIDSON.
Credit Transactions-Deficiency Judgment Statute-Suit on the Note
In Fleishel v. Jessup,' plaintiff was holder of promissory notes se-
cured by deed of trust executed by defendant for the purchase price of-
land, equipment, and machinery. After sale, plaintiff sued for deficiency
judgment. The trial court excluded defendant's evidence bearing on the
question of whether certain structures were real or personal property.
Judgment for plaintiff was reversed on appeal on the ground that de-
fendant was entitled to have the jury decide the question of what pro-
portion of the value of all the property was realty.2 As to such pro-
portion plaintiff was not entitled to deficiency judgment under G. S.
§ 45-21.38. 3
PA. L. REv. 305 (1952); Hayward, The Effect of Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank and Trust Compan-y Upon Publication of Notice in Iowa, 36 IowA L. REV.
47 (1950); Tilley, The Mullane Case: New Notice Requirements, 30 MICH. ST.
B. J. 12 (1951).
21 IowA RULES Civ. P., Rule 60 (1943) (revised in 1951 so that now in all cases
of service of original notice upon known persons by publication, a copy of the notice
must be sent by ordinary mail to such person) ; ME. REv. STAT. 114 § 7 (1954)
(common trust fund statute whose notice provisions were influenced by the Mullane
case) ; MIcH. STAT. ANo. § 27.3178(32) (1943) (revised in 1951 to require mail-
ing of all probate and other legal notices); OKLA. STAT. ANNO. TITLE 60 § 162
(Supp. 1951) (common trust fund statute).
" Quaere the validity of N. C. GEN. STAT. § 105-377 (1950), which states:
"All persons who have or may acquire any interest in any property which may or
may become subject to a lien for taxes are hereby charged with notice .... Such
notice shall be conclusively presumed, whether such persons have actual notice or
not." Also, N. C. GEN. STAT. § 160-219 (1952), providing for notice by publication
as to property owners who are nonresidents of the state when condemnation pro-
ceedings are brought by a municipal corporation.
1 244 N. C. 451, 94 S. E. 2d 308 (1956).
2 The court points out that as between vendor and vendee, personal property
affixed to land passes by a conveyance of the land unless expressly excepted. Home
v. Smith, 105 N. C. 322, 11 S. E. 373 (1890) (engine and boiler connected to main
building of saw mill); Moore v. Valentine, 77 N. C. 188 (1877) (mining ma-
chinery) ; Bryan v. Lawrence, 50 N. C. 337 (1858) (planks laid down, but not
nailed, on the upper floor of gin house). As between landlord and tenant, fixtures
placed on the land for purposes of trade are removable by the tenant at the expira-
tion of the term without provision in the lease for removal. Springs v. Atlantic
Refining Co., 205 N. C. 444, 171 S. E. 635 (1933), Note, 12 N. C. L. Rav. 273
(1934).
' Cf. CALIF. CODE CIV. PROC. § 580 (b) (1955), which provides that where both
a chattel mortgage and real estate deed of trust are given to secure payment of the
balance of the combined purchase price of real and personal property, no deficiency
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not prevent plaintiff from ignoring the security and suing on the note.14
The rationale of the Oregon court is that the title and text of the act
confine its effect to foreclosure suits, leaving intact plaintiff's independent
action at law on the note.15
It may seem that the arguments in favor of allowing the creditor
to sue on the note are of a rather technical, legalistic nature, when bal-
anced against what seems to be the legislative policy to restrict the
creditor to the property conveyed in purchase money transactions.'
6 It
is arguable, however, that restriction of the creditor's right of independ-
ent suit for the debt might work to the disadvantage of the purchaser
of land, the very class the statute was designed to protect. ". . . [I]f
it be understood that the would-be purchaser lawfully may repudiate his
direct promise to pay the contract price absolutely and at all events, as
evidenced by his promissory note, property owners will not deal with
him.' 7 It would be more realistic to say that property owners will
deal with the buyer, but will require a larger down payment on the
purchase price.
Assuming that suit on the note will be permitted, the next inquiry
is as to the effect of judgment in such suit on the right to forclose.
Oregon decisions intimate, contrary to the usual rule absent a statute,' 8
that the right to foreclose a purchase money mortgage is waived by suit
on the note.' 9 This result seems clearly sound against the statutory
closure of any mortgage given to secure payment of the purchase price of real
property ... the mortgagee shall not be entitled to a deficiency judgment on account
of the mortgage or note or obligation secured by the same."1 In Union Trust Co. v. Wiseman, 10 F. 2d 558 (D. C. D. Ore. 1926), it was
held that a prior action to foreclose the purchase money mortgage dismissed at the
instance of plaintiff did not bar later suit on the note, the institution of the suit to
foreclose not being so inconsistent with the suit on the note as to constitute an
election of remedies. Had plaintiff carried the foreclosure suit to final determina-
tion, he would thereafter have been barred from suing on the note, though he did not
realize the full amount of the debt. Wright v. Wimberly, 94 Ore. 1, 184 P. 740
(1919).
1; In Wright v. Wimberly, 94 Ore. 1, 44-47, 184 P. 740, 754-755 (1919) (con-
curring opinion), Harris, J., points out that the real intent of the statute is to
confine the holder of a purchase money note and mortgage to the mortgaged lands
for satisfaction of the debt. He sustains the holding in Page v. Ford, however, on
the ground that the court could not carry out the real intent of the legislature
without resorting to "judicial legislation." Compare Winkelman v. Sides, 31 Cal.
App. 2d 387, 88 P. 2d 147 (1939), holding that the statute preventing a personal
action until the creditor has exhausted the security (stipra note 5) is declarative
of the public policy of the state and may not be waived by a deed of trust pur-
porting to authorize action to enforce payment of a secured debt without a sale
of the property.
"
0Statute Survey, 11 N. C. L. Rrv. 191, 219 (1933).
"'Wright v. Wimberly, 94 Ore. 1, 57, 184 P. 740, 758 (1919) (concurring
opinion), as against the argument that the statute prohibiting deficiency judgments
should be liberally construed in favor of those who buy land.
" Silvey v. Axley, 118 N. C. 959, 963, 23 S. E. 933, 934 (1896) (dictum);
37 Am. Jua., Mortgages § 523 (1941).
"Wright v. Wimberly, 79 Ore. 626, 631, 156 P. 257, 258 (1916); Walters v.
Cooper, 71 Ore. 139, 142 P. 359 (1914).
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background. It is one thing to allow the creditor to exercise his tradi-
tional right to pursue either remedy in the first instance; but it is quite
a different thing to nullify the statutory policy against deficiency judg-
ments by circumlocution. If the creditor may obtain judgment on the
note, levy on the debtor's general assets, and then make up any balance
due by foreclosure, he would be in effect obtaining a deficiency judgment
in advance.
It is held in North Carolina that a mortgagee cannot subject the
mortgagor's equity of redemption to sale under execution for the mort-
gage debt.2 0 If North Carolina were also to hold, in accord with Oregon,
that foreclosure is waived by suit on the note, it would seem that suit
on the note would put the security beyond the reach of the creditor.
RoBIN L. HiNSON.
Criminal Law-Applicability of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act
to Embezzlement and False Pretenses
In United States v. Turley,1 the Supreme Court of the United States
has settled a conflict between the circuits as to the applicability of the
National Motor Vehicles Theft Act2 to such crimes as embezzlement
and obtaining goods by false pretenses. The Act, more commonly known
as the Dyer Act, reads as follows:
"Whoever transports in interstate or foreign commerce a
motor vehicle or aircraft, knowing the same to have been stolen,
shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both."'3
The area of controversy has been whether to interpret the term
"stolen" as synonymous with common-law larceny, or to allow a broader
interpretation which would include the crimes of embezzlement and ob-
taining goods by false pretenses.
The fifth,4 eighth 5 and tenth0 circuits have held that the term
"stolen" should be limited to the definition of common-law larcency. In
20 McPeters v. English, 141 N. C. 491, 54 S. E. 417 (1906) ; Camp v. Coxe, 18
N. C. 52 (1834).
177 Sup. Ct. 397 (1957).
-41 STAT. 324 (1919), as amended, 18 U. S. C. § 2312 (1952).3 Ibid.
'Murphy v. United States, 206 F. 2d 571 (5th Cir. 1932).
'Ackerson v. United States, 185 F. 2d 485 (8th Cir. 1950) ; United States v.
O'Carter, 91 F. Supp. 544 (S. D. Iowa 1949).
O United States v. Hand, 227 F. 2d 794 (10th Cir. 1955) (dictum) ; (jury found
the defendant intended to steal car from the inception) ; Hite v. United States, 168
F. 2d 973 (10th Cir. 1948).
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Hite v. United States7 where the automobile was obtained by false pre-
tenses, the tenth circuit said:
"... . When a Federal criminal statute uses a term known to the
common-law and does not define that term, the courts will apply
the common-law meaning of the term unless the context indicates
a contrary intent on the part of Congress.... The word 'steal' in
a criminal statute ordinarily imports the common-law offense of
larceny."8
Conversely, the fourth,9 sixth,10 and ninth" circuits have given the
term "stolen," as used in the Act, a broader interpretation which would
include embezzlement and obtaining goods by false pretenses.' 2  The
language of Judge Shackelford Miller, Jr., in United States v. Adcock,'3
a district court case, is adopted by several of the courts taking this view:
"The word stolen as used in the Dyer Act is not used in the tech-
nical sense of what constitutes larceny, but in its well-known and
accepted meaning of taking the personal property of another for
one's own use without right or law; and that such taking can exist
whenever the intent comes into existence and is deliberately car-
ried out regardless of how the person so taking the automobile
may have originally come into posession of it."
Common-law larceny is the obtaining of possession of personal prop-
erty, by trespass in the taking and carrying away of the same, from the
possession of another, and with the felonious intent to deprive him of his
ownership therein.' 4 Thus, there seems to be no problem of interpreta-
tion when an automobile has been taken and carried away with felonious
intent, and without the owner's consent. The difficulty in interpreting
the term "stolen" arises when the title and possession of an automobile
are obtained from the owner by means of a worthless check or the like,
or under circumstances which amount to a bailment. Those courts which
hold the term "stolen" as synonymous with common-law larceny will
not apply the Act here. An example of the reasoning in 'these eases is
7168 F. 2d 973 (10th Cir. 1955).8 Id. at 974-75.
'Boone v. United States, 235 F. 2d 939 (4th Cir. 1956) ; United States v.
Turley, 141 F. Supp. 527 (Md. 1956) rev'd 77 Sup. Ct 397 (1957). Contra, Ex
Parte Atkinson, 84 F. Supp. 300 (E. D. S. C. 1949).
"0 Breece v. United States, 218 F. 2d 819 (6th Cir. 1954) ; Wilson v. United
States, 214 F. 2d 313 (6th Cir. 1954) ; Collier v. United States, 190 F. 2d 473 (6th
Cir. 1951); Davilman v. United States, 180 F. 2d 284 (6th Cir. 1950); United
States v. Adcock, 499 F. Supp. 351 (W. D. Ky. 1943).
' Smith v. United States, 233 F. 2d 744 (9th Cir. 1956).
2 United States v. Sicurella, 187 F. 2d 533 (2d Cir. 1951) (dictum) (The
defendant intended to convert automobile when driven away from the house).
1349 F. Supp. 351 (W. D. Ky. 1943).
14
MILLER, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW § 109 (1934).
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Ackerson v. United States.15 In that case, defendant wanted to pur-
chase F's car. In return for defendant's check, F gave him title and
possession to the car. Payment of the check was refused by the bank.
In reversing the conviction under the Act, the court held that when an
owner of property, although induced by fraud, intends to and does part
with his title voluntarily, as well as with his possession of the prop-
erty, not expecting the property to be returned or disposed of according
to his direction, it is not larceny, and therefore, not punishable under the
Act.
The courts which hold that the term "stolen" is not the same as
common-law larceny, however, will allow these additional crimes to
come within the scope of the Act. In Smith v. United States,'0 defendant
agreed to drive R's car to Arizona. Without authority, he drove in and
out of several states and was finally arrested in California. In upholding
the conviction of the defendant, the court said: ". . . automobile thieves
may obtain cars in many ways. Typically an unattended car is taken.
However, a thief may give a dealer a worthless check for a certificate of
title. A trusted employee of an automobile dealer may have lawful
possession of the stock of cars and later take them into another state
and wrongfully sell them. These are larceny, false pretenses, and em-
bezzlement situations; but the evil is the same. The owner of the car
is deprived of it and state law is ineffective to protect him.
"Congress would have no reason to differentiate among the various
theft crimes. . . . The courts should not graft such a distinction on
the statute. '1
7
In the principal case,' the Supreme Court, in a six to three decision
handed down by Mr. Justice Burton, reversed the district court and
decided the case in accord with the views of the fourth, sixth, and ninth
circuits that "stolen," as used in the Act, includes embezzlement and
obtaining goods by false pretenses. The Court said :19
". .. The Government's interpretation is neither unclear nor
vague. 'Stolen' as used in 18 U. S. C. § 2312, 18 U. S. C. A.
§ 2312 includes all felonious takings of motor vehicles with intent
to deprive the owner of the right and benefits of ownership, re-
gardless of whether or not the theft constitutes common-law
larceny."
11 185 F. 2d 485 (8th Cir. 1950). The same result would obtain if the situation
were embezzlement.10233 F. 2d 744 (9th Cir. 1956). These courts would hold the same way where
the automobile had been obtained by false pretenses.17 id. at 747.
" 77 Sup. Ct. 397 (1957).
'OId. at 402.
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In the course of its decision, the Court recognized the fact that when
a federal statute involving criminal law uses a term of established mean-
ing at common-law, without otherwise defining it, that term is given its
common-law meaning.20 The Court quotes with approval language found
in Boone v. United States,21 a case which relies mainly upon lexi-
cographers and a quotation from Blackstone, that the term "stolen" was
not equated with larceny at common-law. The Court found support for
its position in the legislative history of the Act, placing particular reli-
ance on the fact that in the committee reports and floor debates of Con-
gress, there was no mention of excluding embezzlement and false pre-
tenses from the Act, and therefore such crimes were intended to be in-
cluded within the coverage of the Act. "No mention is made of a pur-
pose to distinguish between different forms of theft as would be expected
if the distinction had been intended."
2 2
From a reading of the Court's opinion, it would seem that the
authorities and legislative history of the Act militate to require the result
reached.
Notwithstanding those authorities cited by the Supreme Court in the
majority opinion, there is much authority for the proposition that at
common-law the word "steal" was synonymous with larceny.23  In
Gardiner v. State,24 the court said: "The Word steal or stealing in a crim-
inal statute when unqualified by the context signifies a taking which at
common-law would have been denominated felonious and imports the
common-law offense of larceny." And in Dunnel v. Fiske,25 Chief
Justice Shaw said: "The natural and most obvious import of the word.
'steal' is that of a felonious taking of property, or larceny."
Further, in the crime of receiving stolen goods, we find evidence
of the common-law meaning of the term "stolen." Bishop, in his work
20 United States v. Carll, 105 U. S. 611 (1881) ; United States v. Smith, 18 U. S.
(5 Wheat.) 153 (1820); United States v. Brandenberg, 144 F. 2d 656 (3rd Cir.
1944).
21235 F. 2d 939 (4th Cir. 1954).
"77 Sup. Ct. 397, 401 (1957).
.Murphy v. United States, 206 F. 2d 571 (5th Cir. 1953); Hite v. United
States, 168 F. 2d 973 (10th Cir. 1948); Ex Parte Atkinson, 84 F. Supp. 300
(E. D. S. C. 1949) ; State v. Frost, 289 S. W. 895 (Mo., 1926) ; Cohoe v. State,
79 Neb. 811, 113 N. W. 532 (1907) ; Gardiner v. State, 55 N. J. L. 58, 26 Atl. 30
(1892) ; State v. Uhler, 32 N. D. 483, 156 N. W. 220 (1916) ; Riley v. State, 64
Okla. Crim. 183, 78 P. 2d 712 (1938) ; Huges v. Territory, 8 Okla. 32, 56 Pac. 708
(1899). See also 26 AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENcYcLoPErA OF LAw 769-70 (2d
ed.) ; WEBSTER, NEW IIrmrNATioNAL DIcTIoNARY (2d ed. 1952). "Steal: to take
and carry away feloniously and usually, unobserved; to take or appropriate without
right or leave, and with intent to keep or make use of wrongfully... ."; BLACK, LAw
DicrioxARY (4th ed. 1951). "Steal: the term is commonly used in indictments for
larceny ... and denotes the commission of theft, that is, the felonious taking and
carrying away of the personal property of another, and without right and without
leave or consent of owner. . ..
"55 N. J. L. 58, 60, 26 Atl. 30, 33 (1892).
2552 Mass. (11 Met.) 551, 554 (1846).
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on criminal law, seems to indicate that at common-law "stolen," in this
sense, meant larceny. He points out that it is only by statute that the
receiving of goods obtained by embezzlement and false pretenses is made
punishable.26
The committee reports and floor debates,27 which constitute the
legislative history of the Act, taken as a whole, give the impression that
Congress was confronted with a situation which was purely larceny, and
the Act was passed in order to meet this sitaution.28  There is no men-
tion of embezzlement or obtaining goods by false pretenses in these re-
ports; and although the Supreme Court assumed that if Congress meant
to exclude embezzlement and obtaining goods by false pretenses from
the Act it would have mentioned such a distinction, it seems just as
logical to infer that these crimes were not expressly distinguished, be-
cause Congress was not concerned with those situations.
Three times, at the suggestion of the Justice Department, amend-
ments were proposed to clarify this ambiguous situation by including
these additional crimes. In each instance, the amendment passed one
house of Congress, but failed to come to a vote in the other.29
Mr. Justice Frankfurter writing the dissent3" tersely points out that
the majority of the Court has gone a bit too far in construing the Act.
"If Congress desires to make cheating, in all its myriad varieties, a
federal offense when employed to obtain an automobile that is then taken
across a state line, it should express itself with less ambiguity than by
262 BIsHoP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW §1137(3) (9th ed.
1923) : "Some of the modern statutes in their terms embrace the receiving not only
of stolen but of embezzled goods, those obtained by false pretenses, and the like.
In the absence of such statutes it will not be punishable to receive embezzled
goods." Id. § 1140 (7) : "Though the thing stolen was not the subject of larceny
at the common-law, if it was made such by a statute, the receiving of it is a re-
ceiving of stolen goods." Id. § 1141 (1) : "Where embezzlement is aii offense dis-
tinct from larceny, and the statute contains merely the words 'stolen goods,' the re-
ceiving of embezzled goods is not within the prohibition." See also O'Connell v.
State, 55 Ga. 216 (1875); Commonwealth v. King, 9 Cush. 284 (Mass. 1852);
People v. Montage, 71 Mich. 318, 39 N. W. 60 (1888) ; People v. Seaton, 15 N. Y.
Supp. 270 (1891).
= H. R. Rep. No. 312, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919) ; S. Rep. No. 202, 66th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1919); 58 Cong. Rec. 5470-78, 6433-35 (1919).
2658 Cong. Rec. 5470-78 (1919), Rep. Newton of Missouri said: "... There is
no evil from which there is a greater need for relief than the larceny of automobiles
which is being perpetrated by bands of thieves thoughout the United States.
".... and yet any citizen in any part of the country who leaves his automobile
upon the street while he goes to his office, to the church or the theatre has the
constant dread in his mind that when he returns his automobile may be gone.
"So prevalent has this evil become that scores of anti-theft and auto locking
devicesohave been invented ... and yet so ingenious are the automobile thieves of
the country that as rapidly as devices are invented with which to thwart their evil
work they devise schemes to overcome them .... "
" S. 1483 (S. Rep. No. 358) 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949) ; S. 675 (S. Rep.
No. 2364) 83rd Cong. 2d Sess. § 2 (1953) ; H. R. 3702 (H. R. Rep. No. 919) 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1955).
" United States v. Turley, 77 Sup. Ct. 397 (1957) (dissent).
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language that leads three Courts of Appeals to decide that it has not
said so and three that it has." Another point raised by the dissent is
that Congress has included the additional crimes in question here in other
statutes. Section 2314 of Title 18, U. S. C.,31 which deals with the
transportation of stolen goods, securities, monies, or articles used in
counterfeiting, expressly provides for false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises.
In view of the authorities which apparently can be relied upon for
support of either of the divergent views, possible arguments in favor
of one view or the other must ultimately resolve themselves into differ-
ences of opinion on the concept of the judicial function of which the
Supreme Court is final arbiter. Clearly, the decision has resolved the
conflict and possibly the decision will effect the result which the Congress
would have chosen had it finally passed on this issue. The Supreme
Court, however, may have overlooked the language of Mr. Justice
Holmes in McBoyle v. United States,32 which involved an interpretation
of the same statute:
"Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider
the text of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable
that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that
the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do
if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as
possible the line should be clear. When a rule of conduct is laid
down in words that evoke in the common mind only the picture of
vehicles moving on land, the statute should not be extended to
aircraft, simply because it may seem to us that a similar policy
applies or upon the speculation that if the legislature had thought
of it, very likely, broader words would have been used."
HENRY H. IS4ACSON.
Criminal Law-Federal Courts-Appealability of Order Suppressing
and Returning Evidence
In United States v. Ponder,' election officials were indicted for
election fraud. Fourteen months earlier the District Court had ordered
certain election ballots, books, and returns impounded on application of
the U. S. District Attorney. After the indictment, and before trial, the
defendants moved for the return and suppression of evidence of the im-
" 48 STAT. 794 (1934), as amended, 18 U. S. C. § 2314 (1952), as amended,
18 U. S. C. A. § 2314 (Supp. 1956) ; See also 37 Stat. 670, as amended, 18 U. S. C.§ 659 (1952) (stealing and embezzlement).
2 283 U. S. 25 (1931).
'238 F. 2d 825 (4th Cir. 1956).
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pounded materials. The motion was granted and the government ap-
pealed. On appeal, the defendants interposed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that the order of suppression was merely a mesne order in
the criminal action, without appealable finality. The Court of Appeals
held that the order was a final decision and reviewable by virtue of sec-
tion 1291, title 28, United States Code. The Court stated that the test of
whether an application for apeal is interlocutory or final, in cases where
the application is filed in the form of a motion in the cause, is its essential
character and the circumstances under which it is made. The Court
held the order to be independent and appealable because the title and
terms of the impounding order and the public character of the materials
in question indicated its individuality. Further, the order dissolved the
pound and had the effect of dismissing the indictment, other factors rele-
vant to appealability.2
A final order may be reviewed by way of immediate appeal or writ
of error, but in the absence of statute, an interlocutory order may not be
so reviewed.3 The purpose underlying the requirement of finality is to
avoid piecemeal litigation and the delays caused by interlocutory appeals.
4
For the purpose of determining whether an order is final or interlocutory,
a distinction is made between proceedings incidental or ancillary to a
criminal action, in which case it is considered interlocutory and non-
appealable, and independent proceedngs, in which case it is deemed final
and appealable.5
Where application for the suppression or return of evidence wrong-
fully seized is made in a plenary proceeding, i.e., a proceeding neither
ancillary to nor directly affecting the pending prosecution, its independ-
ent character has been said to be obvious, the appealability of a decree
rendered therein being unaffected by the fact that the purpose of the
suit is solely to influence or control the trial of a pending criminal prose-
cution.0 Where an application for return of papers or other property is
made by motion or other summary proceeding, for instance, because the
person in possession is an officer of the court, its essential character and
the circumstances under which it is made will determine whether it is
2 Section 3731, title 28, United States Code Annotated provides that an order
dismissing an indictment is appealable. In the principal case, the Courf equated the
suppression of the evidence essential to the prosecution with dismissal of the in-
dictment.
' See 2 Am. JuR., Appeal and Error, § 21; Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet. 300, 332
(U. S. 1938).
' See Catlin v. United States, 324 U. S. 229, 233 (1945) ; Lewis v. E. I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 183 F. 2d 29 (5th Cir. 1950); State v. Bass, 153 Tenn. 162,
281 S. W. 936 (1926).
United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., 336 U. S. 793 (1949); Cogen v.
United States, 278 U. S. 221 (1929).C Cogen v. United States supra note 5.
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an independent proceeding or merely a step in the trial of a criminal
case.7
One of the most important factors in determining the appealability
of an order denying or granting a motion for the suppression or return
of evidence is the pendency of a criminal action in which such evidence
is to be used. Where the application for the suppression or return of
evidence is made before an information or indictment against the appli-
cant, the proceeding has been held to be independent and the resulting
order final and appealable.8 On the other hand, it is generally held not
appealable where, at the time the application was filed, a criminal action
against the applicant was undisposed of and pending in the same court.9
The time at which the application is filed, rather than the time at which
it is passed upon by the court, has been held to be controlling in deter-
mining the character of the proceeding. 10 Where the motion for sup-
pression and return is made before indictment and ruled on after indict-
ment, the court in United States v. Poller," reasoned that, conceivably,
it might be held that the proceeding became merged in the indictment,
but the result would be to make the appealability of the order depend
upon the diligence of the prosecution of the proceeding, or of the judge
in deciding it, either of which is an unsatisfactory test. The court con-
cluded that it seems more reasonable to use the time of its first initiation
as the test.1
2
7 Ibid.
' Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U. S. 344 (1931), (reversing
United States v. Gowen, 40 F. 2d 593 (2d Cir. 1930); Cogen v. United States,
278 U. S. 221 (1929); Perlman v. United States, 247 U. S. 7 (1918); Weldon v.
United States, 196 F. 2d 874 (9th Cir. 1952) ; United States v. Rosenwasser, 145
F. 2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1944) ; Davis v. United States, 138 F. 2d 406 (5th Cir. 1943),
cert. denied, 321 U. S. 775 (1944); Cheng Wai v. United States; 125 F. 2d 915(2d Cir. 1942) ; Turner v. Camp, 123 F. 2d 840 (5th Cir. 1941) ; Re Sana Labora-
tories, Inc., 115 F. 2d 717 (3d Cir. 1940), cert. denied sub nom. Sana Laboratories,
Inc. v. United States, 312 U. S. 688 (1941) ; Re Cudahy Packing Co., 104 F. 2d 658(2d Cir. 1939); United States v. Edelson, 83 F. 2d 404 (2d Cir. 1936); Re Mil-
burne, 77 F. 2d 310 (2d Cir. 1935) ; United States v. Poller, 43 F. 2d 911 (2d Cir.
1930).
' Cogen v. United States, 278 U. S. 221 (1929) ; United States v. Rosenwasser,
145 F. 2d 1015 (2d Cir. 1944) ; United States v. Kelley, 105 F. 2d 912 (2d Cir.
1939) ; United States v. Sheehan, 57 F. 2d 759 (D. C. Cir. 1932) ; United States v.
Poller, 43 F. 2d 911 (2d Cir. 1930) ; Jacobs v. United States, 8 F. 2d 981 (9th Cir.
1925); United States v. Bronde, 299 Fed. 332 (D. C. Cir. 1924); United States
v. Mattingly, 285 Fed. 922 (D. C. Cir. 1922); United States v. Marquette, 270
Fed. 214 (9th Cir. 1921); United States v. Maresca, 266 Fed. 713 (D. C. Cir.
1920) ; Coastline Lumber and Supply Co. v. United States, 259 Fed. 847 (2d Cir.
1919).
" Cogen v. United States, 278 U. S. 221 (1929) ; Re Sana Laboratories, Inc.,
115 F. 2d 717 (3d Cir. 1940), cert. denied sub. nom. Sana Laboratories, Inc. v.
United States, 312 U. S. 688 (1941) ; United States v. Poller, 43 F. 2d 911 (2d
Cir. 1930).1143 F. 2d 911 (2d Cir. 1930).
12 See also Cheng Wai v. United States, 125 F. 2d 915 (2d Cir. 1942) ; In Re
Sana Laboratories, Inc., 115 F. 2d 717 (3d Cir. 1940), cert. denied sub nom. Sana
Laboratories, Inc. v. United States, 312 U. S. 688 (1941). But cf. United States
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Another test for determining whether an order denying or granting
a motion for suppression and return is appealable, was developed in
United States v. Cefaratti,13 in which after indictment, the defendant
made a pretrial motion to suppress evidence which was granted. Before
appeal, the government dismissed the indictment. The D. C. Circuit
held the order granting the motion appealable because it was a final order
within the meaning of section 1291, title 28, United States Code. The
court said that an order that does not terminate an action, but is, on the
contrary, made in the course of an action, has the finality that is required
for appeal under the code governing appellate jurisdiction of Courts of
Appeals, if (1) it has a final and irreparable effect on the rights of the
parties, being a final disposition of a claimed right; (2) it is too im-
portant to be denied review; and (3) the claimed right is not an ingredi-
ent of the cause of action and does not require consideration with it. 14
A vigourous dissent urged that the court should not widen the ambit
for appeals by the government in criminal cases unless there is specific
statutory authority for so doing and that there was none here. Further,
the dissent reasoned that since the motion was made after indictment,
the order should be interlocutory and not independent.
This decision was followed in United States v. Stephenson,'" even
though the government did not dismiss the indictment before appealing.
But the D. C. Circuit again held the order appealable because of the
presence of the three requirements stated above in the Cefaratti case.
Again in 1956, this same court followed the rule in United States v.
Carroll,'6 and held that appeal would lie by the government from the
grant of a motion to suppress evidence seized from the persons of the
defendants when they were arrested even though indictments against the
defendants were still pending, when at least with respect to two counts
of the indictment, without the suppressed evidence, the prosecution could
not sficceed. The defendants challenged the jurisdiction of the court
to hear the appeal, and the court held that an order which does not
terminate an action, has the finality required in section 1291, title 28
United States Code for appeal if (1), (2), and (3) above are present.
In United States v. Rosenwasser,'7 it was urged that when the gov-
ernment appeals from an order directing the suppression or return of
evidence, a dismissal of the appeal might forever deprive the government
v. Williams, 227 F. 2d 149 (4th Cir. 1955) ; Nelson v. United States, 208 F. 2d 505(D. C. Cir. 1953) ; United States v. Mattingly, 285 Fed. 922 (D. C. Cir. 1922).
"202 F. 2d 13 (D. C. Cir. 1952).
"See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1950) ; Swift
& Co. v. Compania Caribe, 339 U. S. 684 (1948).
"223 F. 2d 336 (D. C. Cir. 1955).
"234 F. 2d 679 (D. C. Cir. 1956).
1, 145 F. 2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1944).
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of questioning the suppression rule because of the government's limited
appellate rights in a criminal case. But the 9th Circuit pointed out that
this position of the government is no less favorable than in the usual case
of an adverse ruling on a point of evidence during a criminal trial, from
which ruling the government would have no immediate, and possibly no
future right of appeal.
On the other hand, the lack of power in the state to appeal was held,
in State v. Fleckinger,18 to entitle the state to certiorari to test the valid-
ity of the lower court's action ordering the return of lottery para-
phernalia alleged to have been illegally and unlawfully seized without a
warrant, and to prohibit the return of such paraphernalia, so that the
state might use it in evidence in the pending prosecution. This line of
reasoning seems to be similar to that in the Cefaratti, Stephenson, and
Carroll cases.
Where the motion to suppress and return is made by a stranger to
the criminal action or to the intended suit, the order granting or denying
his motion is final as to him, for unless he can sue out a writ of error,
he would be remediless. But where one is a party to a criminal action
pending, and petitions for the return of property that has been seized and
which is to be used in evidence upon the trial of the criminal action, the
ruling upon his petition has been held to be upon an intervening matter,
and is not a final decision.19 The court in the Ponder case said that
where a stranger makes the motion, the order is final. But it is difficult
to see how the 4th Circuit could use this as an illustration of the indi-
viduality of the motion in that case. There it was said that because the
materials in question were public records, and because North Carolina
would have locus standi before the court to inquire of the future use or
disposition of them, and because some of the records had been returned
upon the application of public officials this case is akin to those applying
the rule that when a stranger to the litigation makes the motion, it is con-
sidered final and appealable. In this case, the applicant was not a
stranger, but was one of the defendants. Even if there were other appli-
cations for the suppression and return made by a stranger to the criminal
action, the ruling on the motion is final and appealable only as to him
because he is remediless unless he can sue out a writ of error, while the
parties to the litigation could wait until a final determination of the case
pending.
The court in the principal case also suggests the title and terms of
the impounding order as being among the "circumstances" indicating
18152 La. 337, 93 So. 115 (1922).
19 Cogen v. United States, 278 U. S. 221 (1929) ; United States v. Rosenwasser,
145 F. 2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1944); United States v. Maresca, 266 Fed. 713 (D. C.
Cir. 1920) ; Coastline Lumber & Supply Co. v. United States, 259 Fed. 847 (2d
Cir. 1919).
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the independent character of the motion to suppress and return the im-
pounded materials. But the court in Coastline Lumber & Supply Co. v.
United States,20 in which the defendant suggested that the title of his
petition indicated its independent character, rejected this contention and
said that the material consideration is whether the demand was made in
the criminal action or an independent proceeding. A defendant (and
the Government?) cannot make an interlocutory order final by the
choice of any particular form of words in its title.
The court in the Ponder case also distinguished United States v.
Williams,21 in which the same circuit in 1953 held the order for suppres-
sion and return of illicit whiskey not to be final, but a part of the pending
criminal prosecution. In that case, the motion to suppress and return
was made before the finding of the indictment, and was ruled on after
the indictment was brought. But the court said that the time of making
the motion and bringing the indictment is not the sole criterion for
deciding whether the motion is plenary or interlocutory. It was held
interlocutory because the test is whether the order is one of permanent
"general outlawry" against all use of documents involved, and since its
purpose was merely to prevent their use in a particular criminal proceed-
ing then pending, it was interlocutory and not appealable.
Granting the distinction that in the Williams case the materials were
private property and in the principal case they are public records, does
not the fact that they were public materials make it more evident that the
motion here was part of the criminal case? The defendants did not want
the materials back, they no longer held the public office, and wasn't the
purpose of their motion merely to prevent the use of the materials in
the particular criminal proceeding then pending? Also, how could this
be a "general outlawry" against all use of the documents involved when
the court itself said that they were papers to which every citizen of the
State would be entitled to reasonable access?
The court in the Ponder case further stated that the order was appeal-
able by virtue of section 3731, title 28, United States Code Annotated
which provides for appeal by the government in the Court of Appeals.
"... From a decision or judgment (of the district court) setting aside
or dismissing any indictment . . . except where a direct appeal to the
Supreme Court. . . ." is permitted. Although the indictment here was
not dismissed, the court said that the order immobilized further prosecu-
tion on the indictment, and had the effect of dismissing the indictment
and that there is no reason to insist on the formality of dismissing it
before allowing appeal under the section.
The 4th Circuit's position on this point is disturbing. Aside from
2o259 Fed. 847 (2d Cir. 1919).
2'227 F. 2d 149 (4th Cir. 1955).
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the government's limited appellate rights in criminal cases, some circuits
and the United States Supreme Court have gone to great lengths in
curbing the tendency to widen the ambit for appeals by the government
in criminal cases. In United States v. Mattingly22 and Nelson v. United
States,23 the D. C. Circuit held an order entered on a motion to suppress
and return to be interlocutory even though the order was made before
indictment and ruled on after indictment was brought. This view was
impliedly affirmed by the United States Supreme Court when it was
noted, "after indictment and before trial, an order denying a defendant's
motion to suppress is not final and not appealable. We follow that view
because it serves the strong policy against piecemeal appeals. These
considerations of policy are especially compelling in the administration
of criminal justice. An accused is entitled to scrupulous observance
of constitutional safeguards. But encouragement of delay is fatal to the
vindication of the criminal law. Bearing the discomfiture and cost of
a prosecution for crime even by an innocent person is one of the painful
obligations of citizenship. The correctness of a trial court's rejection
even of a constitutional claim made by the accused in the process of
prosecution must await his conviction before its reconsideration by an
appellate tribunal.
'24
Also, in United States v. Janitz,2 5 a motion to suppress after the in-
dictment had been brought, was sustained, and the government went to
trial and acknowledged that it did not have enough evidence to establish
the charges of illicit manufacture of alcoholic beverages. The defendant's
motion for judgment of acquittal was denied. But seeking a way- to
provide for an appellate review of the ruling upon the suppression of
evidence, the judge entered an order of dismissal of the indictment and
the government appealed. The question raised was whether the district
court's order was a judgment quashing, setting aside, or sustaining a
demurrer or plea in abatement to any indictment. The 3rd Circuit held
it was none of these since the defendants made no attack on the indict-
ment. The government's case failed because it had no evidence to
support it, and the court said that this was not the kind of judgment
to which the Criminal Appeals statute is directed.
The 4th Circuit in the principal case cited the Cefaratti, Stephenson,
and Carroll cases, discussed above, and United States v. BianCo,26 as
authority from other circuits in allowing the government to appeal an
22 285 Fed. 922 (D. C. Cir. 1922).
23 208 F. 2d 505 (D. C. Cir. 1953).
"Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323, 327 (1940). See also Swift &
Co. v. Compania Caribe, 339 U. S. 684 (1950) ; Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan
Corp., 337 U. S. 541 (1948).2 161 F. 2d 19 (3d Cir. 1947).
20189 F. 2d 716 (3d Cir. 1951).
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order suppressing the evidence. In the latter case, the petition to
suppress and return seized lottery materials was filed-as a separate
proceeding-and the order denying the petition was entered, before
return of any indictment, clearly making it an independent proceeding,
and clearly distinguishing it from the principal case. The other three
cases, all from the D. C. Circuit, held that an order which does not
terminate an action but is, on the contrary, made in the course of an
action, has the finality that is required for appellate review under the
federal judiciary code section governing appellate jurisdiction of Courts
of Appeals, if (1) it has a final and irreparable effect on the rights of the
parties, being a final disposition of a claimed right; (2) it is too im-
portant to be denied review; and (3) claimed right is not an ingredient
of the cause of action and does not require consideration with it.
The authority of these cases seems questionable inasmuch as these
cases rely on case law and not statute.27 At common law, and today in
the absence of statutes, only a final judgment may be reviewed by way of
appeal and writ of error.28 Does the fact that without the evidence the
prosecution could not continue, make an otherwise interlocutory order a
final one? Is the fact that the question is too important to be denied
review sufficient to turn an interlocutory order into a final one? And
thirdly, who would deny that the claimed right here (that evidence is
inadmissible in the pending criminal prosecution) is not an ingredient of
the cause of action and does not require consideration with it?
As to the 4th Circuit's position on appealability by virtue of section
3731, title 28, United States Code Annotated, the court in the Janitz
case thought it necessary to appellate review that it go through the
"formality" of dismissing the indictment.
Although it seems unjust to require the government to wait until
a time when review of a suppressing order would be useless, such a
defect is largely the result of the policy which seeks efficient litigation.20
Resolution of the dilemma should come not from the judiciary but from
the legislature, which promotes that policy. In addition, the courts
have consistently guarded against an extension to the government of
the right to appeal from an adverse ruling in a criminal case unless
there is specific statutory sanction for it.8 0
RICHARD R. LEE.
= See note 13 supra.
28 See note 2 supra.
29 Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323 (1940).
o United States v. Banges, 144 U. S. 310 (1892).
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Criminal Law-Requisites for Forfeiture of Vehicles Transporting
Liquor in Violation of Law
From the early common law, the courts have lent added efforts to
the cause of deterring violations of the criminal law by providing for con-
demnation and forfeiture of various instrumentalities used in the com-
mission of crime. Today the Congress and the State Legislatures have,
for the most part, adopted this policy by providing for forfeiture of vari-
ous instrumentalities used in commission of crime as a specific penalty
thereof. However, as a general rule, the legislative adoptions of the
common law policy of forfeiture differ from the common law in one im-
portant respect: American Jurisprudence' points out that "forfeiture in
many cases of felony did not attach at the early English common law
where the proceeding was in rem until the offender was convicted."
But, "the ancient doctrine requiring conviction of a personal offender
does not apply to seizure and forfeiture created by statutes in rem, for
the reason that the thing in such case is primarily considered as the
offender or rather that the offense is attached primarily to the thing. ... "
The practical importance of such a distinction may be illustrated in
this manner: a culprit is engaged in violation of the state law by trans-
porting non-tax paid liquor in an automobile. Upon being overtaken by
law enforcement officers, the culprit determines discretion to be the better
part of valor, abandons the automobile and its cargo and flees to safety.
The officers are thus left with an automobile which is clearly being
used in violation of the criminal law, but with no criminal defendant. It
will be observed that under the common law, it would not be possible to
proceed against the automobile in this case since there is no criminal
defendant, but that under the in rem statutory type proceeding the ab-
sence of a criminal defendant would not be fatal.
In North Carolina the above illustration apparently occurs quite fre-
quently. Although N. C. has a Statute providing for forfeiture of auto-
mobiles used in illegal transportation of liquor, uncertainty of its applica-
tion to this type of situation has created something of a hiatus in the
law, with attendant confusion on the part of law enforcement officers.3
G. S. § 18-6 provides in part as follows:
123 Am. JUR., Forfeitures and Penalties § 6 (1939). Dobbins's Distillery v.
United States, 96 U. S. 395, 399 (1877) ; Various items of Personal Property v.
United States, 282 U. S. 577, 580 (1931).
'United States v. The Ruth Mildred, 286 U. S. 67, 69 (1932) ; Commonwealth
v. Certain Motor Vehicle, 261 Mass. 504, 508, 159 N. E. 613, 614 (1928).
Based on numerous inquiries directed to the Institute of Government, Chapel
Hill, N. C., from Law Enforcement Officers. N. C. Gen. Stat. § 18-6 appears to be
the only statute in N. C. which provides for a judicial forfeiture of articles used in
the commission of crime as a specific penalty thereof.
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"When any officer of the law shall discover any person in the act
of transporting in violation of the law, intoxicating liquor in any
* . .automobile ... or other vehicle, it shall be his duty to seize
any and all intoxicating liquor found therein . .. he shall take
possession of the vehicle ... and shall arrest any person in charge
thereof. Such officer shall at once proceed against the person
arrested.., said vehicle.., shall be returned to owner upon exe-
cution by him of a good and valid bond ... to return said prop-
erty to the custody of said official on the day of trial to abide the
Judgment of the court. All liquor seized under this section shall
be held and shall upon the acquittal of the person so charged be
returned to established owner, and shall within ten days of con-
viction. . . be destroyed ... unless the claimant can show that the
property seized is his property, and that the same was used in
transporting liquor without his knowledge and consent . . .The
court shall order a sale by public auction of the property seized."
Although the North Carolina Supreme Court has not had occasion
for a direct holding on whether G. S.§ 18-6 would authorize the state to
proceed directly against the automobile in the absence of a conviction of
the criminal defendant, there is dicta which gives a strong indication
that the state cannot do so. In State v. Maynor4 where the defendant
had been convicted of illegal transportation of non-tax paid liquor it was
held that the court may at a subsequent term enter an order nunc pro
tunc for the forfeiture and sale of the vehicle used for such transporta-
tion under G. S. § 18-6. The court then said, "The order of condemna-
tion and sale of the vehicle seized is perforce no part of the personal
judgment against the accused, albeit both are dependent upon his con-
viction."5  (Italics added.) Then in a later case 6 the court ruled that
where the jury had found the defendant guilty of transporting non-tax
paid liquor and where defendant had admitted ownership, "all the
essential facts necessary to authorize confiscation of defendant's auto-
mobile were before the court."' 7
Whether this interpretation of G. S. § 18-6 is right or wrong such
language has necessitated the storing of each car involved in the situation
where it has not been possible to proceed against the driver, with the
result that there are many cars stored in North Carolina today with in
rem proceedings made impossible by such interpretation.
It is of interest to contrast the language of G. S. § 18-6 with that of
other federal and state statutes relating to condemnation and forfeiture
'226 N. C. 645, 39 S. E. 2d 833 (1946).
Id. at 646, 39 S. E. 2d at 834.
C State v. Vanhoy, 230 N. C. 162, 52 S. E. 2d 278 (1949).
7Id. at 165, 52 S. E. 2d at 280.
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proceedings. For instance 18 United States Code § 3618 states "any
conveyance, whether used by the owner or another in introducing or at-
tempting to introduce intoxicants into the Indian country or into other
places where the introduction is prohibited by treaty or enactment of
Congress, shall be subject to seizure, libel and forfeiture." In United
States v. One Chevrolet Coupe,8 the court interpreting the statute, held
automobiles used to introduce intoxicating liquors into Indian country
may be seized and forfeited regardless of the owner's innocence. "It is
the automobile itself that is the offender and it is immaterial what the cir-
cumstances are."
Similar language is found in 46 United States Code § 325 dealing
with licensed vessels: "whenever any licensed vessel . . . is employed in
any trade whereby the revenue of the United States is defrauded ... or
found with merchandise of foreign growth . . . or any taxable domestic
spirits, wines, or other alcoholic liquors, on which the duties or taxes
have not been paid or secured to be paid, such vessel with her tackle,
apparel and furniture, and the cargo, found on board shall be forfeited."
In United States v. The Ruth Mildred,'° the court held that for breach
of the navigation laws under 46 United States Code § 325 the proceedings
are strictly in rem and are not dependent upon a preliminary adjudica-
tion of personal guilt.
United States v. 25 Packages of Panama Hats,"' was a proceeding
to forfeit, for fraud of foreign consignors, goods not technically entered
at the New York Customshouse. The Tariff Act 12 declared, "That if any
consignor . . . shall enter . . . into the commerce of the United States
any imported merchandise by means of any fraudulent or false invoice,
or shall be guilty of any willful act or omission ... whereby ... United
States . . : shall ... be deprived of lawful duties, such merchandise ...
shall be forfeited. . . ." The Court held that there is no inconsistency
in proceeding against the res if the wrongdoer is beyond the jurisdiction
of the court. The very fact that the criminal provision of the statute does
not operate extra-territorially against the consignor, would be a reason
why the goods themselves should be subjected to forfeiture on arrival
here. The consignor's absence would not relieve the goods from the
liability to be forfeited.' 3 There are other cases to the same effect.' 4
8 58 F. 2d 235 (9th Cir. 1932).
OId. at 236.10286 U. S. 67 (1932).
1231 U. S. 358 (1913).
"Tariff Act of Aug. 5, 1909, 36 Stat. 11, 97 Repealed, 38 Stat. 201 (1913).
"231 U. S. at 362.
"In an early federal case the property seized was a distillery in the hands of a
lessee. The acts of the lessee with intent to defeat the revenue were unknown to
the owner. Nevertheless it was held that the distillery was subject to forfeiture.
The court said: "A forfeiture proceeding under R. S. § 3257 or 3281 is in rem.
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It may be noted that in the above statutes there has been no mention
of prior conviction of the defendant before forfeiture proceedings may be
instituted, and likewise the courts have not construed them as demand-
ing such conviction. This type of statute is not confined to the federal
codes, but may be found in many state statutes. A Kansas statuteI
states, "If the court shall find that said intoxicating liquors or other
property . . . being used in maintaining a common nuisance, he shall
adjudge forfeited so much thereof as he shall find was being so used...."
In State v. McManus'0 it was argued by defendant that before the prop-
erty could be seized and condemned under this statute there must be a
conviction of the person who unlawfully used such property. The court
in its opinion categorically said, "we don't agree." "The property so
kept and used is tried in a proceeding in rem, regardless of whether there
has been an arrest or conviction of the person charged with maintaining
such place."'17 It was also pointed out in this case that this was the
practice in the courts of the United States where goods have been for-
feited for non-payment of customs revenues.' 8
The code of Virginia'0 states, "if such illegally acquired alcoholic
beverages . . . be found therein . . . shall seize the same, and shall also
seize and take possession of such conveyance or vehicle and deliver the
same.. . to the sheriff of the county ... taking receipt therefor.... The
officer making such seizure shall also arrest all persons found in charge
of such vehicle . . . within ten days after receiving notice of any such
seizure, the attorney for the Commonwealth shall file in the name of the
Commonwealth, any information against the seized property.... Such
information shall allege the seizure and set forth in general terms the
grounds of forfeiture of the seized property, and shall pray that the
same be condemned and sold .... " In Ives v. Commonwealth20 the court
held that a proceeding under this section to have an automobile con-
demned and sold because of a violation of the Alcoholic Beverage Con-
trol Act is a proceeding in rem rather than in personam and is a civil
It is the property which is proceeded against and by resort to a legal fiction, held
guilty and condemned as though it were conscious, instead of inanimate and insenti-
ent. In a criminal prosecution it is the wrongdoer in person who is proceeded
against, convicted and punished. The forfeiture is no part of the punishment for
the criminal offense." Dobbins Distillery v. U. S. 96 U. S. 395 (1877). Similar lan-
guage may be found in a later federal case brought in a libel proceeding under the
internal revenue laws. The court held that the dismissal of the criminal actioh
does not bar the libel proceeding against the vehicle. Sneed v. U. S., 217 F. 2d 912
(4th cir. 1954).
"
5 KAN. GEN. STAT. § 2496 (1942).
1865 Kan. 720, 70 Pac. 700 (1902).
' Id. at 725, 70 Pac. at 701.
': Origet v. United States, 125 U. S. 240 (1888).
"VA. Co, ANN. § 4-56 (1950).
.0 182 Va. 17, 27 S. E. 2d 906 (1943).
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action against an automobile and not a criminal action against a person.
South Carolina and Tennessee have statutes similar in effect. 21
It has been suggested above that the North Carolina Court will not
construe G. S. § 18-6 as allowing forfeiture proceedings before criminal
conviction of the defendant as the above federal and state courts have
done.
One clue to our court's interpretation of G. S. § 18-6 may be found in
the Federal Courts construction of § 26 of the National Prohibition Act 22
which our act very closely follows. It provided "when the commissioner
*.. shall discover any person in the act of transporting in violation of the
law, intoxicating liquors in any ... automobile . . . or other vehicle, it
shall be his duty to seize any and all intoxicating liquors found therein
... he shall take possession of the vehicle ... and arrest the person in
charge thereof. Such officer shall at once proceed against the person ar-
rested . .. but the said vehicle shall be returned to the owner upon
execution by him of a good and valid bond... and to return said prop-
erty to custody of said officer on the day of the trial to abide the judg-
ment of the court. The court upon conviction of the person so arrested
shall order the liquor destroyed, and unless good cause to contrary is
shown by the owner, shall order a sale by public auction of property
seized." In construing this statute the court in United States v.
Shtsser23 held, to authorize the forfeiture of a vehicle as having been
used for illegal transportation of liquor under this section, the person
in charge must previously have been arrested and convicted. And in the
case of "The J. Dutffy"2 4 the court said under this section, "conviction
of the person in charge of a vehicle, or the master of a vessel, seized
while being used for this illegal transportation of liquor, is a condition
precedent to the forfeiture of the vehicle or vessel. And in United States
v. The Ruth Mildred25 the court in distinguishing 46 United States Code
§ 325 from § 26 of the National Prohibition Act said that in the former
statute her guilt was not affected, was neither enlarged or diminished,
by the fact that the cargo happened to be one of intoxicating liquor.
The government made out a case of forfeiture when there was proof that
the cargo was other than fish. "Forfeiture under § 26 of The National
Prohibition Act is one of the consequences of a successful criminal prose-
cution of a personal offender, and is ancillary thereto. While forfeiture
under 46 United States Code § 325 for breach of navigation laws is
strictly in rem and is not dependent upon a preliminary adjudication of
personal guilt.' ' 26
2 S. C. CODE LAWS §§ 4-11, 4-115 (1952) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-622 (1955).
.' 27 USCA § 40. Repealed 49 Stat. 872 (1935).
-270 Fed. 818 (S. D. Ohio 1921). 2 F. 2d 426 (D. Conn. 1926).
25 286 U. S. 67 (1932).
20 Id. at 69.
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Thus the similarity between the two statutes and the respective cases
construing same are clearly evident.
While it might be possible for our court to decide that G. S. § 18-6
does allow direct proceedings against the automobile in the absence of
arrest and conviction of the criminal offender without doing violence to
the language of the act, a literal reading of the statute seems clearly to
lead to a contrary conclusion. There is, however, language in G. S. § 18-6
which could be seized upon to support condemnation and forfeiture pro-
ceedings without arrest and conviction. That language is "if no one
shall be found claiming the ... vehicle, the taking of the same with a
description thereof, shall be advertized in some newspaper ... and if no
claimant shall appear within ten days after the last publication . . . the
-property shall be sold.. .. "
However, to interpret the above language as allowing condemnation
and forfeiture proceedings without prior arrest and conviction of the
culprit would be to take it out of context. For unlike many Federal
statutes, G. S. § 18-6 protects the rights of innocent owners and creditors
in the offending property. This section of the statute immediately pre-
cedes the above language, "and the officer . . . after deducting the ex-
penses of keeping the property . . . shall pay all liens . . . which are
established . . . and as having been created without the lienor having
any notice that the carrying vehicle was being used for illegal transporta-
tion of liquor .... All liens against property sold under the provisions
of this section shall be transferred from the property to the proceeds
of the sale of the property: if however no one shall be found claiming...."
Thus the entire meaning of the phrase beginning "if no one shall be
found claiming" is in all probability referring to the absence of a claimant
as distinguished from the absence of a driver or criminal defendant.
Therefore in view of the literal language of the statute, and the in-
terpretation given an almost identical federal statute, by the federal
courts, the dicta found in the several North Carolina cases 27 suggesting
that condemnation and forfeiture proceedings under G. S. § 18-6 are de-
pendent upon arrest and conviction of the criminal offender seem sound.
Inasmuch as the offense of violating the liquor law must be proved
prior to a forfeiture of the vehicle under either the typical in rem pro-
ceeding or the proceeding subsequent to the criminal conviction as con-
templated by G. S. § 18-6, it would seem that either statutory policy
proceeds upon an equal regard of the rights of owners.28 For under the
27 State v. Maynor, 226 N. C. 645, 39 S. E. 2d 833 (1946) ; State v. Vanhoy, 230
N. C. 162, 52 S. E. 2d 278 (1949).28 However, it might be noted that one difference between the two proceedings is
that under the in rem proceedings only the civil burden of proof, a preponderance
of the evidence, would be necessary to sustain a forfeiture, while under N. C. GEN.
STAT. § 18-6, assuming a conviction of the criminal defendant is necessary for for-
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present interpretation of our statute, a fleeing culprit may not only
escape criminal conviction, but also might ultimately regain possession
of his automobile.
Thus the writer suggests that the legislature take cognizance of the
various questions raised from the language of G. S. § 18-6 and the ulti-
mate confusion resulting therefrom, with a view towards clarification, or
better still an adherence to what seems to be the general trend toward
allowing condemnation and forfeiture proceedings without regard to
prior arrest and convictions of the criminal defendant.
THOMAS C. CREASY, JR.
Evidence-Admissibility of Truth Serum Test Results
The Truth Serum Test1 has received practically no judicial recogni-
tion since its recent debut into the truth discovery field. The results of
this test, usually taken voluntarily by the accused, 2 have continually
been excluded by the courts primarily because statements or confessions
made while examinees are under the influence of such drugs as sodium
amytal and sodium pentothol are (1) unreliable,3 (2) self-serving or
feiture, the required burden of proof to support forfeiture is proof beyond a reason-
able doubt.
I This term has been frequently applied even though actually misleading, for the
drugs are neither serum, nor do they always produce the "empirical" truth. After
the drug is injected, the patient falls into a state of partial consciousness (twi-
light sleep) and becomes susceptible to interrogation until recovery which usually
requires several hours. The drug eliminates repressive influences and ordinary
restraints which under normal conditions lead to embarrassment and fear. Halluci-
nations in some instances have occurred. After recovery the patient is said to
have no recollection of the transpired interview. The technical label for such an
examination is narcoanalysis. Dession, Freedman, Donnelly & Redlich, Drug- -
duced Revelation and Criminal Investigation, 62 YALE L. J. 315 (1953) ; Muehl-
berger, Interrogation Under Drug Influence, 42 J. CRIm. L., C. & P. S. 513 (1951).
'Assuming defendant confesses during drug-induced interview to which he
voluntarily submits, no claim of self-incrimination would bar such confession from
evidence; however, such confessions are at present deemed unreliable, and hence,
inadmissible. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 841 (a) (1940). Evidence obtained from
these interviews or from clues tendered therein, most likely would be admissible
as would confessions given after presentation of test results to the examinee. Note,
62 YALE L. J. 315, 337 (1953) ; STANSBURY, EVIDENCE, § 186 (1946). Tests taken
involuntarily must necessarily raise issues of self-incrimination and illegally ob-
tained confessions. Such confessions will of course be held inadmissible when ex-
tracted while examinee is under the influence of injected drugs. Whether evidence
discovered in such interview or whether confessions induced by test results would
be held admissible will depend upon the laws applicable to particular jurisdictions
in question. Despres, Legal Aspects of Drug-Induced Statements, 14 U. CHI. L.
REV. 601 (1946). See, Note 32 N. C L. REv. 98 (1954); 3 WVmmaOam, EvmiE NE§ 859 (1940) ; SrANSBURY, EVIDENCE §§ 182-86 (1946). In regard to due process
see Silving, Testing of the Unconscious in Criminal Cases, 69 HARv. L. REV. 683
(1955).
'State v. Thomas, 79 Ariz. 158, 285 P. 2d 612 (1955) ; State v. Lindemuth, 56
N. M. 257, 243 P. 2d 325 (1952) ; Henderson v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 45, 230 P. 2d
495 (1951), cert. denied, 342 U. S. 898 (1951). See notes 62 YALE L. J. 315
(1953); 46 J. Cii. L., C. & P. S. 259 (1956); annot., 23 A. L. R. 2d 1306
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conjectural, 4 (3) violations of the hearsay rule,5 (4) and once because
no foundation for such evidence had been laid.6
Both legal and medical experts seem to agree that truth drugs, as
such, have not transcended the experimental stages.7  These drugs are
not reliable to the extent that they will force the examinee to tell the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. On the contrary, not
only are some examinees able to retain the deception of fabrication, but
some neurotics are apt to give false confessions.8
When confronted with the truth serum test courts have frequently
referred to Frye v. United States,' where results of a lie-detector test
were offered into evidence for the first time and refused because the
technique had not yet gained the general acceptance of psychiatry, the
particular field in which it belonged.
It remains to be seen however, whether drugs such as sodium amytal
have become sufficiently established in psychiatric medicine to receive
judicial recognition for limited purposes, i.e., foundation material upon
which expert opinions can be based regarding issues of sanity and credi-
bility, as contrasted with the truthfulness of various claims of guilt or
of innocence. It is true that these drugs are currently being utilized by
the medical professions for both analysis and curative treatments.
Whether this will constitute a general acceptance in application of the
Frye test for these limited purposes the courts have not yet fully indi-
cated.
(1952); People v. McCracken, 39 Cal. 2d 336, 246 P. 2d 913 (1952) (matter of
court's discretion); and State v. Hudson, 314 Mo. 599, 289 S. W. 920 (1926)
(where such evidence was termed "clap-trap" and as being "unworthy of serious
consideration").
" People v. Cullen, 37 Cal. 2d 614, 234 P. 2d 201 (1951) ; People v. McNichol,
100 Cal. App. 2d 554, 224 P. 2d 21 (1950). For disapproval of this rule see
STANSBURY, EvIDENcE § 140 (1946); 52 W. VA. L. REv. 81 (1950).
People v. Cullen, 37 Cal. 2d 614, 234 P. 2d 201 (1951) ; People v. McNichol,
100 Cal. App. 2d 554, 224 P. 2d 21 (1950). For application of the hearsay rule
to these cases see 62 YALE L. J. 315, 323-24 (1953).
6 Orange v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 423, 61 S. E. 2d 267 (1950). In rejecting
the evidence the court commented, "The record does not show the drug that was
used or the quantity of it that was administered, nor is there any evidence with
respect to the value or the reliability of the tests. The answers given by the
defendant are at times maudlin and at times obviously self-serving and indicative
of a conscious purpose to avoid self-incrimination."
This case is also interesting from the standpoint of stipulation. The defendant
and state prosecutor agreed that defendant be examined under drugs. The court
refused the evidence because there had been no agreement to allow the results
into evidence, inferring that stipulation agreements would be recognized as in the
lie-detector field. For a stipulation in a lie-detector case see State v. Lowry, 163
Kan. 622, 185 P. 2d 147 (1947); and for validity of stipulation agreements, 46
HARv. L. REv. 138 (1932).
'3 WimoRE, EvrDENcE § 998 (1948) ; 20 Amt. JUR., Evidence § 762 (1939);
annot., 23 A. L. R. 2d 1308 (1952).
846 J. CRIm. L., C. & P. S. 259 (1956); 62 YALE L. J. 315 (1953). Contra
42 J. CRIM. L., C & P. S. 513 (1952).
p293 Fed. 1013 (D. C. Cir. 1923).
[Vol. 35
NOTES AND COMMENTS
In People v. Esposito, ° the defendants pleaded insanity to the charge
of murder. Upon their own motion they were committed to the observa-
tion of court appointed psychiatrists, who in the course of the examina-
tion injected metrazol and sodium amytal. After proof that such drugs
were frequently used in psychiatric examinations, one psychiatrist was
permitted to testify that in his opinion, based upon narcoanalysis, the
defendants were sane at the time of the alleged crime. The Court of
Appeals of New York held on appeal that in claiming the defense of in-
sanity the defendants ". . . were subject to the use of methods set up
objectively by the medical profession for the proper determination of
such claims. . ... l
This same court ten years later in People v. Ford,12 allowed a psychi-
atrist to testify after three interviews that in his opinion the defendant,
being charged with first degree murder, did not have the mental ability
for premeditation. However, the witness was not permitted .to testify
regarding the second interview in which he had administered sodium.,
amytal. The basis for the court's ruling seemed to be that no New York
court had ever permitted such into evidence before.
The dissenting opinion, ably written by Judge Desmond, reasoned
that in all probability the expert had based his conclusion upon all three
interviews regardless of the court's exclusion of the second. Therefore,
continued the dissent, the excluded testimony should have been ad-
mitted since ". . the jury are entitled to all the facts on which the
expert bases his opinion."' 3 The dissent also pointed out that the sole
issue was one of mental condition, the defendant having admitted the
crime prior to the exclusion, and not whether the defendant was guilty
of fabrication. On the basis of this distinction, it seems consistent to
speculate that drugs such as sodium amytal, although not generally
accepted for one purpose, might be acceptable for another.
Of all the truth serum cases, a California case, People v. Jones,
14
appears to be the most controversial. Here the defendant was indicted
for violation of Section 288 of the California Penal Code:
"Any person who shall wilfully and lewdly commit any lewd or
lascivious act ... upon or with the body ... of a child under the
age of fourteen years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to,
or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of such person
or of such child, shall be guilty of a felony."
Prior California cases had held that this statute required proof of a
10287 N. Y. 389, 39 N. E. 2d 925 (1942).11Id. at 397-98, 39 N. E. 2d at 928.
12304 N. Y. 679, 107 N. E. 2d 595 (1952).
13Id. at 682, 107 N. E. 2d at 597.
"42 Cal. 2d 219, 266 P. 2d 38 (1954).
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specific intent. The defense produced a psychiatrist willing to testify
that (1) he had administered sodium pentothol to the defendant for
purposes of interrogation, (2) that it was his opinion based upon the
results of said interview that the defendant was not a sexual deviate and
that he was incapable of having the necessary intent. Because of the
trial court's exclusion of this evidence, the conviction was reversed on
appeal. After ruling that the evidence was admissible as circumstantial
or character evidence' 5 and that the exclusion thereof amounted to re-
versible error, the Supreme Court of California held that the results
of a sodium pentothol examination are only improper ". . if the state-
ments are offered for the purpose of proving the truth of the matter
asserted . . .here the proffered evidence was not the answers of Jones
to certain questions, but the interrogator's expert analysis of those
answers for the purpose of determining whether Jones was a sexual
deviate ... "16
Lindsey v. United States,'7 the first federal case involving sodium
amytal, possibly extends the Jones rationale even further to credibility
and character traits of a prosecuting witness. The defendant was in-
dicted in the District Court of Alaska on three counts of statutory rape
and three counts of sodomy committed on the person of his fifteen year
old adopted daughter. The prosecuting witness testified on direct
examination as to the offenses charged. On cross-examination the de-
fense sought to impeach the state's witness by introducing into evidence
certain letters and an affidavit wherein she had retracted all original
accusations. The prosecution then called a qualified psychiatrist at-
tempting to rehabilitate its witness. The expert testified, over de-
fendant's objection, as to a sodium amytal examination of said witness
upon which he based his opinion that the state's witness had been telling
the truth on direct examination. He testified that the witness was not
a fabricator or liar, and that she could not have gained the information
she had related to him in the examination unless she had personally
experienced such acts. In the process of delivering this testimony the
" Prior to the Jones case, California had followed the orthodox rule that char-
acter must be proved by general reputation. See 42 CALIF. L. REV. 880 (1954).
For contrary views over Jones decision see 102 U. PA. L. REv. 980 (1954) and
103 U. PA. L. REV. 999 (1955).
1642 Cal. 2d at 226, 266 P. 2d at 43 (1954). But see State v. Sinnott, 43 N. J.
Super. 1, 127 A. 2d 424 (1956), where the defendant was convicted of sodomy.
The testimony of a psychiatrist who had examined the defendant while under the
influence of sodium pentothol was refused by the trial court. The record indicates
the psychiatrist would have testified that the examinee exhibited no manifestations
of homosexual perversions, nor was he a sexual deviate. The Superior Court of
New Jersey in affirming the conviction expressly rejected the Jones decision, ad-
hering to the orthodox rule pertaining to character evidence, see note 15 supra.
The court further maintained that the use of narcoanalysis should be limited
to issues of insanity.
" 237 F. 2d 893 (9th Cir. 1956).
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psychiatrist was permitted to explain the use and operation of the truth
serum test (actually referring to it as such), to explain that its effect
would prevent this witness from falsifying, and finally, to-play an actual
tape recording of the interview to the jury. The court instructed the
jury to consider the recording only as corroborating the testimony of the
state's witness. The United States Court of Appeals reversed the
lower court's decision because prior consistent statements are not ad-
missible ". . except in cases where it affirmatively appears that the
prior consistent statement was made at a time when the declarant had
no motive to fabricate."'' 3 The court rejected the government's con-
tention that sodium amytal would destroy the witness' ability and mo-
tive to fabricate, thus adhering to the current weight of authority that
sodium amytal, when used as a truth drug, is neither trustworthy nor
reliable.
Although the introduction of the same testimony in relation to credi-
bility was considered, the court specifically declined to make any ruling
thereon. The court did comment that ".. . [t] here has been ... an in-
creasing tendency to allow expert psychiatric opinion testimony as to
the credibility and character traits of a witness ... and the need is said
to be especially great in prosecutions for rape where the guilt of the
accused is often dependent solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of
an under-age girl."' 91
After assuming arguendo that the expert opinions, based upon
sodium amytal examinations, would be admissible for limited purposes.
i.e., credibility, the court stated that the playing of the tape recording to
the jury would amount to reversible error because of the difficulty that
it would have in properly evaluating the evidence. The court criticized
both the fact that the expert witness in testifying had referred to the
drug as Truth Serum, and, a fortiori, that said expert was permitted
to expound upon the pseudoscientificus aspect of the drug whereby the
examinee was bound to tell the truth.
Whether the courts come to embrace the liberal Jones attitude or
not, the logical inference to be drawn is that the propounder of such
evidence would greatly increase the possibility of its admission relating
to issues of insanity and credibility if reference to such terms as "Truth,"
"Test," "Truth-Test," "Truth Serum," were completely abandoned and
"Id. at 895. This seems to be the prevailing rule, 58 Am. JUR., Witnesses
§ 825 (1948) ; 4 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 1126 (1940). North Carolina is contra.
STANSBURY, EVIDENCE §§ 51, 52 (1946).
"
0Id. at 897. Also see United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559 (1950), aff'd,
185 F. 2d 822 (1950), cert. denied, 340 U. S. 948 (1951) ; State v. Armstrong, 232
N. C. 727, 62 S. E. 2d 50 (1950) ; 59 YALE L. J. 1324 (1950) ; 3 WIGMORE, EvI-
DENCE §§ 924(a), 997 (1940) ; 26 IND. L. J. 98 (1950) ; 39 J. CRIM. L., C. & P. S.
750 (1949).
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if the pseudoscientificus aspect were never mentioned or expounded dur-
ing the trial.
It is also apparent that the possibility of admission would be in-
creased if narcoanalysis were included in a long term examination as
opposed to one or two brief interviews. This would afford the expert
other data on which to base his opinion, thus constructing a sounder
foundation and diverting the spot-light which now seems to be focused
on the reliability of truth drugs. 20
In conclusion, narcoanalysis seems to be generally recognized by the
courts and favored by legal writers when utilized in cases of insanity.
There is conflict, however, in relation to milder mental conditions. Some
courts seem to be willing to extend the use of such drugs into the area
of credibility and character evidence both of the accused and of the
witness; while others, as indicated, are not so willing. In addition, local
rules pertaining to exclusion of evidence will continue to be an im-
portant variant in regard to the use and acceptance of narcoanalysis, in
that such rules will encourage greater court discretion.
J. N. GOLDIN1G.
Guardian and Ward-Dissent by an Incompetent Widow Through
Her Guardian
The guardian of an incompetent widow has many problems, a few
of which may best be pointed out in a hypothetical situation. As-
sume a seventy-year old incompetent widow has a personal estate of
$100,000.00. The husband left no children or collateral heirs. His
estate, valued at $500,000.00, is predominantly personalty such as stock
in his family corporation. Under his will the widow is to receive the
income from one fourth of this estate for life. The residue of the estate
is devised to what had been the widow's favorite charity before she
became incompetent. She did not make a will while she was competent.
She has a brother living who has not seen her for 10 years. What
should the widow's guardian do in regard to the will-should he dis-
sent for her, or should he elect for her to take under the will? What
standard should govern him in making this deicsion? As her brothhr
will be her heir upon her death,' how can the guardian be sure that he
has protected himself against suit by the brother since upon her death
intestate the brother would have an interest sufficient to sue?2
"State v. Sinnott, 43 N. J. Super. 1, 127 A. 2d 424 (1956); STANSBURY,
EVMENCE § 136 (1946).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 29-1, Rule 5 (1950).
- N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-57 (1953). The amount that the brother would receive
upon his sister's death would very possibly bear a direct relationship to the amount
which the widow received from her husband's estate.
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Prior to 1849 a widow in North Carolina was required to dissent
from her husband's will in person and this could not be done for her by
an attorney or, if she had one, by her guardian.3 If she was a lunatic,
no dissent could be made. In that year a statute was passed to allow
the guardian of an incompetent widow to dissent for her.4  Were the
widow competent, she could elect to take under the will or to dissent
for numerous and unknown personal reasons without having to answer
to anyone for her decision. The exercise of the right by the guardian
to dissent for the incompetent should be subject to discretionary stand-
ards, but quaere as to the standard to be applied? The statute is silent
on this point.
Two tests have been evolved elsewhere to determine when the right of
election should be exercised for an incompetent widow.5 The first is based
solely on the monetary benefit to the widow. If under a dissent she
would be entitled to a larger share than she would get under the will,
then the guardian must dissent.6 The second test repudiates the mone-
tary benefit as the sole test, and considers it only as one of the many
broad factors to be taken into account in reaching the decision.7
It seems to be a settled proposition in North Carolina that a guardian
must make certain that he receives from the administrator of an estate
the full share to which his ward is entitled." In managing his ward's
estate a guardian must act in good faith and with the care and judg-
ment that a man of ordinary prudence exercises in his own affairs.9 The
general rule is that in determining whether election by the guardian
should be for or against the will, financial benefit should be considered
as a strong, but not conclusive, reason for electing to renounce.10 No
cases have been found which state the North Carolina view on this
point.
In a 1953 Oklahoma case," the testator left his eighty-four year old
Lewis v. Lewis, 29 N. C. 72 (1846) ; Hinton v. Hinton, 28 N. C. 274 (1846).
See Bell v. Wilson, 41 N. C. 1 (1849).
'This provision may now be found in N. C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1 (1950).
'See 39 VA. L. REv. 717 (1953).
' Wentworth v. Waldron, 86 N. H. 559, 172 Atl. 247 (1934) ; Matter of Hills,
157 Misc. 109, 283 N. Y. Supp. 733 (Sup. Ct. 1936) ; German's Case, 318 Pa. 200,
178 At. 38 (1935).
'Estate of Kees, 39 Iowa 287, 31 N. W. 2d 380 (1948) ; Hogan v. Roche, 95
N. H. 368, 63 A. 2d 794 (1949) ; Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Dais, 122 N. J. Eq. 182,
192 Atl. 849 (1937) ; Hamilton Nat'l Bank v. Haynes, 180 Tenn. 247, 174 S. W. 2d
39 (1943).
' Alexander v. Alexander, 120 N. C. 472, 27 S. E. 121 (1897) ; Culp v. Lee, 109
N. C. 675, 14 S. E. 74 (1891). -See LAKE, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE METHODS
§ 523 (1952).
° N. C. GEN. STAT. § 33-20 (1950) ; Luton v. Wilcox, 83 N. C. 21 (1880).
10 In re Connor, 254 Mo. 65, 162 S. W. 252 (1914) ; Van Steenwyck v. Wash-
burn, 59 Wis. 483, 17 N. W. 289 (1883). See 74 A. L. R. 464; 147 A. L. R. 349:
57 Am. Jua., Wills § 1528. See also ATKINSON, WILLS § 138 (2d ed. 1953); 4
PAGE ON WILLS, § 1363 (Lifetime edition).
" Turner v. First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 262 P. 2d 897 (Okla. 1953).
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incompetent widow one half of his estate of approximately $600,000.00.
Her personal estate was valued at about the same amount. Since the
testator left no children, parents, brothers, or sisters, his widow would
have been entitled to the whole estate in case of intestacy under the
Oklahoma law. 12  For that reason the incompetent widow's guardian
filed a dissent to the will. The county court, however, ruled that the
widow should take under the will instead of by intestacy. Upon the
guardian's appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court said:
"We cannot agree with the argument that the election of the
court that Mrs. Turner take under the will is illegal in that it
gives her less than she would take under the law. If, when the
surviving spouse is unable to elect, the court must elect for the
incompetent survivor solely upon the basis of which election
would render greater material value, then the matter of election
would be merely a question of mathematics, a task for appraisers
and accountants. The word 'Election' means the right and power
to choose without restrictions."' 3
An earlier case in Florida1 4 had reached the same result. Although
the guardian had flied a dissent for his ward, an incompetent widow, the
Florida Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision that the
widow take the income from $400,000.00 for life as provided under her
husband's will. Her share under the intestacy laws amounted to
$2,000,000.00. In reaching this decision the court said:
'In determining what is for the best interest of the afflicted
widow, the chancellor will generally be influenced by these con-
siderations: (1) The husband's right to dispose of his estate is
limited by the right given the widow to renounce the provisions
of the will in her behalf and take under the statute but the sole
reason in law for giving the widow the right to renounce is to
insure ample provision for her personal needs and comforts. (2)
Her personal needs and comforts may not be confined to pure
84 OKLA. STAT. § 213 (1951).
"Turner v. First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 262 P. 2d 897, 903 (Okla. 1953).
1" First Nat'l Bank v. McDonald, 100 Fla. 675, 130 So. 596 (1930). In rejecting
the monetary test, the court said: "An insane widow or one acting for her does not
come into a court of equity for the purpose of renouncing her husband's will on like
terms and in the same legal status as if she were sane. As to the sane widow we
have shown that the act of renunciation is personal, absolute, and incontestible.
The same right might be exercised by her guardian for her if specifically directed
by statute; but our statute not having so directed she is left to her remedy
in a court of equity. When made by a court of equity election is no longer personal
and voluntary but must be predicated on some ground of equity shown to exist in
favor of the widow, and of which she is deprived by the will. In determining
whether such equity exists the chancellor will be guided by what is to the best
interest of the afflicted widow." Id. at 681, 130 So. at 598.
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monetary considerations. (3) The matter of enriching the
widow's estate and passing something to her kinspeople has no
place in the chancellor's consideration. (4) The kinspeople of the
wife have no claim direct or indirect on the estate of the husband.
(5) The fact that a permanently insane widow knows nothing of
the value of money, cannot use it with discretion, and has no need
for money nor property save to furnish ample comforts and needs
may be considered. (6) It may also be borne in mind that when
the husband has made ample provision for his insane wife he has
an inherent right to dispose of his property as he pleases, pro-
vided the disposition will not be contrary to public policy. Other
considerations will no doubt arise from time to time."'15
A Virgiina case'16 gives an interesting twist to this problem. There
also the incompetent widow would have taken less under the will than
under the law of intestacy. The devisees and legatees, however, made
a compromise with the widow's guardian which increased the widow's
share, although it was still smaller than her intestate share. The lower
court approved the compromise, but upon appeal the Virginia Supreme
Court said that the widow's guardian could either accept or dissent, but
that it would be beyond the power of the court to sanction a compromise.
The lack of a standard17 other than perhaps the monetary one
greatly hinders the effective use of estate planning in North Carolina by
a man who is married to an incompetent. He must leave her at least
her intestate share of his estate or else her guardian will probably be
compelled to dissent for her. Upon her death this estate will go to her
heirs-who might well not be the persons the husband would desire to
inherit any of his estate. This is particularly burdensome to a husband
whose main assets are personalty, such as stock in a family corporation.
If the incompetent has a separate estate of any great size, the inclusion
in her estate of the share received from her husband will greatly in-
crease the taxes to be paid.18
Perhaps the safest way for the guardian to protect himself would be
for him to bring an action seeking the advice of the court.19 In such
5 Id. at 681, 130 So. at 598.1 First Nat'l Exchange Bank v. Hughson, 194 Va. 736, 74 S. E. 2d 797 (1953).
" AxINSON, WILLS § 138 (2d ed. 1953) suggests three possible ways for making
the election: (1) have a judicial hearing to approve the guardian's determination;(2) have an independent decision of the court; or (3) refer the entire matter to a
master for investigation and report.
"s Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2001 and § 1. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 105-4, § 105-5,
§ 105-6 (1950).
20 Johnson v. Wagner, 219 N. C. 235, 13 S. E. 2d 419 (1941) ; In re Reynolds'
Guardianship, 206 N. C. 276, 173 S. E. 789 (1934) ; Commercial National Bank v.
Alexander, 188 N. C. 667, 125 S. E. 385 (1924). See MINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA
PRAcricE AND PROCEDURz § 168 2d ed. 1956). See also footnote 17, supra.
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action the heirs apparent of the widow should be parties. Any decision
given would then become res adjudicata as to the parties.20
HENRY M. WHITESDES.
International Law-The High Seas, The Continental Shelf, and Free
Navigation
Few principles of International Law have been more fully recognized
and accepted than free navigation on the high seas ! Professor Colombos
of the Hague Academy of International Law states, "Today it is uni-
versally recognized that the open sea is not susceptible of appropriation
and that no state can obtain such possession of it as would legally be
necessary to give rise to a claim of property. The high sea cannot be
subject to a right of sovereignty for it is the necessary means of com-
munication between nations and its free use thus constitutes an indis-
pensable element for international trade and navigation."'
I
Though the seas are free today, this was not always so, nor were they
set free without a struggle. From the tenth to the sixteenth century,
English kings made sovereign claims to all seas.2 During the fifteenth
century Pope Alexander, by a Papal Bull of September 25, 1493, par-
titioned the Atlantic Ocean between Portugal and Spain. Denmark,
Genoa, Sweden, Russia, and many other states asserted similar claims
of sovereignty over the high seas. This tide of sovereign claims, how-
ever, soon receded when Queen Elizabeth proclaimed, "The use of the
sea and air is common to all; neither can any title to the ocean belong
to any people or private persons forasmuch as neither nature nor regard
of the public use and custom permitteth any possession thereof." Twenty-
five years later, in 1609, the Dutch publicist Grotius (Hugo de Groot),
traditionally considered the founder of International Law, stated as a
basic principle, "The open sea cannot be subject to the sovereignty of
any state, access to all nations is open to all, not merely by the per-
mission but by the command of the Law of Nations. ' 3 Justice Story,
in The Marianna Flora,4 stated the American view---" . . . [U]pon the
20 In re Morris, 224 N. C. 487, 31 S. E. 2d 539 (1944) ; Cameron v. McDonald,
216 N. C. 712, 6 S. E. 2d 497 (1940) ; Ludwick v. Penny, 158 N. C. 104, 73 S. E.
228 (1910).
* HIcGINS & COLOMBOS, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA § 50 (3d ed. 1954).
2 For a historical outline of these British claims, see FULTON, THE SoVrR-
EIGNTY OF THE SEA (1911).
'GRorius, MARE LiBuEm (1609), contained in c. 12 of GROTIUS, DE JURE
PRAFDAE (CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Scott Trans., 1950).
'24 U. S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 42 (1826). To the effect that "International Law is
a part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of
justice . . . ," see Justice Gray's opinion in The Paquete Habana, 175 U. S. 677
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ocean, in time of peace, all possess an entire equality. It is the common
highway of all, appropriated to the use of all, and no one can vindicate
to himself a superior or exclusive prerogative there." Suffice it to say
that for the past two hundred years, the seas, in principle, have been
free to all men for navigation.5
Granting that free navigation on a free sea has gained universal
acquiescence, this is not to say that the high seas are in a state of
anarchy. In order to keep the seas open for navigation, it has become
necessary for the International Community to formulate and adopt rules
and regulations for sea use. The relative safety of our water highways
today will bear witness to the numerous successful conventions which
met on the questions of safety of life at sea, international signals, com-
munications, collisions, carriage of goods, piracy, and control of liquor
and slave trade, to mention but a few.0
A century after Grotius' Open Seas Doctrine appeared, the Dutch
Judge Bynkershoek gave birth to the modern doctrine of territorial
waters, and thereby gave definition to the high seas. He wrote, "Where-
fore on the whole it seems a better rule that the control of the land (over
the sea) extends as far as a cannon will carry; for that is as far as we
seem to have both command and possession."7 This "cannon shot rule"
has for many years been equated with the more familiar, and generally
accepted, Anglo-American "three-mile limit rule," though admittedly the
purpose, national defense, is no longer served.8 All expanse beyond
the territorial waters, or territorial belt or marginal seas, as it is some-
times called, defines the high seas.
The territorial waters are usually determined by running a line parallel
to the shore a specific distance from the shore.9 All of this water, area
above the water, and sea-bed and subsoil below the water of the terri-
torial belt is considered the sovereign territory of the coastal state.10
(1900); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U. S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796); Dickinson, The Law of
Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 26(1952-53).
'Freedom of Navigation as an international precept follows logically, notwith-
standing the conflicting philosophical bases of res communis and res nullius. See
JEssup, THE LAw OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 75 (1927);
HIGGINS & COLOMBOS, op. cit. supra note 1, § 71.
' For an excellent and authoritative treatment of these various conventions gen-
erally, see BENEDICr, ADMIRALTY (6th ed. 1940); HIGGINS & COLOMBOS, op. cit.
supra note 1, §§ 292-388.
" BYNKERSHOEK, DE DOMINIO MARIS (1702), as contained in CLASSICS OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW c. 2, at 44 (Magoflin Trans., 1923).
' See Walker, Territorial Waters: The Cannon Shot Rule, 22 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L
L. 210 (1945).
0 Problems of delimitation of territorial Waters cannot be treated within the scope
of this article. See generally the citations under note 11, infra.
"0 Cf. Draft of the Hague Codification Conference 1930, LEAGUE OF NATIONS
PUBLICATION: Art. 2 (1930).
The question of local concern in the United States, as to Whether the State or
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Over this belt, the littoral states exercise jurisdiction and control, sub-
ject only to the right of innocent passage. 1 The Hague Codification
Conference of 1930, though not establishing agreement on the width of
the territorial belt, did determine that no state claims less than a three-
mile limit.' 2  Today, due mainly to English influence around the turn
of the nineteenth century, the majority of maritime states accept the
minimum width of three miles as also the maximum width.' 3
Though the major maritime powers support this three-mile zone,
claims to wider belts have nevertheless been made.14 The most extensive
claims to marginal areas are limited today to twelve miles. The United
States' adherence to the three-mile limit practice since 1794 was re-
affirmed in Cunard S. S. Co. v. Mellon' 5-". . . [T]he territory subject
to its jurisdiction includes . . . , the ports, harbors, bays, and other
enclosed arms of the sea along its coast and a marginal belt of sea ex-
tending from the coastline outward a marine league or three geographical
miles."16
II
Classic as well as modern International Law publicists tell us that
the modes used by a state for acquiring additional sovereign territory are
Federal Government will exercise this sovereignty over the territorial belt, was
settled in favor of the Federal Government in United States v. California, 332 U. S.
19 (1947). Cf. United States v. Louisiana, 339 U. S. 699 (1950), and United States
v. Texas, 339 U. S. 707 (1950). The Submerged Land Act, 67 STAT. 29 (1953),
43 U. S. C. § 1301, reversed the Court to the extent of the three mile limit.
" The right of innocent passage is defined by the International Law Commission
as follows: "Passage means navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose
either of traversing that sea without entering internal waters, or of proceeding to
internal waters, or of making for the high seas from internal waters. Passage is
innocent so long as the ship does not use the territorial sea for committing any acts
prejudicial to the security of the coastal state or contrary to the present rules, or
to other rules of international law. Passage includes stopping and anchoring, but
only insofar as the same are incidental to ordinary navigation or are rendered
necessary by force majeure or by distress." 51 Am. J. INT'L L., Sure. 164 (1957).
On the subject of territorial waters generally, see JEssup, op. cit. supra note 5;
MASTaESON, JUIsDicTION IN MARGINAL SEAS (1929); Harvard Research in
International Law, Territorial Waters, 23 Am. J. INT'L L., SPEc. Supp. 241-46(1929); DANIEL, SOVEREIGNTY AND OWNERSHIP IN THE MARGINAL SEAS 14 (1950);
HIGGINS & CoLomBos, op. cit. supra note 1, c. 3-7.
12 The "mile" here used is the so-called nautical, or marine, or geographical mile.
One league equals three marine miles.
" Reeves, Codification of the Law of Territorial Waters, 24 Am. J. INT'L L. 486
(1930) ; HIGGINS & COLOMBOS, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 77-99.
14 Boggs, National Claims on Adjacent Seas, 61 GEOGRAPHICAL REVIEW 185
(1951) ; HIGGINS & COLOmBOS, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 86-93.
15262 U. S. 100 at 122 (1922) ; Cf. United States v. Carrillo, 13 F. Supp. 121
(1935).
10 Though fixed in their claims to sovereignty over a specific width of marginal
seas, many states, including the United States, claim additional jurisdiction beyond
the territorial belt and up to twelve miles, for specific reasons-for example, to
enforce revenue, customs, and immigration laws; to enforce and regulate national
sanitation laws; to protect fisheries; etc. See 19 U. S. C. §§ 1581, 1584, 1585,
1586, 1587, 1594; HIGGINS & COLOMBOS, op. cit. supra note 1, §§ 106-132; BENEDICT,
op. cit. supra note 6.
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occupation and cession, conquest, prescription, and accretion.' 7  Yet a
fifth method, that of proclamation,' 8 was used by President Harry S.
Truman on September 28, 1945, when he proclaimed the American policy
respecting the natural resources of the subsoil and sea-bed of the conti-
nental shelf.19
Though this proclamation stirred little national interest, the interna-
tional repercussions were extensive, for during the following years over
thirty other states have issued similar decrees concerning the continental
shelf; Mexico, most of the Central and South American States, Pakistan,
Iran, South Korea, and the Philippines numbering among them. Of
these, many were put in a stronger and more extensive language, claim-
1
,HALL, INTERNATiONAL LAW, 125 (8th ed. 1925).
18 "Whereas the Government of the United States of America, aware of the long
range world-wide need for new sources of petroleum and other minerals, holds the
view that efforts to discover and make available new supplies of these resources
should be encouraged; and
"Whereas its competent experts are of the opinion that such resources underlie
many parts of the contintental shelf off the coasts of the United States of America,
and that with modern technological progress their utilization is already practicable
or will become so at an early date; and
"Whereas recognized jurisdiction over these resources is required in the interest
of their conservation and prudent utilization when and as development is under-
taken; and
"Whereas it is the view of the Government of the United States that the exercise
of jurisdiction over the natural resources of the subsoil and sea-bed of the con-
tinental shelf by the contiguous nation is reasonable and just, since the effectiveness
of measures to utilize or conserve these resources would be contingent upon
cooperation and protection from the shore, since the continental shelf may be re-
garded as an extension of the land-mass of the coastal nation and thus naturally
appurtenant to it, since these resources frequently form a seaward extension of a
pool or deposit lying within the territory, and since self-protection compels the
coastal nation to keep close watch over activities off its shores which are of the
nature necessary for utilization of these resources;
"Now, therefore, I, HARRY S. TRUMAN, President of the United States of
America, do hereby proclaim the following policy of the United States of America
with respect to the natural resources of the subsoil and sea-bed of the continental
shelf.
"Having concern for the urgency of conserving and prudently utilizing its nat-
ural resources, the Government of the United States regards the natural resources
of the subsoil and sea-bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but con-
tiguous to the coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United States, sub-ject to its jurisdiction and control. In cases where the continental shelf extends
to the shores of another State, or is shared with an adjacent State, the boundary
shall be determined by the United States and the State concerned in accordance with
equitable principles. The character as high seas of the waters above the continental
shelf and the right to their free and unimpeded navigation are in no way thus
affected." PROc. No. 2667, 3 C. F. R. 39 (Supp. 1945) ; 40 AM. J. IN L L., Sup".
45 (1946).
"o That same day, September 28, 1945, President Truman, by Executive Order,
placed control and jurisdiction of these resources under the Secretary of Interior.
40 Am. J. INT'L L., Supp. 47 (1946).
A White House press release of same date, defined the continental shelf as the
area out from short to a 600 foot depth, 13 DEP'T STATE BULL. 484 (1945).
The first congressional assertion of control and jurisdiction over the continental
shelf appertaining to the United States was the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,
67 STAT. 462 (1953), 43 U. S. C. 1331 (1953). For an excellent article analyzing
this Act, see Christopher, The Outer Contizental Shelf Lands Act: Key to a New
Frontier, 6 STAN. L. REv. 23 (1953-54).
1957]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ing sovereignty over the shelf itself, irrespective of depth. Some went
so far as to claim sovereignty over the high seas above the shelf.20
Among these states which, to date, have officially asserted claims, some
of the powers are conspicuously absent, e.g., England, Russia. Also
France, Italy, Japan, Spain, India, Scandinavian States, and West
Germany are abstainers. Mr. Boggs humorously attributes the sudden
rash of decrees following the Truman Proclamation to "a sort of 'carto-
graphic chauvinism' and a desire to 'keep up with the Joneses.' "21
The concept of the continental shelf has a philosophical as well as a
scientific basis. The philosophical justification for the sovereign ex-
tension over the shelf is often found within the proclamations themselves,
for example, the Truman Proclamation contends that ". . . the continental
shelf may be regarded as an extension of the land-mass of the coastal
nation and thus naturally appurtenant to it. . . ." The scientific basis
is founded in ocean geology and geography. It is generally agreed that
out from the shores of the littoral state the sea-bed gradually falls off to
and levels at about two hundred metres, 22 until it reaches a point (the
limit of the shelf) where the drop becomes suddenly steep and continues
down to the oceanic basin.23  The International Law Commission, at its
fifth session, tentatively approved articles for submission to the General
Assembly of the United Nations wherein the continental shelf is
defined as "... the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas contiguous
to the coast, but outside the area of the territorial sea, td a depth of two
hundred metres.124 The practical purposes of adopting the two hundred
metre line are evident in light of the aforementioned scientific knowledge,
as well as the fact that many nautical charts have the two hundred metre
line already indicated. 25 At this line, however, the extent of the shelf is
by no means uniform. It has been asserted that no shelf exists along
some shores, while in other places, the Yellow Sea and Gulf of Siam, it
extends some 800 miles. It has been estimated that the shelf area all
20 For an analysis of the difference between many of these proclamations, see
generally, Young, Recent Developments with Respect to the Con tiental Shelf,
42 Am. J. INT'L L. 849 (1948) ; Young, Further Claims to Areas Beneath the
High Seas, 43 Am. J. INT'L L. 790 (1949) ; Young, Saudi Arabian Offshore Legisra-
tion, 43 Am. J. INT'L L. 530 (1949) ; Lauterpacht, Sovereignty Over Submarine
Areas, 27 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 376 (1950) ; Boggs, op. cit. supra note 14, at 185;
Waldock, Legal Basis of Clains to the Continental Shelf, 36 GROTIus Soc., TRANS.
FOR 1950, 115 (1951); MOUTON, THE CONTINENTAL SHELF, c. 4 (1952).2
_Delimitations of Seaward Areas Under National Jurisdiction, 45 Am. J. INTL
L. 240 at 241 (1951).
2 200 metres, 100 fathoms, 600 feet, are all approximately equal. 600 feet =
100 fathoms; 200 metres = 656.1 feet.
3 For an impressive collection of this scientific data, see MOUTON, op. cit.
stpra note 20, c. 4.2'48 AM. .. INT'L L., SuPP. 28 (1954).
" See Young's article wherein he proposes that states accept the 200 metre line
as the "legal standard." Legal Status of Sucbmarine Areas Beneath the High Seas,
45 Am. 3. INT'L L. 225 at 234 (1951).
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over the world covers 27,500,000 square kilometres, or 7.6 per cent of
the surface of the oceans.2 6
In spite of the simpliicty achieved by the International Law Com-
mission when it accepted the "200 metre limit" in defining the continental
shelf, at its final session concerning this matter, July 1956, it reverted to
its 1951 position, abandoning in part the geological concept of that
term. In the final report on the Law of the Sea, the Commission added
the following words to the aforementioned definition of the continental
shelf: ". . . or, beyond that limit [referring to the 200 metre line], to
where the depth of the superjacent water admits the exploitation of the
natural resources of the said areas." 27 Here the limits of the "shelf,"
beyond the geographic shelf, are determinable only with reference to the
exploitability of the sea-bed and subsoil.
The amendment to the definition of the continental shelf was prob-
ably made by the Commission in the hope of appeasing those states which
lack an adjacent shelf area. Yet in light of contemporary scientific
knowledge, this recession of certainty-substitution of limits of exploit-
ability for the 200 metre line-is ill-founded, for as a practical matter
exploitation to a depth greater than 600 feet is not now considered
feasible, nor is it expected to become so in the near future. This amend-
ment merely adds one more abstraction to a field already surrounded
by uncertainties.
The late international attention given to the continental shelf is due
principally to two factors: the needs of an ever-increasing population,
confined within the limited availability of land, have turned scientific
research to methods of utilizing the natural resources of the sea-bed and
subsoil; considerations of national defense, though not generally empha-
sized, have been no small consideration. National hopes of locating
rich oil fields, sulphur beds, and other heavy minerals, even uranium, are
even now materializing.28 As of June 1, 1950, twenty-two oil fields west
of the Mississippi River on the Gulf of Mexico were producing on the
continental shelf.2 9 In August, 1954, the United States Government an-
nounced the future construction of radar installations upon the conti-
nental shelf as a means of furthering national security. 30 To-day many
such radar installations are in operation, some as far as 110 miles out
at sea.
SUmEGROvE, THE PULSE OF THE EARTH, 99 (2nd ed., 1947).2 Article 67, Law of the Sea, Report of International Law Commission, U. N.
GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 11th Sess., OFFICIAL RECORDS, Supp. No. 9 (A/3159); 51
Am. J. INT'L L., Supp. 177 (1957).
8 See International Law Association's Report of the Forty-third Conference,
Brussels 1948, p. 172 (1948).
2" Weaver, The Continental Shelf of the Gulf of Mexico, BULL. OF Am. Asso.
OF PETROLEUM GEoLoGISTS, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Feb. 1951).
"0 N. Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1954, p. 1,. col. 2; Note 40 CORNELL L. Q. 110 (1954).
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The practical necessities of a Truman Proclamation are seen when
one considers the international consequences of a foreign power moving
within one hundred miles of American shores and drilling for oil, setting
up advance communication bases, or other installations. Mr. Vallat,
speaking of the Truman Proclamation, said, "This unilateral declaration
does not purport to be based on any recognized and established rule of
interantional law, but on what is reasonable and just."3' That these
claims will continue to be insisted upon is open to little doubt; that the
rights sought by these claims will one day be upheld as matters of Inter-
national Law is also evident due to the nature of that law-". .. founded
on justice, equity, convenience, and the reason of the thing, and con-
firmed by long usage."13 2
Judge Lauterpacht, of the International Court of Justice, would carry
this one step further, for he states, ". . . [T]here is no existing principle
or rule of International Law which is opposed to what, for the sake of
brevity, may be called here the doctrine and the practice of the continental
shelf, and the latter has now, in any case, become a part of the Inter-
national Law by unequivocal positive acts of some states, including the
leading maritime powers, and general acquiescence on the part of
others. '33 The wording of some of the state proclamations concerning
the continental shelf would also appear to be in accord with this latter
view.
III
Eleven years have now passed since the Truman Proclamation initi-
ated the practice of the continental shelf. Eleven years ago many people
realized the immediate difficulties- and conflicts that such a proclamation
entails. Today, due to the efforts of those concerned, many of these
difficulties have been reconciled.3 4  Sovereign claims by littoral states
over their adjacent shelf areas have not been challenged; rather the
response has been one in kind. International Law authorities have also
endorsed this practice, basing their arguments upon natural law, justice,
or merely the reason of the thing. This doctrine, however, has been
approved only to the extent that it applies to the shelf itself.35 It is over
21 Continental Shelf, 23 BRaIT. Y. B. INTL L. 333 at 334 (1946).
"Lord Mansfield, as quoted in PoLLocic, ESSAYS IN THE LAW, 64 (1922).
"Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra note 20, p. 376.
"4 Sir Cecil Hurst's advice to members of the Grotius Society undoubtedly con-
tributed to the general air of reconciliation and understanding. "The world wants
oil and I think we ought to all approach the study (of the continental shelf) not with
the idea of magnifying the objections but with the intention of finding ways of
overcoming the difficulties with which the whole subject is surrounded." The Con-
tinental Shelf, 34 GROTius Socisry, TRANS. FOR 1948, 153 at 169 (1949).
2" See generally, Vallat, op. cit. supra note 31, 333; Lauterpacht, op. cit. supra
note 20, 376; also MOUTON, op. cit. supra note 20, wherein many of Lauterpacht's
ideas, have been incorporated; Borchard, Resources of Contitental Shelf, 40 Am. J.
INT'L L. 53 (1946) ; Selak, Recent Developments int High Seas Fisheries Juris-
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the more extensive claims that the controversy can still be heard-it
is here that the future of free navigation will be decided.
For our purpose, the continental shelf claims can be divided into three
groups: (1) those claiming sovereign rights over the shelf alone,30 (2)
those claiming sovereign rights over the shelf as well as the epicon-
tinental waters,37 and (3) those claiming sovereign rights over a specific
area of water, irrespective of the continental shelf.33  Properly speaking,
this third group has no connection with the doctrine of the continental
shelf as it is generally understood, unless it be a causal one.39 Gratis
dicta to sovereignty over a broad expense of high seas, without regard
to the continental shelf as a basis of such claims, are obviously contrary to
International Law, as seen by section one of this article. Consequently, no
attempt will be made to directly discuss those claims categorized in group
three, but rather limit the comparisons to ones between group one and
group two above, and the effect of each on freedom of navigaton.
Considering the Truman Proclamation of 1945 as representative of
group one, supra, and the Argentina Declaration as representative of
group two, supra, wherein lies the difference? The Argentina Declara-
tion clearly lays claim to the continetnal shelf itself. The operative sec-
tion reads: "It is hereby declared that the Argentine Epicontinental Sea
and Continental Shelf are subject to the sovereign power of the Na-
tion."'40 The United States proclamation purports to claim jurisdiction
and control only over the "natural resources" within the shelf. The
diction Under Presidential Proclamation of 1945, 44 Am. J. INTIL L. 670 (1950);
Young, op. cit. supra note 25, 225; GmrEL, LA PLATAFORMA CONTINENTAL ANTE EL
DERECHO, 169 (Trans. by Rubio, 1950) ; Kunz, Continental Shelf and International
Law: Confusion and Abuse, 50 Am. J. INT'L L. 828 (1956); LEE, DIVERGENCIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL
WArERS, Dissertation for M. Litt. Degree at University of Cambridge, June, 1951;
Phleger, Recent Developments Affecting the Regine of the High Seas, 32 DEP'T
STATE BuUL. 934-40 (June 6, 1955); Smith, Expanded Maritimne Jurisdiction, 19
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 469 (1950-51); Trigg, National Sovereignty Over Maritime
Resources, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 82 (1950).
" Those states which issued proclamations of the "group one" character are:
United States (1945) ; Bahamas (1948); Jamaica (1948) ; Guatemala (1949) ;
Philippines (1949) ; Saudi Arabia (1949); United Kingdom of Bahrain-The Arab
Shiekdoms (1949); Brazil (1950); British Honduras (1950); Falkland Islands(1950) ; Iran (1950) ; Pakistan (1950) ; Israel (1950).
" Those states which issued proclamations of the "group two" character are:
Mexico (1945) ; Argentina (1946) ; Panama (1946) ; Iceland (1948) ; Costa Rica
(1949); Australia (1953).
" Those states which issued proclamations of the "group three" character are:
Chile (1947); Peru (1947); Nicaragua (1949); El Salvador (1950); Honduras(1950) ; Ecuador (1951) ; South Korea (1952).
" See Kunz' excellent article wherein he shows the incompatibility between the
doctrine of the continental shelf and the "group three" type proclamations as well
as the illegality of such claims. Kunz, op. cit. supra note 35, 828. For state protest
notes on the Chilean and Peruvian claims, see Replies front Governments to
Questionnaires of the International Law Commission, A/CN. 4/9, March 23, 1950,
p. 113.
" 41 Am. J. INT'L L., Su',. 12 (1947).
1957]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
operative section reads: ". . [T]he Government of the United States
regards the natural resources of the subsoil and sea-bed of the continental
shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the coast of the United
States as appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction and
control." 41 Yet, ". .. [o]ne cannot read this proclamation (Truman's)
without feeling that within the area of its Continental Shelf, the United
States is claiming rights as large as sovereignty. ' 42  "It is difficult to
see what distinction there is between control over the 'natural resources'
and control over the subsoil and sea-bed themselves. Anything of value
might be included in 'natural resources,' and any use or interference with
the subsoil or sea-bed might equally be regarded as a use of or interfer-
ence with their 'natural resources.' Therefore, it does not seem that the
use of this expression imports any real limitation, and the claim may be
taken as relating to the sea-bed and subsoil themselves. '43 For practical
purposes, therefore, we can say that in this respect the American and
Argentine claims are not conflicting.
The major difference between the United States Presidential
Proclamation and the Argentina Declaration is in the purported sover-
eignty over the waters above the shelf, though both decrees expressly
state that rights of free navigation are in no way affected. The operative
section of the Truman Proclamation is: "The character is high seas of
the water above the continental shelf and the right to their free and un-
impeded navigation are in no way thus affected, ' 44 while the operative
wording of the Argentina Declaration is: "For purposes of free naviga-
tion the character of the waters situated in the Argentine Epicontinental
Sea and above the Argentine Continental Shelf, remains uneffected by the
present declaration. ' '45
The Argentine assertion of sovereignty over their epicontinental
waters is to some degree a reasonable one. Is it not a matter of
linguistic sophistry to hypothesize sovereignty over the shelf area with-
out concurrent sovereignty over the epicontinental seas? Could a state
fully exercise sovereignty over the shelf area, exploiting the natural re-
sources, without complete freedom and control of the sea above? Ob-
viously not. On the other hand, it is an antimony to assert sovereignty
over waters, while at the same time asserting that free navigation will
not thereby be affected. The principle of free navigation depends for
its existence on free seas, res communes. Therefore, the only conceivable
right conferred by the Argentina Declaration is that of innocent passage.
If it is true that the lack of sovereign control over the epicontinental sea
"For full text of the Proclamation, see note 18 supra.
42 Hurst, op. cit. mipra note 34, at 162.
"Vallat, Qp. cit. supra note 31, at 336.
"See full text, note 18 supra.
" Full text printed in 41 Am. J. INT'L L., Supp. 11 (1947).
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affects adversely the scope of sovereign control over the shelf itself,
then this latter control must suffer.
In view of the protests to the Argentine claims,4 6 and in the opinions
of recognized contemporary publicists, 47 sovereign claims to high seas
are, a fortiori, illegal. Once a state is permitted to establish a legal claim
over large areas of water merely on the strength of their superposition
to the continental shelf, it is but a small step for other states to likewise
claim sovereignty over their adjacent high seas, irrespective of the shelf.
This is, in effect, what Chile and the other "group three" states have at-
tempted to do.48 Allow this to happen and the international community
will have regressed to their 14th century position; a position they fought
so valiantly to overcome.49
Of course, the exploitation of natural resources within the shelf will
necessarily cause some obstruction to navigation; yet it is insisted that
this obstruction should never be unreasonable. The tendency is to view
the setting up of oil wells or pumping stations on waters over the shelf,
as merely another "use" of the high seas, in the same manner that free
navigation for transportation and commerce is a "use." Which use in
each case will prevail shall be determined by an, equitable balance of the
conflicting interests.50 What is and what is not unreasonable, must ulti-
mately be decided on the merits of each case. It is conceivable that
substantial interference with navigation could be justified in one case,
while insignificant interference in another could be found totally unjusti-
fiable. The decision of justification will initially lie with the coastal
state, however, the International Law Commission provided in Article
73 concerning the Law of the Sea, that disputes not otherwise peacefully
46 Replies from Govermients to Questionnaires of the International Law Com-
mission, op. cit. supra note 39, 113; 24 DEP'T STATE BuLL. (Jan. 1, 1951).
'7 See generally the citation under footnote No. 35, supra.
"For arguments in support of the "group three" view, see Aramburu y Men-
chaca, Character and Scope of the Rights Declared and Practiced Over the Conti-
nental Sea and Shelf, 47 Am. J. INT'L L. 120 (1953) ; see also Young's attempted
rebuttal, Over-extension of the Continental Sea, 47 Am. J. INT'L L. 454 (1953).
Also in support of the "group three" claims, erroneously coupled with the concept
of territorial waters, see Garioca's argumentum ad hominein, The Continental Shelf
and the Extension of the Territorial Sea, 10 MIAM1i L. Q. 490 (1956); and in
answer, Bayitch, International Fishery Problems in the Western Hempisphere, 10
MIAMI L. Q. 499 (1956).
" Enforcement of the "group three" claims in the future might be considered
a casus belli. The countries involved, though refusing to test their 200 mile claim
to high seas in the International Court of Justice, have enforced the purportedjurisdictional control. In 1955 Ecuador seized two American flag-vessels which
were sailing within the 200 mile radius. One American seaman was seriously in-jured by Ecuadorean gun fire.-In 1954 Peruvian war vessels and airplanes seized
five Panamanian flag-vessels, while sailing 300 miles off the Peruvian coast. The
charge was labeled "piratical." It is clear that the "group three" states intend to
enforce their decrees claiming exclusive fishing rights within the so-called 200 miles
of territorial waters. Official protests were to no avail. Kunz, op. cit. supra note
35, 828.
"0 MouToN, op. cit. supra note 20, c. 3.
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settled concerning the "reasonableness of interference" be referred to the
International Court of Justice.51
It is also conceded that the littoral state ought to be allowed to exer-
cise sovereign controls over the people and tools used to exploit the shelf,
as well as some control over the water area occupied in this endeavor,
however, this latter control is in no way comparable to sovereignty. The
coastal state, engaged in exploration and exploitation of its natural re-
sources would have, for example, jurisdiction for the prevention and
punishment of crime, as well as other causes of action now recognized
in Admiralty.
The International Law Commission's final report of its eighth session,
1956, covering The Law of the Sea, as requested by the United Nations,
included a set of rules which would give reasonable protection to both
freedom of navigation and the continental shelf doctrine. 5 2
Art. 68: The coastal state exercises over the continental shelf sover-
eign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting its nat-
ural resources.
Art. 69: The rights of the coastal state over the continental shelf do not
affect the legal status of the superjacent waters as high seas,
or that of the airspace above those waters.
Art. 70: Subject to its right to take reasonable measures for the ex-
ploration of the continental shelf and the exploitation of its
natural resources, the coastal state may not impede the laying
or maintenance of submarine cables on the continental shelf.
Art. 71. 1. The exploration of the continental shelf and the exploitation
of its natural resources must not result in any unjustifiable
interference with navigation, fishing or the conservation of
the living resources of the sea.
2. Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 5 of this
article, the coastal state is entitled to construct and main-
tain on the continental shelf installations necessary for the
exploration and exploitation of its natural resources, and
to establish safety zones at a reasonable distance around
such installations and take in those zones measures neces-
sary for their protection.
3. Such installations, though under the jurisdiction of the
Article 73, op. cit. supra note 27; 51 AM. J. INT'L L., Supp. 178 (1957).
U. N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 11th Sess. (Eight Session of International Law
Commission), OF'crAL RECORDS, Supp. No. 9 (A/3159); 51 Am. J. INT'L L., SuPp.
154 at 177-78 (1957).
For reports of the International Law Commission covering the seven preceding
sessions, see the AM. J. INT'L L. SUPPLEMENTS: Vol. 44 (1950) (1st and 2d Sess.) ;
Vol. 45 (1951) (3rd Sess.); Vol. 47 (1953) (4th Sess.); Vol. 48 (1954) (5th
Sess.) ; Vol. 49 (1955) (6th Sess.) ; Vol. 50 (1956) (7th Sess.).
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coastal state, do not possess the status of islands. They
have no territorial sea of their own, and their presence
does not affect the delimitation of the territorial sea of the
coastal state.
4. Due notice must be given of any such installations con-
structed, and permanent means for giving warning of their
presence must be maintained.
5. Neither the installations themselves, nor the said safety
zones around them may be established in narrow channels
or where interference may be caused in recognized sea lanes
essential to international navigation.
Precepts of International Law ultimately depend upon international
acceptance, be it expressed or implied. Without this acceptance, no Jus
Gentium exists.5 3 Which type of unilateral claims, those asserted by the
Truman Proclamation or those asserted by the Argentina Declaration,
will become established principles of international law, only the future
:an tell. Yet the direction of this acceptance cannot be doubted today.
Free navigation-juris et de jure!
H. WALLACE ROBERTS.
Libel-Multi-State Defamation-Place of Commission of Tort
In recent years courts throughout the country have often been faced
with the problems of multi-state defamation arising from national dis-
tribution of books and periodicals and from the wide coverage of radio
and television programs. Yet, there has been almost a complete judicial
reluctance to face these problems squarely. Many courts have failed to
discuss the issue when it was obviously present.' In some cases the scope
of recovery was not clearly set out ;2 and, even where the issue was cor-
rectly presented, courts have on occasion applied the law of the forum
" "International law consists in certain rules of conduct which modern civilized
states regard as being binding on them in their relations with one another with a
force comparable in nature and degree to the binding the conscientious person to
obey the laws of his country, and which they also regard as being enforceable by
appropriate means in case of infringement." HALL, op. cit. supra note 17, at 1.
"What is internationlaw law? It is the body of principles and rules which civil-
ized States consider as binding upon them in their mutual relations. It rests upon
the consent of Sovereign States." Hughes, The World Court as a Going Concern,
16 A. B. A. J. 151 at 153 (1930).
' Levey v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 57 F. Supp. 40 (S. D. N. Y. 1944);
Wright v. R. K. 0. Radio Pictures, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 639 (D. Mass. 1944); Backus
v. Look, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 662 (S. D. N. Y. 1941) ; Cannon v. Time, Inc., 39 F.
Supp. 660 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) ; Means v. MacFadden Publications, Inc., 25 F. Supp.
993 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
2Brinkley v. Fishbein, 110 F. 2d 62 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U. S. 672(1940) ; Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931).
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without much discussion of the matter.3 A few decisions have met the
problem squarely, and in these the results differ. 4
One of the underlying problems is in attempting to apply the sub-
stantive law of one jurisdiction when the tort is committed in several
different jurisdictions. As many as ten different choices of law have
been suggested. These will be merely mentioned and the relative merits
of each will not be discussed.
1. The law of the state of the publisher's domicile or incorporation.5
2. The law of the state where the defendant's main publishing office
is locatedY
3. The law of the state of plaintiff's domicile, on the theory that the
harm to plaintiff is centered there. 7
4. The law of the state of plaintiff's principal business.8
5. The law of the state where the defamation is principally circulated.
6. The law of the state where the plaintiff actually suffered the greatest
harm from the defamation. 10
7. The law of the state where the defendant's physical acts originating
the alleged defamation occurred; that is, the state where a magazine,
book or newspaper was printed or a radio or television broadcast
made.-"
8. The law of the state where the damaging statement was first seen or
heard by anyone.12
Spanei v. Pegler, 160 F. 2d 619 (7th Cir. 1947) ; Caldwell v. Crowell-Collier
Publishing Co., 161 F. 2d 333 (5th Cir. 1947); Curley v. Curtis Publishing Co.,
48 F. Supp. 29 (D. Mass. 1942) ; Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N. Y. 354, 107
N. E. 2d 485 (1952) ; Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182,
8 A. 2d 302 (1939).
'Leverton v. Curtis Publishing Co., 192 F. 2d 974 (3d Cir. 1951) ; Hartmann v.
Time, Inc., 166 F. 2d 127 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U. S. 838 (1948);
Sidis v. F.-R. Publishing Corp., 113 F. 2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U. S.
711 (1940) ; Dale System Inc., v. General Teleradio, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 745(S. D. N. Y. 1952) ; Howser v. Pearson, 95 F. Supp. 936 (D. D. C. 1951) ; O'Reilly
v. Curtis Publishing Co., 31 F. Supp. 364 (D. Mass. 1940) ; Schumann v. Loew's,
Inc., 199 Misc. 38, 102 N. Y. S. 2d 572 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
Notes, 43 ILL. L. REV. 556, 560 (1948) ; 35 VA. L. REV. 627, 633 (1949).
'2 Rabel, THE CoNFLcr OF LAWS: A COMPAaTVE STUDY 323, 335 (1947);
Notes, 10 LA. L. REv. 339 (1950) ; 16 U. oF CI. L. REv. 164, 168 (1948).
'Notes, 60 HARv. L. R1v. 941, 947 (1947); 35 VA. L. REv. 627, 636 (1949).
'Lefler, The Single Publication Rule, 25 RocxY MTN. L. REV. 263, 270 (1953);
Comment, 10 LA. L. Ray. 339, 345 (1950).
'Ludwig, "Peace of Mind" it 48 Pieces Versus Uniform Right of Privacy, 32
MINN. L. Rv. 734, 761 (1948).
" Mattox v. News Syndicate Co., 176 F. 2d 897 (2d Cir. 1949), 63 HAzv. L.
REV. 1272 (1950), 34 MINN. L. REv. 332 (1950), 25 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 165(1950), 24 So. CALIF. L. REV. 103 (1950); Caldwell v. Crowell-Collier Publishing
Co., 161 F. 2d 333 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U. S. 766 (1947).
"x Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong: A Study in the Method of Case Law, 19
TUL. L. REv. 4, 30 (1944) ; Comments, 60 HARV. L. Ray. 941, 946 (1947) ; 35 VA.
L. REv. 627, 634 (1949).
"Banks v. King Features, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 352 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
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9. The law of the state which the merits of the case suggest, without
any rule of thumb as to what law governs.13
10. The law of the forum.1
4
There is at least some authority to sustain each of the above choices,
which serves to indicate the divergent views that exist concerning this
complicated problem.
Another problem that arises stems from the rule of Brunswick v.
Harmer,1 5 which is still technically the majority rule in America.:'
Under this view, a new tort occurs each time libelous matter is read by a
third person, and a different suit can be brought to collect for each sep-
arate cause of action. An opposing judicial effort aimed at reducing
multiplicity of suits is the "single publication" rule. There is no general
agreement as to what the rule is,1 7 but the underlying rationale is that
there can be but one publication' 8 of libelous matter within the jurisdic-
tion adopting the rule. All the economic steps' 9 leading to the publish-
ing of the magazine, book, or newspaper are considered as a single
process, and as regards that jurisdiction there can be but one cause of
action against any one defendant.20 The extent of the circulation will
weigh heavily in determining the amount of damages but the tort is con-
summated as of the first communication to a third person,21 and the
statute of limitations begins to run as of that time.22
This rule is rapidly finding favor throughout the country,23 but even
1863 HARV. L. REV. 1272, 1274 (1950).
14 Ludwig, supra note 9, at 760.
2514 Q. B. 185, 117 Eng. Rep. 75 (1849).
"- This rule has been adopted by the American Law Institute. RESTATEMENT,
TORTs § 578, comment b (1938).
"- The rule has a double aspect; it sets a time for the statute of limitations to
begin running, and defines the actual place of the tort for venue purposes. The
rule is judicial in origin and was created mainly for the purpose of giving substance
to the statute of limitations, which had little effect under the traditional rule.
18 Publication is a technical concept involving an issue of historical fact; that
is, a communication to a third person. McGlue v. Weekly Publication, Inc., 63 F.
Supp. 744 (D. Mass. 1946) ; Stella v. James J. Farley Ass'n, Inc., 204 Misc. 998,
122 N. Y. S. 2d 322 (Sup. Ct. 1953), aff'd, 284 App. Div. 873, 135 N. Y. S. 2d
234 (1st Dep't 1954).
" The composition, printing, and distribution of a magazine or newspaper when
completed is taken as the one act of publication. Winrod v. McFadden Publica-
tions, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 249 (N. D. Ill. 1945), aff'd, 187 F. 2d 180 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 342 U. S. 814 (1951).
20 The rule does not preclude suits against several different defendants who
publish the libel successively, such as two or more separate newspapers or a radio
company and a newspaper.
21See Winrod v. McFadden Publications, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 249 (N. D. Ill.
1945), aff'd, 187 F. 2d 180 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U. S. 814 (1951) ; Age-
Herald Publishing Co. v. Huddleston, 207 Ala. 40, 92 So. 193 (1921) ; O'Malley v.
Statesman Printing Co., 60 Idaho 326, 91 P. 2d 357 (1939).
22 See Winrod v. McFadden Publications, supra note 21; Cannon v. Time, Inc.,
39 F. Supp. 660 (S. D. N. Y. 1939); Means v. MacFadden Publications, Inc., 25
F. Supp. 993 (S. D. N. Y. 1939).
2 See, e.g., Kilian v. Stackpole Sons, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 500 (M. D. Pa. 1951);
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if every state should adopt the rule there would still be difficult choice
of law problems. It would seem that the rule in each state would at
best curtail the causes of action only within that particular jurisdic-
tion24 because a state law cannot have extraterritorial effect ;25 it cannot
of itself cross state lines to bar action in another state. It has been
suggested that it would depend on how a plaintiff phrased his complaint
in determining whether the first suit was res judicatac as to any subse-
quent action.26 If the complaint embraced all causes of action in every
jurisdiction the plaintiff has exhausted his remedies in one suit. How-
ever, if he seeks damages only within that particular jurisdiction, he ap-
parently is free to go elsewhere and sue the defendant in other juris-
dictions.27 The possibility of such multiple suits is illustrated by the
Oakley and Sweeney cases.
2 8
Kelly v Loew's, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 473 (D. Mass. 1948) ; Hartmann v. Time, Inc.,
166 F. 2d 127 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U. S. 838 (1948) ; Backus v. Look,
Inc., 39 F. Supp. 662 (S. D. N. Y. 1941); Cannon v. Time, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 660(S. D. N. Y. 1939); Winrod v. Time, Inc., 334 Ill. App. 59, 78 N. E. 2d 708(1948); Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc., 254 App. Div. 211, 4 N. Y. S. 2d
640 (4th Dep't 1938).
" See O'Reilly v. Curtis Publishing Co., 31 F. Supp. 364, 365 (D. Mass. 1940):
"The publication in each of the 38 states give rise to separate causes of action. The
defendant's liability for the libel published in each state is governed by the laws
of that state."
Why does circulation of libel in a new state give a new cause of action when
circulation in new counties within a state does not? Dean Prosser suggests that
the various states realize they are getting into deep water when they say a cause of
action exists in one state only, because each state has its own law and some of them
may recognize the existence of the cause of action whereas others do not. Prosser,
Interstate Publication, 51 MiC. L. REv. 959, 965 (1953).
See 11 Am. Jua., Conflict of Laws § 10, n. 5 (1937) for a collection of cases.
_6 See Note, 43 ILL. L. REV. 556 (1948). Generally, a cause of action for a
- tort is transitory in nature, and can be sued on wherever the tortfeasor can be
found. Collins v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 226 Ala. 659, 148 So. 133(1933); Piplack v. Mueller, 97 Fla. 440, 121 So. 459 (1929); Johnston v. Mac-
Fadden Newspaper Corp., 238 App. Div. 68, 263 N. Y. Supp. 561 (1st Dep't 1933).
However, some torts such as trespass are local in nature and suit must be brought
at the place the tort was committed. Livingston v. Jefferson, 15 Fed. Cas. 660, No.
8,411 (C. C. D. Va. 1811).
2'Of course the plaintiff can do this only if he can get jurisdiction over the
defendant in the various states.
2 Annie Oakley once brought fifty different suits for being labeled a dope addict.
She recovered judgments in forty-eight of the fifty for amounts ranging from
$500 to $27,500. See EARNST & LINDEY, HOLD YouR TONGUE 190 (1950). A typical
case was Butler v. Hoboken Printing and Publishing Co., 73 N. J. L. 45, 62 Att.
272 (1905).
Congressman Martin Sweeney of Ohio brought sixty-eight suits for an alleged
libel printed in a nationally syndicated column. At least fifteen of these cases are
reported on the appellate level: See Donnelly, The Law of Defamation: Proposalsfor Reform, 33 MINN. L. REv. 609, 627, n. 79 (1949) for a listing of some of these
cases. An example is Sweeney v. Schenectady Union Publishing Co., 122 F. 2d
288 (2d Cir. 1941), aff'd without opinion by evenly divided court, 316 U. S. 642(1942).
In both of the above situations the defendants were separate newspapers through-
out the country and therefore they have little relation to the single publication rule
but they do give concrete evidence of the probable consequences of a single libelous
statement.
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The Commission on Uniform State Laws has proposed a Uniform
Single Publication Act which has thus far been adopted by six states.2 9
The act contemplates a single cause of action which will include recovery
for damages incurred in all jurisdictions where the tort occurred so that
the judgment will be res judicata as to any other action on the same
tort. There is no doubt that the act has merit, but it would seem that
in order for it to be fully effective it is necessary that all states adopt
it. Experience has demonstrated the reluctance of many states to adopt
uniform laws in the past, and there is no foreseeable reason why this re-
luctance would be discarded in the case of this particular act.
Suggestions have been made that federal legislation be enacted to
unify the law in this area.30 It is settled that Congress has the power to
regulate tort liability which affects interstate commerce,31 and there are
probably no constitutional barriers to legislation by Congress in the area
of multi-state defamation.3 2  The propriety of upsetting the established
substantive law of each state would be questionable, but federal legisla-
tion which would simply limit the causes of action and formulate a choice
of law rule would seem to have merit. It is true that some instances of
interstate defamation are so related to a particular jurisdiction that it
has a significant interest in applying its own law, but this would seem
almost to be the exception rather than the rule in this day when defima-
tion if interstate at all, is so often spread throughout the country thus
providing significant contacts with many states.
North Carolina has neither adopted the single publication rule33 nor
wrestled with the choice of law problem in multi-state torts. A recent
case, Putnam v. Triangle Publications Co.,34 seemed to present the
problem in its basic facts, but the case was dismissed on procedural
grounds and the question was not expressly reached. However, in dis-
cussing one issue, the court made a statement that could affect North
Carolina's position in this area. Suit was brought against a Pennsyl-
vania corporaion for an alleged libel3 5 which was circulated in defendant's
. ARiz. CODE ANN. §§ 27-2001 to -2005 (Supp. 1954) (Arizona) ; WEsT's ANN.
CIv. CODE §§ 3425.1 to .5 (1955) (California); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 6-702 to
-705 (Supp. 1955) (Idaho) ; N. M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-27-30 to -34. (Supp. 1955)
(New Mexico); N. D. REv. CoDE §§ 14-0210 to -0214 (Supp. 1953) (North
Dakota) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 §§ 2090.1 to .5 (Purdon Supp. 1954) (Pennsyl-
vania) ; see 9 A. U. L. A. (Supp. 1956) for a text of the act.
" Notes, 4 SYRACUSE L. REv. 310, 317 (1953) ; 35 VA. L. REV. 627, 638 (1949);
60 HARv. L. Rrv. 941, 951 (1947).
" See Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1 (1912).
" Such legislation could be supported under the commerce clause, U. S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3; or under the power to regulate the mails, U. S. CoNsT. art. I,§ 8, cl. 7. See Note, 35 VA. L. REv. 627, 639 (1949).
" See Note, 27 N. C. L. REv. 271 (1949).
1'245 N. C. 432, 96 S. E. 2d 445 (1957).
" There was also alleged a cause of action for invasion of privacy. The same
problems encountered in suits for libel are also encountered in suits for invasion
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magazines in North Carolina. The plaintiff served process on defendant
by publication pursuant to the statute allowing such service on a corpora-
tion for, among other things, any cause of action arising "out of any
tortious conduct in this State, whether arising out of repeated activity or
single acts, and whether arising out of misfeasance or nonfeasance."30°
One of the questions presented was the validity of service under this
provison.37 In the course of the decision, the court stated: "We agree
with the conclusion of the judge below that plaintiff's cause of action did
not arise out of any tortious conduct of the defendant in this state.13 8
There are two possible explanations which might justify the court's
summary dismissal of the tort issue. Both theories were argued in the
defendant's brief. (1) Assuming a tort consists of two phases, conduct
and harm, the two could well occur in different jurisdictions. So, if the
statute is interpreted literally, there would be no tortious conduct within
the state even though there was a tort committed in the state under the
normal conflict of laws rules. (2) It could be argued simply that no tort
had been committed in North Carolina. A state can decide as a part of
its law of conflict of laws that when a libel is printed in a foreign state
there is no local tort committed because each state can determine whether
or not an act is an actionable wrong within its borders.3 0 Thus if in the
Putnam case the court intended to imply that no tort was committed in
North Carolina, it would be a valid exercise of power; however, it would
destroy the traditional rule declared in the Brunswick case and followed
by the Restatement. Aside from any question of the desirability of over-
ruling this long-standing multiple publication doctrine, it is believed that
if the court did in fact decide on the basis of the defendant's second argu-
ment it should have elaborated on its reasoning so as to inform the public
of the significance of the decision.
If the plaintiff should now sue in Pennsylvania where he can get per-
sonal service of process, he might be jeopardized by the ambiguous word-
ing of the principal case. For example, assume plaintiff is known only
in North Carolina, and, consequently has his reputation injured only in
of privacy and unfair competition. See Notes, 32 MINN. L. REV. 934 (1948) ; 60
HARv. L. REv. 1315 (1947) for a discussion of these.
"' N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-38.1 (a) (4) (Supp. 1955). The attempted service
was also made pursuant to the provisions of §§ 55-38.1 (a) (1) through (3), and
the major portion of the opinion was devoted to these other parts of the statute.
However, for the purposes of this discussion, only the subsection (4) relating to
tortious conduct will be considered.
" For a discussion of the constitutional aspects of this subsection, see Note, 35
N. C. L. REv. 546 (1957).8 Putnam v. Triangle Publications Co., 245 N. C. 432, 443, 96 S. E. 2d 445, 454(1957).
"See 11 Am. Jur., Conflict of Laws § 182, n. 4 (1937). In support of this
second theory, the defendant cited decisions of those courts adopting the single
publication rule.
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North Carolina. Should the Pennsylvania courts construe the principal
case as deciding that no tort was committed in North Carolina, plain-
tiff might be in the unenviable postion of having been definitely injured
without a right of redress. This is because a cause of action, if any, must
arise at the place of injury and not at the place where the act or omission
which caused the injury occurred.40  North Carolina being the place
of injury, and no cause of action arising in North Carolina, plaintiff
would have no right to recover. Of course the result is absurd, but it is
within the realm of possibility. Moreover, several North Carolina
cases4 ' in the area of defamation and negligence have previously inti-
mated that the tort occurred as of the time of the act or omission rather
than at the time of the injury. In Powers v. Planters National Bank
and Trust Co.,42 the court said: "It is well settled in an action for dam-
ages, resulting from negligent breach of duty, the statute of limitations
begins to run from the breach, from the wrongful act or omission com-
plained of without regard to the time when the harmful consequences
were discovered." 43  While this pertains to the statute of limitations,
the implication is that the tort occurred at the time of the act.
Whatever the actual basis of the decision on this tort issue, the court
did refrain from any open discussion of the question of multi-state
defamation just as so many other courts have done. In view of the
constitutional issues presented, it was probably not an ideal case for
treatment of the defamation aspect. It is hoped that when such a case
does arise, the court will devise a working formula.
HAmLIN WADE.
Libel and Slander-Immunity of Counsel for Defamatory Matter
Published in a Judicial Proceeding
In Wall v. Blalock,' the Supreme Court of North Carolina was con-
fronted with a problem not often presented to the Court.2 The defendant,
'0 Smyth Sales, Inc. v. Petroleum Heat and Power Co., 128 F. 2d 697 (3d Cir.
1942) ; Mike v. Lian, 322 Pa. 353, 185 Atl. 775 (1936) ; 86 C. J. S., Torts § 24
(1954).
"Lewis v. Shaver, 236 N. C. 510, 73 S. E. 2d 320 (1952) ; Powers v. Planters
Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 219 N. C. 254, 13 S. E. 2d 431 (1941) ; Bank of Spruce
Pine v. McKinney, 209 N. C. 668, 184 S. E. 506 (1936) ; Gordon v. Fredle, 206
N. C. 734, 175 S. E. 126 (1934) ; State v. Grizzard, 117 N. C. 105, 23 S. E. 93
(1895).
'2219 N. C. 254, 13 S. E. 2d 431 (1941).
48 Id. at 256, 13 S. E. 2d at 432.
' 245 N. C. 232, 95 S. E. 2d 450 (1956).
For North Carolina cases dealing generally with this problem see, Scott v.
Veneer Co., 240 N. C. 73, 81 S. E. 2d 146 (1954) ; Jarman v. Offutt, 239 N. C. 468,
80 S. E. 2d 248 (1954); Perry v. Perry, 153 N. C. 266, 69 S. E. 130 (1910);
Taylor v. Huff, 130 N. C. 595, 41 S. E. 873 (1902) ; Ramsey v. Cheek, 109 N. C.
270, 13 S. E. 775 (1891); Nissen v. Cramer, 104 N. C. 574, 10 S. E. 270 (1889);
Shelfer v. Gooding, 47 N. C. 175 (1855) ; Biggs v. Byrd, 34 N. C. 377 (1851).
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a defense attorney in a prior criminal trial, had told the jury that the
plaintiff, a witness for the state, had a "mental condition" and that was
the reason for his testifying against his client. Thereafter the plaintiff
brought this action based on the alleged slanderous statements. The
lower court sustained a demurrer to the complaint and the plaintiff ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court affirmed and in so doing discussed the two
prevailing rules regarding the attorney's absolute privilege or immunity
from civil prosecution for defamatory matter published in the course of a
judicial proceeding. The rule in England is settled that judges, counsel,
parties, and witnesses are absolutely exempt from responsibility for
words, otherwise defamatory, published in the course of a judicial pro-
ceeding.4 The majority of courts in this country have refused to extend
the privilege this far, requiring that the defamatory matter published in
a judicial proceeding, in order to be absolutely privileged, be pertinent,
relevant, or material to the proceeding at hand.5 The minority view in
this country is to the effect that the attorney's privilege is conditional,0
i.e., the defamatory matter is privileged if material and made with prob-
able cause without malice. According to this view, if the plaintiff can
prove malice on the part of the attorney in publishing the defamatory
matter the privilege is destroyed, and the plaintiff has a good cause of
action for libel or slander. This position is squarely opposed to the
weight of authority in this country.7 Under the majority view, if the
defamatory publication is pertinent, material, or relevant to the issue at
hand, it is privileged notwithstanding the fact it was published maliciously
and falsely.8 The rule of the Restatement of Torts9 is even more broad
than the majority rule, permitting the publication to be privileged if it
"has some relation" to the judicial proceeding, thereby omitting the re-
quirement of relevancy.' 0 The Restatement has been followed in a
recent federal case."
' See Veeder, Absolute Immunity it Defamation: Judicial Proceeding, 9 COLUM.
L. REv. 463, 469 (1909).
'11 Q. B. D. 588, 603 (C. A. 1883); 33 Am. JUR., Libel and Slander § 146(1941).
Wall v. Blalock, 245 N. C. 232, 95 S. E. 2d 450 (1956) ; 30 N. Y. U. L. REv.
171, 178 (1955).
'White v. Nichols, 44 U. S. (3 How.) 266 (1845) (dictum) ; Atlanta News
Pub. Co. v. Medlock, 123 Ga. 714, 51 S. E. 756 (1905); Waldo v. Morrison, 220
La. 1006, 58 So. 2d 210 (1952); Viosca v. Landfried, 140 La. 690, 73 So. 698
(1916) ; Andrews v. Gardiner, 224 N. Y. 440, 121 N. E. 341 (1918).
Shelfer v. Gooding, 47 N. C. 175 (1855) (An attorney may choose to say what-
ever is relevant and pertinent to the matter before the court, and no inquiry will be
made into his motives) ; La. Porta v. Leonard, 88 N. J. L. 666, 97 A. 251 (1916)
(Counsel is not liable in a slander action even if the words spoken were maliciotis
and intended to defame, provided the words were relevant and pertinent).
833 Am. Jun., LIBEL AND SLANDER § 146 (1941) ; 53 C. J. S., Libel and Slander
§ 104 (1948).
'3 RESTATEMENT, Torts, § 586 (1938).10Ibid., comment a (1938).11Ginsbury v. Black, 192 F. 2d 823 (7th Cir. 1951).
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The attorney's privilege is based on public policy. 12 Public policy
dictates that the attorney be free to speak and write whatever is relevant
and material to the cause without fear of being harassed with slander
suits and by attempts to prove that he acted maliciously and irrelevantly
in the discharge of his duties toward his client.' 3 The power of this
privilege is obvious. It permits an attorney to violate maliciously an
individual's basic right not to be slandered, and yet remain exempt from
civil or criminal' 4 prosecution provided the defamatory matter was per-
tinent and relevant.15
Since the judicial proceeding is the most obvious instance for allowing
this privilege, this necessitates an inquiry into two things: (1) What tests
have the majority of courts applied in determining relevancy, pertinency,
or materiality? (2) What is the nature of a judicial proceeding to
which the attorney's privilege attaches ?16 Prosser states that the test
of pertinency adopted in this country is a standard of good faith,17 re-
quiring only that the statement or writing have some "reasonable rela-
tion" or reference to the subject of inquiry,' 8 or be one that may "possibly
be pertinent."'91 The earlier cases applied a stricter test, even to the
extent of requiring colorable evidential relevance.20 But the modern
trend is opposed to this test, and it is well settled that a defamatory
publication does not have to meet the test of legal relevance. 21 Possibly
the most liberal test is one applied in a recent North Carolina decision,
Scott v. Statesville Plywood and Veneer Co.,22 where the court said,
". .. the matter to which this privilege does not extend must be so
palpably irrelevant to the subject matter of the controversy that no
reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy or impropriety.
23
In regard to the nature of a judicial proceeding to which the at-
torney's privilege attaches, there are certain prerequisites common to all
2Wall v. Blalock, 245 N. C. 232, 95 S. E. 2d 450 (1956) ; Shelfer v. Gooding, 47
N. C. 175 (1855).
23 Ibid.
1" La Porta v. Leonard, 88 N. J. L. 666, 97 A. 251 (1916).
2r 30 N. Y. U. L. REv. 171, 172 (1955).
"Veeder, op. cit. supra note 2 at 484.
17 PROSSER, TORTS, § 95 at 609 (2d ed. 1955).
16 Ginsburg v. Black, 192 F. 2d 823 (7th Cir. 1951) ; 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS,
§ 586, comment c (1938).1 Bleeker v. Drury, 149 F. 2d 770 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Lefler v. Clark, 287 N. Y.
Supp. 476, 247 App. Div. 402 (1936) ; People v. Warden of City Prison, 258 N. Y.
55, 179 N. E. 257 (1936).
2! Carpenter v. Ashley, 148 Cal. 422, 83 P. 444 (1906) ; Myers v. Hodges, 53
Fla. 197, 44 So. 357 (1907) ; Hasting v. Lusk, 22 Wend. 410 (N. Y. 1839) ; Dodge
v. Gilman, 122 Minn. 177, 142 N. W. 147 (1913).
"
2 Taliafero v. Sims, 187 F. 2d 6 (5th Cir. 1951) ; Johnston v. Shlarb, 7 Wash.
2d 528, 110 P. 2d 190 (1941).
2240 N. C. 73, 81 S. E. 2d 146 (1954).
23Id. at 76, 81 S. E. 2d 146, 149 (1954); See also, McGinnis v. Philips, 224
Mo. App. 702, 27 S. W. 2d 468 (1930).
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proceedings24 that must be complied with before counsel is exempt from
liability. These are: (1) the attorney must be acting in a professional
capacity when he publishes the defamation ;25 (2) the court or tribunal
must have jurisdiction over the subject matter ;20 (3) and the proceeding
must have commenced at the time of the publication.27 Assuming these
requirements have been met, it has been held that the term judicial pro-
ceeding includes all actions in law and equity whether in tribunals of
general or limited jurisdiction, whether public or not, ex parte or other-
wise,28 and that all communications pertinent to the judicial proceeding
are accorded an absolute privilege.2 9 Furthermore, it has been held that
communications are privileged even as against a third party, i.e., a
party who is not connected in any way with the judicial proceeding in
which the defamation was published, 30 and the immunity has been ex-
tended to cover letters written by at attorney for his client.3 ' As a gen-
eral rule all communications are privileged which constitute a "step in,"
or "arise out of a judicial proceeding," or "have some relation thereto."8 -2
The immunity granted counsel is not limited solely to "judicial pro-
ceedings," but has been enlarged to cover "quasi-judicial" proceedings.83
2' See 30 N. Y. U. L. REv. 171, 172 (1955).
3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 586, comment c (1938).28Accord: Anonymous v. Trenkman, 48 F. 2d 571 (2d Cir. 1931); Taylor v.
Alropa Corp., 138 Fla. 137, 189 So. 230 (1939) ; Parker v. Kirkland, 298 Ill. App.
304, 18 N. E. 2d 707 (1939). Contra: Bleecker v. Drury, 149 F. 2d 770 (2d Cir.
1945) ; PROSSER, TORTS, § 95 (2d ed. 1955).
" Robinson v. Home Fire Ins. Co., 242 Iowa 1120, 69 N. W. 2d 521 (1951) (An
attorney is privileged to publish false and defamatory matter of another in the
institution of, or during the course and as a part of judicial proceeding in which
he participates as counsel, if it has some relation thereto) ; Roberts v. Pratt, 174
Misc. 585, 21 N. Y. S. 2d 549 (1940) (The commencement of a judicial proceeding
does not necessarily mean the actual beginning of the court session. The privilege
arises immediately on the doing of any act required or permitted by law in due
course of a judicial proceeding, and it is not absolutely essential that the slanderous
language be used in open court, or in the communications therein); Beezley v.
Hansen, 4 Utah 2d 64, 286 P. 2d 1057 (1955) (Where relationship of attorney and
his client existed at a time when alleged slanderous words were published in the
presence of only the attorney and his client and pertained to suit, such publication, if
made, was absolutely privileged).
2'53 C. J. S., Libel and Slander, § 104 (1948) ; PROSSER, Torts, § 95 (2d ed.
1955).
"Taliafero v. Sims, 187 F. 2d 6 (5th Cir. 1951) (pleading); Fletcher v.
Maupin, 138 F. 2d 742 (4th Cir. 1943) (pleading) ; Anonymous v. Trenkman, 48
F. 2d 571 (2d Cir. 1931) (pleading) ; Schmitt v. Mann, 219 Ky. 80, 163 S. W. 2d
281 (1942) (libelous affidavit filed for a new trial after judgment has been entered) ;
Speenburgh v. Schwartz, 156 Misc. 508, 300 N. Y. S. 196 (1937) (pleading) ; Scott
v. Veneer Co., 240 N. C. 73, 81 S. E. 2d 146 (1954) (pleading) ; Perry v. Perry,
153 N. C. 266, 69 S. E. 130 (1910) (affidavit).
" Viera v. Meredith, 123 A. 2d 743 (R. I. 1956) (third party libeled in de-
fendant's answer).
" Richardson v. Keesler, 73 Idaho 548, 255 P. 2d 707 (1953) (letter written
by attorney to the presiding judge) ; Zirn v. Collum, 187 Misc. 241, 63 N. Y. S. 2d
439 (1946) (letter to adversary regarding settlement).
' Ibid.
"Myer v. Parr, 69 Ohio App. 344, 37 N. E. 2d 637 (1941) ; Shumway v. War-
rick, 108 Neb. 652, 189 N. W. 30 (1922).
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The courts differ as to what is a "quasi-judicial proceeding,"3 4 but the
test for determining whether to extend the privilege to a certain admin-
istrative agency is an examination of the agency's procedural require-
ments.35 If similar to the procedure in a court and the agency has power
to punish for contempt, the court will generally extend the privilege.
36
However, confusion still exists in this area. For example, in Andrews
v. Gardiner,3 7 the court held that an application presented to the Gov-
ernor of the state in a pardoning proceeding was not a "quasi-judicial"
proceeding, and accordingly, was not absolutely privileged. On the
other hand, in Brown v. Glove Printing Co.,38 it was held that a pro-
ceeding before the Governor to extradite a fugitive from justice was a
"quasi-judicial" proceeding. In this area North Carolina has by statute3 9
extended the doctrine of immunity to include defamatory publications in
lunacy proceedings.40
More specifically, it has been held that the privilege extends to ad-
ministrative agencies such as a county tax board,41 a state Labor Com-
missioner,42 a state Banking Board,43 a Director of a state's Milk In-
dustry,44 an Industrial Board,45 and to proceedings in receivership.
46
The absolute privilege of an attorney to make defamatory statements
in the course of a judicial or "quasi-judicial" proceeding is well estab-
lished, as long as the statement is relevant. Without question this rule
is subject to serious abuse. Qiwra should attorneys be immune from
liability for defamatory matter published in the course of a judicial
proceeding for purposes other than the administration of justice and in
the legitimate defense of their client's rights?
JAMES M. JOHNSON.
" 53 C. J. S., Libel and Slander § 104 (1946).
" Roberston v. Industrial Ins. Co., 75 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1954).
"' McAlister and Co. v. Jenkins, 214 Ky. 802, 284 S. W. 88 (1926).
.7224 N. Y. 440, 121 N. E. 342 (1918).
88213 Mo. App. 611, 112 S. W. 462 (1908).
"N. C. GEN. STAT. § 122-42 (1952) ; Jarman v. Offutt, 239 N. C. 468, 80 S. E.
2d 248 (1954).40 Ibid.
4' Parker v. Kirkland, 98 Ill. 340, 18 N. E. 2d (1939).
41 White v. United Mills Co., 240 Mo. App. 443, 208 S. W. 2d 803 (1948).
"Shumway v. Warrick, 108 Neb. 652, 189 N. W. 301 (1922).
"Rainer's Dairies v. Raritan Valley Farms, 15 Ohio St. 330, 117 A. 2d 889
(1955).4'Bleeker v. Drury, 149 F. 2d 770 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Lipton v. Friedman, 2 Misc.
2d 165, 152 N. Y. S. 2d 261 (1956).
" Bartlett v. Christhilf, 69 Md. 156, 14 A. 518 (1818).
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Service of Process--Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations
Three recent decisions, one by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit' and two by the North Carolina Supreme Court,2
focus attention on conflicting views concerning a foreign corporation's
amenability to suit in a state where it conducts some activities but is not
licensed to do business.3  The North Carolina General Assembly pro-
vided by statute for service of process on foreign corporations "not trans-
acting business in this State," but which engage in certain specified
activity.4 In two of the afore-mentioned decisions, the courts took a
restrictive view of state jurisdiction over such corporations and held
the statute unconstitutional as applied to the facts of each case;, in the
third decision, the statute was upheld.0
An examination of these cases should perhaps be prefaced by a brief
consideration of the judicial history of state jurisdiction over foreign
corporations. The subject has not had constancy as one of its character-
istics. Originally, the view was taken that a corporation could be sued
only in the state that created it.7 This view was superseded by the "im-
plied consent" theory,8 which in turn was replaced by the "presence"
theory.9 Actually, these last two theories relied on the same criterion,
viz., whether or not the corporation was "doing business" in the state.
Since a state has power to keep a foreign corporation out,' 0 when the
corporation entered the state its "implied consent" to be sued therein was
' Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F. 2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956).
'Painter v. Home Finance Co., 245 N. C. 576, 96 S. E. 2d 731 (1957) aiid
Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 245 N. C. 432, 96 S. E. 2d 445 (1957).
'No difficulty arises in situations in which a foreign corporation actually con-
sents to being sued by appointing an agent to receive service of process, and service
is made pursuant to the statute. Re Louisville Underwriters, 134 U. S. 488 (1890) ;
Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U. S. 369 (1878). There may be a problem in such
a situation, however, concerning the scope of the agent's authority, i.e. whether it
extends to causes of action arising in other jurisdictions, or is based solely on
corporate acts within the territory of the forum. See In Morris & Co. v. Scan-
dinavia Ins. Co., 279 U. S. 405 (1929) and Louisville and N. R. Co. v. Chatters, 279
U. S. 320 (1929).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-38.1 and 55-38.2 (Supp. 1955). The activities speci-
fied are set out on p. -, infra.
Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 245 N. C. 432, 96 S. E. 2d 445 (1957)
and Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F. 2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956).
' Painter v. Home Finance Co., 245 N. C. 576, 96 S. E. 2d 731 (1957).
'Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U. S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839), where Chief
Justice Taney stated: "It is very true, that a corporation can have no legal
existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty by which it is created. It exists
only in contemplation of law, and by force of the law; and where that law ceases
to operate, and is no longer obligatory, the corporation can have no existence. Jt
must dwell in the place of its creation, and cannot migrate to another sovereignty."
' St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350 (1882); Insurance Co. v. French, 59 U. S.
(18 How.) 404 (1855).
'Barrow Steamship Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. 100 (1897).
"0 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U. S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868); 23 Am. JUR., Foreign
Corporations § 235 (1939).
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constructed by the courts.' But a foreign corporation had entered a
state (so as to give its "implied consent" to suit) only when it was "doing
business" therein.1 2  And a foreign corporation was not "present" in
the state unless it was "doing business" therein,13 thus the common
criterion. 14
It was early established that state jurisdiction over a foreign corpora-
tion was primarily a question of due process of law, and that a personal
judgment against a defendant, whether individual or corporate, over
whom the court has no jurisdiction, violates the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution and is void.'5
The test of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations was analyzed
and overhauled by the United States Supreme Court in International
Shoe Co. v. State of Washington,' which today remains the landmark
case in this field of the law. It has been almost universally cited as
having liberalized, i.e., extended, state jurisdiction over foreign corpora-
tions. This is true notwithstanding the Washington Supreme Court's
having held the corporation subject to suit in the state under the already
well-established rule that "solicitation within a state by the agents of a
foreign corporation plus some additional activities there are sufficient
to render the corporation amenable to suit brought in the courts of the
state to enforce an obligation arising out of its activities there."'17 In
affirming judgment, the United States Supreme Court nowhere refuted
this basis for the state court's decision. However, the opinion manifests
an obvious intent to overhaul the test for state jurisdiction over foreign
corporations, so the fact that it was done by dicta is probably of no
consequence.
"PRESENCE" TEST: DISCARDED OR DISGUISED?
Characterizing the "implied consent" rule as a mere legal fiction' s
and the "presence" test as begging the question,'9 the Court pronounced
"St. Clair v. Cox, 106'U. S. 350 (1882). "Ibid.
" International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579 (1914); Green v.
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 205 U. S. 530 (1907).
" It should be noted that there are three degrees of "doing business" for three
different legal purposes: (1) the least degree is that which will permit service of
process in a suit against a foreign corporation; (2) a higher degree is necessary
to subject such a corporation to a tax on its activity; (3) a still higher degree is
the standard for the application of statutes requiring qualification in the state. See
Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing Business, 25 Col. L. Rev. 1018 (1925) ; Travelers
Health Assn. v. Virginia, 339 U. S. 643 (1950).
Consideration is herein related only to the first of these legal purposes, viz.,
the state's power to serve its process on a foreign., corporation so as to validly
subject it to a judgment ii personain.
"Riverside and Dan River Cotton Mills v. Menefee, 237 U. S. 189 (1915);
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877).
x6326 U. S. 310 (1945). 17Id. at 314.
Is Id. at 318.
" Id. at 317. "To say that the corporation is so far 'present' there as to satisfy
due process requirements, for purposes of taxation or the maintenance of suits
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a statement which may be said to epitomize the International Shoe doc-
trine: "[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant
to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory
of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.' "20 The Court's usage of the phrase, "if he be
not present," and its characterization of the "presence" test as begging
the question to be decided apparently furnished the motivation for
courts and commentators to conclude that the International Shoe de-
cision discarded the "presence" test (and its criterion, "doing busi-
ness") .21 This conclusion, even if technically correct, may tend to state
too much. It implies that no longer must a corporation have agents pres-
ent in the state, doing business, as a requisite to its being subject to suit
therein.22 It implies that no longer will courts think in terms of "pres-
ence," and that (since "'presence' of a corporation can be manifested
only by activities of those authorized to act for it") 2a a foreign corpora-
tion may be subjected to suit in a state wherein not one of its agents ever
set foot. That such an inference may be drawn seems attested to by
statutes such as the one herein considered,24 designed to confer on the
state jurisdiction over foreign corporations not doing business in the
state, and making a basis for jurisdiction such acts as the corporation's
making "any contract . . . in this State," or its repeated solicitation of
business in the state by mail.2 5 The validity of such a statute rests on
the dubious assumption that the "minimum contacts" doctrine of Inter-
national Shoe altogether excludes the necessity of the corporation having
agents physically present in the state asserting jurisdiction.
against it in the courts of the state, is to beg the question to be decided. For the
terms 'present' or 'presence' are used merely to symbolize those activities of the
corporation's agent within the state which courts will deem, to be sufficient to
satisfy the demands of due process."
" Id. at 316. The case is said to have laid down the test of "minimum' con-
tacts," also referred to in the opinion as "contacts, ties, or relations." Id. at 319.
" This is a stock observation of courts and commentators interpreting the
decision. E.g., see Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 245 N. C. 432, 96
S. E. 2d 445 (1957) ; and Notes, 16 U. CHL L. REv. 523 (1949) and 30 N. C. L.
REv. 454 (1952). This is not to say that the observation is not technically correct,
since, in name, the "presence" test was quite obviously replaced by the "minimum
contacts" test.
"2The fact. that a foreign corporation attempts to withdraw from the state
after having made transactions giving rise to the liability sued on does not affect
the power of the forum to subject the corporation to suit. Washington ex rel.
Bond & Goodwin & Tucker v. Superior Court, 289 U. S. 361 (1933); Mutual Re-
serve Fund Life Assn. v. Phelps, 190 U. S. 147 (1903) ; Connecticut Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 602 (1899).
28 International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U. S. at 316.
2" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-38.1 (Supp. 1955).
"-Id., subsection (a), subdivisions (1) and (2). For statutes of other states
similar to the one herein considered, see Compania De Astral, S. A. v. Boston
Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A. 2d 357 (1954), cert. den., 348 U. S. 943; Smyth v.
Twin State Improvement Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A. 2d 664 (1951).
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It may seem obstinate to argue that the Court did not intend to dis-
pense with presence of the corporation's agents as a requisite to juris-
diction when it flatly stated: "if he be not present within the territory
of the forum, he [must] have certain minimum contacts with it . ..."26
But following this statement, the Court cited Milliken v. Meyer,27 from
which was quoted the phrase, "traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice." 28  There, the defendant, an individual domiciled in
Wyoming, was personally served with Wyoming process while in Col-
orado, pursuant to a Wyoming statute authorizing such service. It was
held that the defendant's domicile in Wyoming was a sufficient basis
for the extra-territorial service.
Few would contest a state's jurisdiction over a domestic corpora-
tion, though all its officers, directors, employees, agents, and security
holders be out of the state. Therefore, the statement in International
Shoe, "if he be not present," as applied to a corporation, merely refers
to a foreign corporation, and not necessarily a foreign corporation whose
agents have never been physically present in the state asserting jurisdic-
tion over it. In Milliken v. Meyer, the defendant's domicile in Wyoming
provided the basis for that state's extra-territorial jurisdiction over him.
Since there can be no such basis where a foreign corporation is con-
cerned,29 it seems doubtful that the Court in International Shoe intended
by the statement, "if he be not present," to discard the "presence" theory
to the extent that a state could acquire jurisdiction over a foreign corpo-
ration whose agents have never been physically present in the state. This
doubt is strengthened by the Court's statement that the "presence" of a
corporation can be manifested only by activities of those authorized to
act for it, and that the terms "present" or "presence" are used merely
to symbolize those activities of the corporation's agents "within the
state" (Emphasis added) which courts will deem sufficient to satisfy the
demands of due process3 0 Any inference that the Court had ceased to
think in terms of "presence" would seem to be negated by two sentences
in the final paragraph of the opinion: "For Washington has made one of
.11326 U. S. at 316.
27 311 U. S. 457 (1940).
8 The Court in Milliken v. Meyer, supra note 27, had borrowed the terms "fair
play" and "substantial justice" from Holmes, J., in McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S.
90, 91 (1917).
" Except perhaps when a foreign corporation domesticates, but it is extremely
unlikely that the Court had such a situation in mind.
20 International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U. S. at 316, 317. Fur-
thermore, it was stated that where a corporate agent is only casually present within
the state or he conducts only single or isolated items of activity, it would lay too
great and unreasonable a burden on the corporation to comport with due process
to require the corporation to defend the suit away from its home or other jurisdic-
tion where it carries on more substantial activities.
It would seem non sequitur that since casual presence will not suffice, no
presence will.
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those activities [viz., employing salesmen within the state], which taken
together establish appellant's [the corporation's] 'presence' there for
purposes of suit, the taxable event by which the state brings appellant
within the reach of its taxing power. . . . The activities which estab-
lish its 'presence' subject it alike to taxation by the state and to suit to
recover the tax."3'
On first impression, Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia32 appears to
justify the inference that "presence" is no longer a consideration. There,
the defendant mail-order health insurance association, located in Ne-
braska, had for years been issuing insurance certificates to Virginia
residents upon recommendations of Virginia "members." It was held
that Virginia, under its "Blue Sky Law," had power to issue a cease and
desist order to enforce at least the requirement that the defendant consent
to suit against it by service of process on the secretary of state. The
Court's opinion, by Black, J., stated: "But where business activities
reach out beyond one state and create continuing relationships and obliga-
tions with citizens of another state, courts need not resort to a fictional
'consent' in order to sustain the jurisdiction of regulatory agencies in
the latter state."3 3  Although the defendant had "caused claims to be
investigated,"' 4 it solicited its insurance solely by mail. Thus, it might
appear that "presence" is not essential for jurisdiction. However, five
justices expressed opinions to the contrary. Four of them dissented
because in their opinion: "No agent of the appellant corporation has
entered the State. . . . The contracts were made wholly in Nebraska.
Under these circumstances, I would hold that appellants were never
'present' in Virginia."3  Douglas, J., concurring with the four-man
opinion of the Court by Black, J., expressed the opinion that the Vir-
ginia members of the defendant association were for all practical pur-
poses "agents" of defendant; thus, he found "presence."30  Justice
11Id. at 321. " 339 U. S. 643 (1950).
33 Id. at 647. 34 Id. at 646.
"Id. at 658. Minton, J., writing the dissent, also stated. "As I understand the
International Shoe Co. case, the minimum contacts which a corporation has in the
state must be 'activities of the corporation's agent within the State.'" Id. at 658,
659.
"Id. at 654, 655: "Where the corporate project entails the use of one or more
people in the state for the solicitation of business, in my view it does no violence
to the traditional concept of due process to allow the state to provide protective
measures governing that solicitation."
The seemingly unique treatment reserved for the defendant foreign insurance
corporation is further illustrated by a North Carolina case factually in point with
the Travelers Health case, where the defendant was held to be "doing business"
within the meaning of that term as used in a statute conferring jurisdiction over
foreign insurance companies, the court stating: "The dominant purpose of such a
statute is to protect residents of the State from being imposed upon by foreign
insurance companies. In case any such company offers to ao business with one
within such protection, it holds itself out as having qualified to do such business,
and the resident, in the absence of knowledge, actual or constructive, to the
[Vol. 35
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Douglas also pointed to the wide power of a state by virtue of the
McCarran Act3 7 to exclude an interstate insurance company which re-
fuses to comply with its regulatory laws. 38 Thus, it might be more ac-
curate to cite this case as supporting, rather than opposing, the theory
that a foreign corporation's agents must have been present in the state
for jurisdiction to obtain.
It is not doubted that in International Shoe the "minimum con-
tacts" test was meant to supersede the "presence" test. However, the
change seems to have been one chiefly of terminology.39  On the other
hand, regardless of the Court's intention, the result has been to liberalize
the law, i.e., to give the states wider jurisdiction over foreign corpora-
tions by requiring less activities of them in the territory of the forum
to subject them to suit there.40  Indeed, the very adoption of the term
"minimum contacts" as the test, with the resultant deemphasis of the
terms "presence" and "doing business," is a semantic indication that less
will now suffice.
CONVENIENCE As A FACTOR
Three factors were deemed weighty in determining whether the for-
eign corporation had established "minimum contacts . .. such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.'" They were: (1) whether the activities within
the state have been continuous and systematic or only single or isolated ;41
(2) whether or not the activities give rise to the liabilities sued on ;42 and
(3) an estimate of the inconveniences which would result to the corpora-
tion from a trial away from its "home" or principal place of business.4 3
The first two were merely a recognition of factors deemed pertinent in
contrary, may safely act upon the faith thereof." Lunceford v. Commercial
Travelers Mutual Accident Assn., 190 N. C. 314, 129 S. E. 805 (1925), followed
in Suits v. Old Equity Life Ins. Co., 241 N. C. 483, 85 S. E. 2d 602 (1955), which
cited the Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia and International Shoe cases.
S59 STAT. 33, h. 20, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011-1015 (1945).
"Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia, 339 U. S. at 652.
"See Tudge Sobeloff's statement to this effect in Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes
Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F. 2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956). Justice Rutledge, writing the
opinion in Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U. S. 416, 422 (1946), said that
International Shoe decided that regular and continuous solicitation constitutes "'do-
ing business,' contrary to formerly prevailing notions."
"' See, for example, Compania De Astral, S. A. v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md.
237, 107 A. 2d 357 (1954), cert. den., 348 U. S. 943; Johns v. Bay State Abrasive
Products Co., 89 F. Supp. 654 (D. C. Md. 1950); Smyth v. Twin State Improve-
ment Corp., 116 Vt. 569, 80 A. 2d 664 (1951).
41326 U. S. at 317.
4" Ibid.
" Ibid., quoting L. Hand, J., in Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F. 2d 139,
141 (2d Cir. 1930). No mention was made of the plaintiff's convenience, although
Black, J., alluded to such in his dissent, stating that in his opinion the Constitution
gave the states power "to open the doors of its courts for its citizens to sue corpora-
tions whose agents do business in those States. . . ." Id. at 323.
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earlier decisions, 44 and so well-founded as to need no elaboration here.
The third one, however, constituted a new element of consideration, 4 5
the propriety of which seems arguable. Perhaps it should be noted that
the accuracy in assigning considerations of convenience as underlying the
International Shoe case has been questioned,46 but it appears to have
been only a voice in the wilderness. 47 In fact, the opinion in Travelers
Health Assn. v. Virginia affirms the existence of this consideration and
goes further to bring in a consideration of the local citizens' inconveni-
ence in having to sue the foreign corporation in its home state, likening
the matter to the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 48 In the opinion
of Judge Learned Hand, International Shoe holds that in order to de-
termine jurisdiction "the court must balance the conflicting interests in-
volved; i.e., whether the gain to the plaintiff in retaining the action where
it was, outweighed the burden imposed upon the defendant; or vice
versa. That question is certainly indistinguishable from the issue of
'forum non conveniens.' -49
That considerations of mere convenience of the parties are proper
in this jurisdictional issue, and a comparison of these considerations to
forum non conveniens seem highly questionable. One obvious fallacy
appears in the comparison: Forum non conveniens presupposes the de-
fendant's amenability to suit in the forum exercising the doctrine, but if
the forum is not the convenient one it may decline to exercise its juris-
diction ;50o whereas, in the International Shoe type case the very issue is
whether the forum has jurisdiction, and the convenience element is in-
" Ibid., citing the earlier decisions in which these factors were deemed rele-
vant.
However, the Court further stated that the test to determine whether there has
been sufficient activity in the state to subject the foreign corporation to suit there
"cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative," but "must depend ,rather upon the
quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administra-
tion.of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure." Id.
at 319. This "quality and nature" criterion was expressly drawn from the non-
resident motorist situation (Id. at 318, citing Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. 160,
Hess. v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352, and Young v. Masci, 289 U. S. 253), thus making
it of dubious value in the ordinary foreign corporation situation where the suit
does not usually rise from an auto accident, or even a tort.
" New, that is, in United States Supreme Court decisions. L. Hand, J., had
injected this element into the picture in Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F. 2d
139 (2d Cir. 1930), which the Supreme Court relied on considerably in Interna-
tional Shoe, at 316-317.
" Note, 61 HARV. L. Rrv. 1254, 1255 (1948).
" No other commentary or decision taking this position has been discovered.
339 U. S. at 648, 649.
"Kilpatrick v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 166 F. 2d 788 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. den. 335
U. S. 814, criticized in Note, 61 HARV. L. REv. 1254 (1948).
" "Indeed the doctrine of formn non conveniens can never apply if there is
absence of jurisdiction or mistake of venue." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S.
501, 504 (1947). "In all cases in which the doctrine of forum non conveniens comes
into play, it presupposes at least two forums in which the defendant is amenable
to process; the doctrine furnishes criteria for choice between them." Id. at 506,
507.
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tended to go to the root of the issue of jurisdiction vel non. Moreover,
it seems doubtful that the underlying principles of the two theories are
in harmony. Briefly stated, forum non conveniens is designed to secure
trial in the most appropriate forum from the standpoint of justice for
all parties,51 whereas the International Shoe doctrine is concerned only
with inconvenience to the defendant foreign corporation.52 Of course,
the Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia opinion, by Black, J. (who
vigorously dissented in International Shoe for fear state jurisdiction was
being curtailed) '  injected into the International Shoe doctrine the
additional factor of the plaintiff's convenience.54 It may be wondered
that the two considerations do not cancel each other, since what will be
convenient for one will be inconvenient for the other, and vice versa.
The foreign corporation presents a novelty, its presence in the forum de-
pending as it does upon the activities of those who act for it. But to
condition a state's jurisdiction on the convenience of the defendant (or of
either, or both, parties) is indeed novel. What is to be the result when
convenience is actually no factor, e.g. a New Jersey corporation doing
business in Jersey City, New Jersey, and having only minimal contacts
with the state of New York, being sued in a court in New York City
by a resident thereof. Will the fact that suit in New York City will
work no great inconvenience to the corporation suffice to give the New
York court jurisdiction over a foreign corporation not present, doing
""Important considerations are the relative ease of access to sources of proof;
availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of
obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view
would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make
trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. There may also be questions as
to the enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained. The court will weigh
relative advantages and obstacles to fair trial. It is often said that the plaintiff may
not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, 'vex,' 'harass,' or 'oppress' the defendant
by inflicting upon him expense or trouble not necessary to his own right to pursue
his remedy. But unless tire balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the
plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed. (Emphasis added.)
"Factors of public interest also have place in applying the doctrine. Admin-
istrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in congested
centers instead of being handled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden that ought not
to be imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the litiga-
tion. In cases which touch the affairs of many persons, there is reason for holding
the trial in their view and reach rather than in remote parts of the country where
they can learn of it by report only. There is a local interest in having localized
controversies decided at home. There is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial
of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the state law that must govern
the case, rather than having a court in some other forum untangle problems in
conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself." Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U. S.
501, 508 (1947).
In the typical International Shoe type case, it is likely that few of these con-
siderations would weigh in the foreign corporation's favor.
'2 326 U. S. at 317. See note 43, supra.
Id. at 323, where Black, J., stated: "It [the Court] has thus introduced un-
certain elements confusing the simple pattern and tending to curtail the exercise of
State powers to an extent not justified by the Constitution."
51339 U. S. at 648, 649.
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business, in New York? In short, will convenience supply part of the
requisite "minimum contacts ?" If so, then, conversely, considerable in-
convenience to the corporation would result in lack of jurisdiction where
only the barest "minimum [business] contacts" exist.
If the convenience element is designed to secure justice (due
process), it is also designed to defy statutory definition or reasonable
predictability by the parties. Each case must hinge, to some extent at
least, on the distance between the foreign corporation's home or principal
place of business and the court where suit is brought. No reason appears
for showing more concern for the foreign corporation's convenience than
is shown for the individual defendant's convenience.65 As respects due
process, either type of defendant is afforded the most a party should have
a right to expect in the way of demanding another forum, by virtue of
the doctrine of forum non conveniens, to be exercised in the interests of
a fair trial-not for one party's mere convenience, which must necessarily
be at the inconvenience of his adversary.
INTERNATIONAL SHOE INTERPRETED
Apparently interpreting the International Shoe decision liberally,
the 1955 North Carolina General Assembly enacted General Statute
§ 55-38.1, pertinent parts of which read: "(a) Every foreign corpora-
tion shall be subject to suit in this State, by a resident of this State or
by a person having a usual place of business in this State, whether or not
such foreign corporation is transacting or has transacted business in this
State ... on any cause of action arising as follows: . . . (3) Out of the
production, manufacture, or distribution of goods by such corporation
with the reasonable expectation that those goods are to be used or con-
sumed in this State and are so used or consumed, regardless of how or
where the goods were produced, manufactured, marketed, or sold or
whether or not through the medium of independent contractors or
dealers; or (4) Out of tortious conduct in this State, whether arising
out of repeated activity or single acts, and whether arising out of mis-
feasance or nonfeasance."
In Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc.,56 subdivision (3) of the
above statute was declared unconstitutional as applied to the facts of that
case.57 Defendant foreign corporation published magazines in Phila-
delphia and sold them to eighteen independent wholesale newsdealers in
North Carolina, title passing upon delivery by defendant to the com-
mon carrier in Philadelphia. The magazines were paid for at defend-
ant's Philadelphia or Washington offices, no offices of any kind being
"Apparently, none is shown. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 (1927);
Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U. S. 623 (1935).
r" 245 N. C. 432, 96 S. E. 2d 445 (1957).6 Id. at 443, 96 S. E. 2d at 454.
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maintained in North Carolina. Some subscriptions were solicited by
mail, but the cause of action did not arise out of such solicitations. Three
sales promotion representatives entered North Carolina, from two to five
times a year each, for purposes of promoting sales to newsdealers and
television dealers. Plaintiff's alleged cause of action was for libel and
invasion of privacy as a result of an article appearing in one of de-
fendant's magazifies.
It was held that the defendant had no "contacts, ties, or relations
with North Carolina, so as to make it amenable to service of process from
the Courts of the State for the purpose of a judgment in personam
against it. The occasional visits of agents of the defendant .. , are not
deemed sufficient to render the defendant liable to suit in the State
Courts. Upon all the facts found by the judge, he correctly concluded
that defendant has not transacted or done business in the State. .... ,,58
The case of Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp.,59 was dis-
tinguished on grounds indistinguishable from the "presence" theory;
thus: "In that case the defendant was in the State of Vermont and
committed the tort in the state."'60 Although International Shoe Co.
v. State of Washington was quoted extensively61 and Travelers Health
Ass'n. v. Virginia was cited,6 2 no attempt was made to base the de-
cision on inconvenience to the corporation; indeed, the convenience
factor was not even adverted to.
The Court cited with approval the recent case of Erlanger Mills,
Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc.,63 where it was held that subdivision
(3) of the same statute64 may not validly subject a foreign corporation
not doing business in North Carolina to the jurisdiction of the state for
a breach of warranty action arising from a single sale consummated in
New York "with the reasonable expectation that those goods are to be
used or consumed in [North Carolina] and are so used or consumed.
65
Sobeloff, J., writing the Erlanger Mills opinion, perceived that, "Though
the 'minimum contact' theory may have liberalizing tendencies, it was
not so much an innovation on due process as it was a rephrasing of the
'11Id. at 441, 96 S. E. 2d at 453, citing the International Shoe case. The Court
interpreted the word "goods" as used in the statute to include "magazines," and was
also of the opinion that the alleged tort was not committed in North Carolina,
hence subdivision (4) of G. S. 55-38.1 (a), making "tortious conduct" in the state
a basis for jurisdiction in a suit arising therefrom, was held not applicable. But
the Court stated that if subdivision (4) were applicable, it "would raise a serious
question as to its constitutionality." Id. at 444, 96 S. E. 2d at 455.(' 116 Vt. 569, 80 A. 2d 664 (1951), where defendant foreign corporation was
held subject to suit in Vermont for alleged negligent re-roofing of plaintiff's house
there.
" 245 N. C. at 443, 444, 96 S. E. 2d at 454.
11 Id. at 438, 439. 62 Id. at 439.
"239 F. 2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-38.1 (a) (3) (Supp. 1955).
"239 F. 2d at 505, quoting a portion of the statute, smpra note 64.
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prevailing fictional tests, in order more properly to describe the judicial
methodology long employed. 60
In dismissing the contention that a visit of one of the corporation's
agents to North Carolina to attempt to compromise the controversy was
a sufficient basis for jurisdiction, Judge Sobeloff clearly indicated that
courts still think in terms of "presence": "This incidental and ephem-
eral presence of the [corporation's] agent is not the equivalent of
the presence of the [corporation], and it is to be remembered that it
is the [corporation's] 'presence'--a term that symbolizes adequate con-
tacts-that is needed to make it amenable to suit in North Carolina.
So also 'contacts' is not to be understood in the most literal sense, as
though the law's requirement is satisfied by a foot-fall on the State's
soil. The word refers to the relationship through activity deemed sub-
stantial. '67 If, as Judge Sobeloff states, "presence" is a term that sym-
bolizes "adequate contacts," which is presumably synonomous with "min-
imum contacts," then International Shoe truly represents only a change
of nomenclature.
Apart from the value of Judge Sobeloff's statements as interpretive of
the International Shoe doctrine, they are significant as a reflection of
the judicial inclination, or perhaps desire, to think in terms of "pres-
ence" when applying the "minimum contacts" test.68 It also seems
significant that the corporation's inconvenience in having to defend a suit
in North Carolina was not mentioned as a reason for denying jurisdic-
tion.6 9 Apparently, it would have made little difference if the contract
sued upon had been consummated in North Carolina rather than in New
York, because "the place of execution and performance of the contract
are not alone decisive."70 Further, there was a strong intimation that
no jurisdiction would have existed even had the plaintiff's cause of
action been in tort.71
00 Id. at 506.
"7 Id. at 509.
" Cf. In Compania De Astral, S. A. v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107
A. 2d 357 (1954), cert. den. 348 U. S. 943, where a foreign corporation not regu-
larly doing business in Maryland was held subject to suit there under a statute
conferring jurisdiction over such corporations on a cause of action arising on a
contract made in the State, whether or iot the corporation was doing business there.
However, the contract was for the purchase of ships lying in Maryland waters;
defendant's president came into Maryland to negotiate the contract and inspect the
ships; defendant, by the terms of the contract, had deposited money in escrow in
Baltimore, and was required to comply with certain requirements of the state mari-
time commission.
" judge Sobeloff stated that, "The question to begin with is whether there is
legal power in the State's courts over the corporation." 239 F. 2d at 509.
"Id. at 505. This throws doubt on the validity of subdivision (1) of G. S.
55-38.1 (a), which confers jurisdiction for causes of action arising "Out of any
contract made in this State or to be performed in this State."
"' "We are not persuaded by the argument that jurisdiction should be sustained
because it is said there would be jurisdiction if the suit were for a tort arising
[Vol. 35
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Where the corporation's activity in the state is tortious, however, the
courts are more inclined to take a liberal view of the state's jurisdiction.
In Painter v. Home Finance Co.,72 the defendant foreign corporation was
held subject to local jurisdiction where its agent apparently entered
the state for the sole purpose of repossessing plaintiff's automobile, re-
sulting in plaintiff's suit for wrongful taking of property, invasion of
privacy, unlawful public threats of duress, and mental and physical
suffering resulting therefrom. Jurisdiction was upheld under subdivision
(4) of G. S. 55-38.1 (a), which provides for service of process on foreign
corporations "not transacting business in this State" for any cause of
action arising out of "tortious conduct in this State. '73
The trial court's finding that defendant's activity (including perhaps
the fact that its president resided in North Carolina) constituted "doing
business" in the state was expressly held unnecessary and treated as
surplusage since the statute does not require such. The brief opinion
made no reference to Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc.,7 4 decided
earlier the same month, where the Court had held subdivision (3) of the
same statute unconstitutional and expressed doubt as to the consti-
tutionality of subdivision (4).75
Painter v. Home Finance Co., now stands alongside Smyth v. Twin
State Improvement Corp.,7 a Vermont decision, in holding that the
commission of a tort by a foreign corporation's agents physically present
in the state subjects the corporation to suit therein based on the tort.
Although the corporate activity in these cases was not "continuous and
systematic, '77 its giving rise to the liabilities sued on,78 taken with a
due regard for its nature and quality79 (tortious), probably justifies juris-
diction under the International Shoe doctrine.
from the transaction between the parties rather than for a breach of contract.
Appellant's [plaintiff's] premise, that there would be jurisdiction if the case were
one in tort is without authoritative support." Id. at 507.
-2245 N. C. 576, 96 S. E. 2d 731 (1957).
7' See p. 554, supra, where pertinent parts of the statute are set out.
7, See note 56, supra.
See note 58, supra.
7 See note 59, supra. Also see Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co.,
89 F. Supp. 654 (D. C. Md. 1950), where defendant, having made a substantial
number of sales in the state and having an agent for solicitation therein, was held
subject to Maryland jurisdiction in a tort action, although its activity there was
held not to be "doing business." In Hall v. Flintkote Co., 139 F. Supp. 32 (D. C.
Md. 1956), defendant was held to be "doing business" where it employed in the
state two sales representatives to whom it furnished letterheads, these agents
making inspections to see that defendant's products were being properly installed
on jobs, and having desk space with a local distributor; defendant also had a tele-
phone listing showing its distributor's address, and it guaranteed roofing projects
in which its products were used.
" International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U. S. at 317.
78 Ibid.
" Id. at 319. See note 44, supra.
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CONCLUSION
These recent decisions contrast two schools of interpretation of the
International Shoe doctrine: On the one hand are the state legislatures,
seeking maximum jurisdiction in the interests of local residents by de-
fining "minimum contacts" in such terms as "any contract made in this
State,"8' 0 or the repeated solicitation of business in this State by mail or
otherwise,8 or the distribution of goods with the "reasonable expecta-
tion" that they will be used in this state and are so used,82 or "tortious
conduct" in this state,83 provided the suit against the foreign corporation
arises out of such "contacts. '8 4 On the other hand are the courts, re-
fusing to accept these definitions when it is thought they will "offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,"8 5 yet accepting
them when they are thought not to so offend.
It has been observed that by granting to the judiciary the power to
determine what is "fair play" or "substantial justice" sets up the courts
as policy-making bodies.8 6 There is no argument here. The question
is, what is the policy? And what is it to be tomorrow? From what has
gone before, these observations seem justified: (1) Since International
Shoe, the trend is clearly toward broader state jurisdiction; (2) how-
ever, there is a marked tendency to require physical presence of the
'agents of the corporation in the state before subjecting it to suit therein;
and (3) the forum's inconvenience to the parties is sometimes deemed
a factor but is of dubious pertinence; (4) although in the desire to secure
a fair trial the doctrine of forum non conveniens may be seemingly in-
correctly applied. It may be expected that, in the future, the "presence"
and "convenience" factors will decline in importance, resulting in even
broader state jurisdiction, with the forum non conveniens doctrine avail-
able as a safeguard against injustice to the foreign corporation.
FREDERICK A. BABSON, JR.
Taxation-Marital Deduction-Life Insurance Proceeds and the
Terminable Interest Rule
In the Internal Revenue Act of 19481 Congress repealed the 1942
community property amendments, 2 and added the now familiar marital
"N. C. GEN. STAT. § 55-38.1 (a) (1) (Sup p. 1955).
1Id., subdivision (2). "Id., subdivsion (3).
":Id., subdivision (4). "Id., subsection (a).
"International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U. S. at 316.
"Note, 20 TUL. L. REv. 437, 439 (1946). Justice Black, dissenting in the
International Shoe case, 326 U. S. at 323, stated: "I think it a judicial depriva-
tion to condition its exercise [state jurisdiction] upon this Court's notion of 'fair
play,' however appealing that term may be."
'INT. REV. AcT OF 1948, 62 STAT. 110 (1948).
'INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, Sec. 811, as amended 62 STAT. 116 (1948).
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deduction provision3 to the Federal Estate Tax.
After setting out the marital deduction, the provision states that
under certain circumstances, where the interest in property passing from
the decedent to the surviving spouse might terminate or fail, the interest
will not qualify for the deduction.4 This portion of the section has come
to be known as the "Terminable Interest Rule."
Broadly, the terminable interest rule excepts from marital deduction
any asset included in decedent's gross estate which may, by any event,
ultimately pass from the decedent to any person other than the surviving
spouse for less than a full consideration in money or monies worth, and
be possessed and enjoyed by such person after the surviving spouse.5
For example, a terminable interest involving life insurance: decedent's
life insurance proceeds are to be held by the insurer and are to be paid
to the surviving spouse over a ten year period, with the added provision
that if the surviving spouse should die within ten years, all remaining
installments should be paid to decedent's children. In this case if the
surviving spouse were to die within ten years, the interest in the property,
which originally passed to decedent's surviving spouse, would terminate
and pass to, and be enjoyed by, decedent's children for less than a full
consideration. The fact that the surviving spouse may have a life ex-
pectancy of more than ten years will not prevent the interest from being
terminable. It is enough that the interest may terminate and pass to
someone else.
It is also important to note that to come within the rule, the interest
must pass from the decedent to someone other than the surviving spouse.
If the insurance proceeds were given to the surviving spouse as a lump
sum settlement, and the surviving spouse later made a gift of the pro-
ceeds to other persons, the terminable interest rule would not apply since
the proceeds would pass, not from the decedent to such other person, but
from the surviving spouse.
The recently published proposed estate tax regulations for the In-
ternal Revenue Code of 19546 have clarified a recent change in the
application of the terminable interest rule to life insurance payments
I INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, Sec. 812 (e)added by 62 STAT. 117 (1948), amended
62 STAT. 1214 (1948).
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 812 (e) (1), 62 STAT. 117 (1948), amended 62
STAT. 1214 (1948),
'Id. See also Estate of Reilly v. Comm., 239 F. 2d 707 (3rd Cir. 1957). To
qualify for marital deduction the asset must pass to the surviving spouse. The
terminable rule concerns cases where an interest in property passing to the surviving
spouse may terminate and pass to someone other than the surviving spouse. The
purpose of the rule is to prevent property, which is not taxed in decedent's estate,
from passing to someone other than the surviving spouse. Under the terminable
interest rule an asset is taxed in either decedent's estate, or in estate of surviving
spouse provided it is not dissipated or given away by surviving spouse prior to her
death.
'21 Fed. Reg. 7850 (1956).
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made to the surviving spouse. The following discussion will be limited
to the application of the rule to such proceeds.7
Terminable Interest Rule Prior to 1954 Code
Section 812 (e) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 19398 sets out
the "power of appointment" exception to the terminable interest -rule.
Subparagraph G is made applicable to only life insurance and annuity
payments.9 Although stated in the code section, the requirements that
must be followed to bring payments within this exception are more
clearly stated in the regulations,' ° as follows:
"1) The proceeds must be held by the insurer subject to an agree-
ment either to pay the proceeds in installments, or to pay interest thereon,
with all such amounts payable during the life of the surviving spouse
payable only to her.
"2) Such installments or interest must be payable annually or more
frequently, commencing not later than 13 months after the decedent's
death.
"3) The surviving spouse must have the power, exercisable in favor
of herself or her estate, to appoint all amounts so held by the insurer.
"4) Such power in the surviving spouse must be exercisable by such
surviving spouse alone and (whether exercisable by will or during life)
must be exercisable in all events.
"5) The amounts payable under such a contract must not be subject
For a full discussion of the Terminable Interest Rule as applied to other
interests passing from decedent to the surviving spouse, see Lowndes & Kramer,
Federal Estate and Gift Taxes 386 (1956).
s Sec. 812 (e) (1) (G)-Life Insurance or Annuity Payments with Power of
Appointment in the Surviving Spouse-In the case of an interest in property pass-
ing from the decedent consisting of proceeds under a life insurance, endowment,
or annuity contract, if under the terms of the contract such proceeds are payable
in installments, or are held by the insurer subject to an agreement to pay interest
thereon (whether the proceeds upon termination of any interest payments are pay-
able in a lump sum or in annual or more frequent installments), and such install-
ments or interest payments are payable annually or at more frequent intervals
commencing not later than thirteen months after decedent's death, and all amounts
payable during the life of the surviving spouse are payable only to such spouse,
and such spouse has the power to appoint all amounts payable under such contract
(exercisable in favor of such surviving spouse, or of the estate of such surviving
spouse, whether or not in each case the power is exercisable in favor of the others)
with no power in any other person to appoint to any person other than the sur-
viving spouse any part of the amounts payable under such contract.
(i) such proceeds shall, for purposes of subparagraph (A) be considered
as passing to the surviving spouse, and
(ii) No part of such proceeds shall, for purposes of subparagraph (B) (i), be
considered as passing to any person other than the surviving spouse.
This subparagraph shall be applicable only if, under the terms of the contract,
such power in the surviving spouse to appoint, whether exercisable by will or during
life. is exercisable by such spouse alone, and in all events."
o Other portions of § 812 (e) (1) apply the power of appointment exception
to interest passing to the surviving spouse other than life insurance.
"026 C. F. R. 81.47 (a) (d) (1) (Supp. 1956).
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to a power of appointment in any person, to appoint any part thereof, to
any person other than the surviving spouse." (Emphasis added.)
In applying these regulations to an insurance plan the particular re-
quirement that would cause special difficulty is that which states that
the power of appointment in the surviving spouse must extend to "all the
amounts so held by the insurer." It would follow from this requirement
that if the power of appointment in the surviving spouse extended to only.
a portion of the proceeds held by the insurer, and the remainder were
to be paid out as a terminable interest, then none of the proceeds would
qualify for marital deduction.
The question thus facing the estate planner was, how could the
settlement of life insurance proceeds be arranged so that although all of
the proceeds would not qualify for marital deduction, at least that
portion which satisfied the five requirements would qualify.
The regulations gave a solution to this question by a provision which
stated in effect that if the insured, by the contract, directed that the pro-
ceeds be paid into separate funds to be held by the insurer and if the
above requirements were satisfied as to all amounts held in any one of
these separate funds, then the portion of the proceeds in that fund would
qualify for marital deduction." This separation of the insurance pro-
ceeds by direction in the contract appeared to be the only way the pro-
ceeds would be divided into separate interests, for marital deduction
purposes.
The case of Estate of Reilly v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,'2
though not involving the power of appointment provision, presented an
interesting aspect of this problem. There the decedent's life insurance
was planned so that the surviving spouse would receive a life annuity,
with payments guaranteed for ten years. The policy further provided
that if the surviving spouse died within ten years, all remaining pay-
ments would be made to decedent's children. The beneficiaries were
denied the right to alienate, commute, assign, or anticipate payments.' 3
The insurer, by actuarial computation had determined that of the
$58,000 insurance proceeds, $28,000 would be necessary to pay the
annuity for the ten year period, and $30,000 to pay the life annuity to
the wife after the ten years. The tax payer conceded that the $28,000
necessary to pay the installments over the ten year period was a termi-
nable interest,' 4 but argued that since annuity payments to the surviving
126 C. F. R. 81.47 (a) (d) (2) (Supp. 1956).
239 F. 2d 797 (3rd Cir. 1957). Tax Court decision appears in 25 T. C. 366
(1955).
" If the surviving spouse were given such powers it might be argued that they
were tantamount to a power of appointment.
" This portion was a terminable interest since the surviving spouse might die
within ten years and then an interest in the property would pass to someone other
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spouse after the ten year period was not a terminable interest,"; the por-
tion of the insurance proceeds necessary for those payments should
qualify for marital deduction. The commissioner argued that "property"
as used in the code referred to the entire property and that none of the
insurance proceeds should qualify for marital deduction. The court, in
adopting the taxpayer's theory that the insurance proceeds could be di-
vided into separate property interests, stated, "The fact that each single
property had its genesis in the same piece of paper is of no consequence
taxwise."'16 As support for its holding the court cites the regulation
providing for the separation of the proceeds into two funds.17  Apparent-
ly, the court felt that although the decedent did not specifically direct
payment into separate funds, he inadvertently accomplished the same
result by choosing a settlement option as he did."8
Thus, prior to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, if a division of
insurance proceeds was desired for marital deduction purposes, the de-
cedent could either direct that proceeds be divided into separate funds
or hope that the court would hold that the settlement options selected ac-
complished the same result.
Terminable Interest Under the 1954 Internal Revenue Code
When the power of appointment provision applicable to life insur-
ance proceeds in the Internal Revenue Code of 195410 is compared to its
counterpart under the 1939 Code20 the change in government policy in
the area becomes quite apparent.
Section 812 (e) (1) (G) of the 1939 Code, in setting out the re-
quirements for marital deduction states, "and such spouse has the power
to appoint all amounts payable under such contract" (Emphasis added).
Section 2056 (b) (6) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 is almost
than the surviving spouse, here the decedent's children, for less than an adequate
consideration, and be possessed and enjoyed by them.
"As for payments after the ten year period, upon the death of the surviving
spouse all payments ceased and no interest passed to anyone else.10239 F. 2d 797, 800. (3rd Cir. 1957.)
'726 C. F. R. 81.47 (a) (d) (2) (Supp. 1956).
18 In Shedds Estate v. Commissioner, 237 F. 2d 345 (9th Cir. 1956) involving
property held in trust ior the decedent's surviving spouse, the surviving spouse's
interest in the trust entitled her to two-thirds of the income for life, and gave her
power of appointment over one-half of the corpus. Though the question was not
discussed, the Court refused to allow the corpus to be split into separate property
interests, but gave full effect to subsection F of § 812 (e) (1) of the 1939 Code,
which requires that the surviving spouse must have power of appointment over
the entire corpus before marital deduction will be permitted. The Court said,
"It is well settled that statutory exemption from taxes of this kind should be
strictly construed against the taxpayer, and are held applicable only to subject matter
or beneficiaries clearly within their terms." Ibid. at 357. Apparently this view
was not adopted by the Court in the Reilly case.19 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2056 (b) (6).
-o INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, § 812 (e) (1) (G). See footnote 8 for the com-
plete section.
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identical to the comparable section of the 1939 Code except that the 1954
Code section states, "and all amounts, or a specific portion of all such
amounts, payable during the life of the surviving spouse are payable only
to her, and such surviving spouse has power to appoint all amounts,
or such specific portions, payable under such contract" (Emphasis
added) .21
Thus, under the 1954 Code, if the power of appointment require-
ments are satisfied as to only a portion of the insurance proceeds, that
portion will qualify for marital deduction even though the remainder of
the proceeds may be paid out as a terminable interest. The estate plan-
ner can now apply the power of appointment provision without any fear
that if any part of of the insurance proceeds are paid out as a terminable
interest, it will cause the entire proceeds to be disqualified for marital
deduction purposes.
Under the 1954 Code, if interest on the entire proceeds of decedent's
insurance were to be paid to the surviving spouse during his or her
life time and the proceeds were to be paid to decedent's children at the
death of the surviving spouse, if the wife were given a power to appoint
only one-third of the proceeds, then only that one third would qualify
for marital deduction. Conversely, if the wife had power of appointment
over the entire proceeds, but received interest on only one third, still
only one third would qualify.22
Now that the government has clearly adopted a policy of allowing
proceeds to be divided into separate properties where the power of
appointment provision is used, the question remains, will that policy be
adopted in situations such as the Reilly case presented, where the power
of appointment provision is not applied. It would seem that since the
policy has been adopted, it would be applied in all cases, whether or not
the power of appointment provision is involved.
Summary
In dealing with the particular area of marital deduction, the estate
planner must make certain that, as to the portion of the life insurance
proceeds which he expects to qualify for marital deduction, all of the
requirements are met.
1 In the Proposed Estate Tax Regulations, under the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, published in 21 Fed. Reg. 7901 (1956) the clause, "or such specific portions
of such proceeds" is included in all appropriate places. With this clause added, the
five requirements of a valid power of appointment, as set out earlier in the note,
are the same under the 1954 Code proposed regulations as under the regulations
for the 1939 Code. A similar addition was also made in § 2056 (b) (5) of the 1954
Code relating to life estates with power of appointment in the surviving spouse.
".In the second example, as to the two-thirds of the proceeds on which the wife
did not receive interest, the requirement that proceeds must be held subject to an
agreement to pay interest (or installments) thereon to surviving spouse during her
life time, would not have been met.
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Special notice should be taken to the following:
1) Payments of either interest or installments must be made during
the life of the surviving spouse, and only to the surviving spouse. Here
special care should be taken in making certain that interest, or even
dividends, could not be received by anyone other than the surviving
spouse.
2) Payments must be made at least annually, and commence within
thirteen months of decedent's death. An annuity for the surviving
spouse that would commence two years from decedent's death would
fail to qualify if interest were not paid in the interim.
3) The power of appointment in the surviving spouse can be exer-
cisable only in favor of the surviving spouse or her estate.
4) Only the surviving spouse may exercise the power of appoint-
ment, and it must be exercisable in all events. If the policy provided
that the surviving spouse would lose the power of appointment, for
example, if she remarried, this condition would not be satisfied.23
It would pay the estate planner to compare payments made under
each settlement option employed, with the requirements set out in the
regulations, with particular attention toward all contingencies that might
occur under each option. In this way the planner would be assured
that the proceeds which he expects to qualify would, in the final analysis,
be subject to marital deduction.
ROBERT M. HUTTAR.
Torts-Distinction Between Intentional and Negligent Conduct Under
Tort Claims Act
Governmental immunity from civil suit is an historical characteristic
of Anglo-American jurisprudence. The principle developed in England
on the premise that "the king can do no wrong."1  While it may be
said that immunity is still the basic rule and liability the exception, the
modern trend is to allow limited avenues of enforceable liability against
the government.2  In allowing itself to be sued for any wrongful act of
its employees and permitting liability "to the same extent as a private
individual,"3 the Federal Government, with a few exceptions, 4 has
"a The only exception to this rule is that an interest passing to surviving spouse
will not be considered terminable because of a common disaster clause provided 1)
the clause does not exceed six months, and 2) the termination of wife's interest by
a common disaster does not, in fact, occur. Sec. 21 Fed. Reg. 7894 (1956).
' See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U. S. 1, 33 Law. Ed. 842 (1889).
Leflar and Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N. Y. U. L. REv.
1363 (1954).
828 U. S. C. § 2674 (1952).
4 28 U. S. C. § 2680 (1952).
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waived immunity. Adoption of Tort Claims Acts among the states has
been piecemeal and accompanied by a hesitancy of the courts to accede
to alterations of century old concepts. Thtis, almost without exception,
the courts have applied the doctrine of strict construction to these acts.
The result is that tort liability against most states is either unenforcable
or restricted to specifically defined categories of tort.'
The North Carolina Tort Claims Act6 goes as far toward removing
sovereign immunity as most state acts. Under the Act,7 a plaintiff is
permitted to sue the state if (1) the injury was the proximate result
of the negligence of a state employee or agency, (2) the active tortfeasor
was acting within the scope of his employment, and (3) the plaintiff was
free of contributory negligence." The Industrial Commission is author-
ized to hear and determine claims under the act and may award a maxi-
mum amount of $10,0009 with' the privilege of appeal by either party to
the courts. The court has committed itself to a strict construction of
the act.' 0 It has been held that there can be no recovery for a negligent
omission since the statute refers only to a negligent act," but that the
common law principles of negligence apply ;12 that a prisoner is not a
state employee within the meaning of the act,'3 and that a full release
given by plaintiff to the active tort feasor is also'a release to the state.
As a practical matter, the label given a tort is often not so critical as
to defeat or effect the right of recovery. 14 However, the requirement of
the Tort Claims Act that recovery may be had only for a negligent act
has recently focused attention on the often difficult distinction between
a negligent and an intentional tort.
The formula for ordinary negligence is simple, its application more
difficult. It is usually defined as the failure to use due care, or to act as a
reasonable and prudent man would act under the same or similar circum-
stances.' 5 Because the Tort Claims Act refers only to negligence, it is
'Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L. J. 1 (1924).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 et seq. (1952 and Supp. 1955).
7 See 29 N. C. L. REv. 416 (1951), for a history and analysis of the Act.
8 Alliance Co. v. State Hospital at Butner, 241 N. C. 329, 85 S. E. 2d 386
(1955).
°N. C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (Supp. 1955).
"Floyd v. North Carolina State Highway and Public Works Comm'n, 244
N. C. 461, 85 S. E. 2d 703 (1955); 33 N. C. L. REv. 613 (1955).
" Flynn v. North Carolina State Highway and Public Works Comm'n, 241 N. C.
617, 94 S. E. 2d 571 (1956).
" McFarlane v. North Carolina Wildlife Resources Comm'n, 244 N. C. 385, 93
S. E. 2d 557 (1956).
"n Alliance Co. v. State Hospital at Butner, 241 N. C. 329, 85 S. E. 2d 386(1955).
" "Whether we say this is an action for damages resulting from a continuing
trespass or for the maintenance of a nuisance or accord it some other name is
immaterial." Phillips v. Hassett Mining Co., 244 N. C. 17, 21, 92 S. E. 2d 429,
432 (1956).
"RPaossm, TORTS § 31 (1955).
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necessary to distinguish gross negligence in order to appraise the extent
of recovery against the state. The term gross negligence has appeared
in North Carolina decisions as indicating a degree of conduct more
reprehensible than ordinary negligence but falling short of an intentional
injury. It is attributed to the actor who is cognizant of the probable
consequences of his act but nevertheless acts in conscious disregard of
the likely consequences. 16 It is synonymous with wanton conduct.' 7
To this type of conduct, contributory negligence is no defense."' Since
contributory negligence is stated to be a defense to an action brought un-
der the Tort Claims Act, it would seem to follow that the legislature aid
not contemplate actions against the state for gross negligence. This
seems to be the view of the court as indicated by dicta in a recent case.'0
The same considerations deny recovery for the intentional injury. This
type of tort assumes actual knowledge by the actor of the impending
danger, coupled with a design and purpose to commit the injury.20
Compensation for such torts is not recoverable against the state.
In Jenkins v. North Carolina Dept. of Motor Vehicles,21 a state high-
way patrolman shot and killed an arrestee. The findings of the Com-
mission revealed that the patrolman had arrested plaintiff's intestate,
placed him in the patrol car and proceeded to drive away. Upon being
seized around the neck by the deceased, the patrolman stopped the car
and pulled deceased out. In the ensuing struggle, the patrolman pulled
his pistol and after firing two warning shots into the ground in front
of deceased, fired a third shot which grazed decedent's chest, causing him
to fall. The fourth and fatal bullet struck deceased in the back. The
full Commission reversed a finding of negligence by the hearing Com-
missioner.2 2 On appeal to superior court, the Commission was reversed,
the court being of the opinion that the death of plaintiff's intestate was
the result of the negligence of a state employee acting within the scope
of his employment. 23 On appeal to the Supreme Court, the decision
'was reversed, the court holding that the Tort Claims Act covers only
negligent acts by state employees and that negligence cannot be predi-
cated on an intentional act.
"o Wagoner v. North Carolina R. R. Co., 238 N. C. 162, 168, 77 S. E. 2d 701, 706
(1953).
" See, Hinson v. Dawson, 244 N. C. 23, 28, 92 S. E. 2d 393, 396 (1956).
8 Fry v. Southern Public Utilities Co., 183 N. C. 281, 111 S. E. 354 (1922).
"g "That contributory negligence is made a defense lends powerful support to the
view that the negligent acts contemplated are those to which contributory negli-
gence would be a defense." Jenkins v. North Carolina Dept. of Motor Vehicles,
244 N. C. 560, 564, 94 S. E. 2d 577, 581 (1956).
"0 Wagoner v. North Carolina R. R. Co., 238 N. C. 162, 168, 77 S. E. 2d 701,
706 (1953).
-244 N. C. 560, 94 S. E. 2d 577 (1956).
" Record on appeal, P. 46, Jenkins v. North Carolina Dept. of Motor Vehicles,
244 N. C. 560, 94 S. E. 2d 577 (1956).
". Ibid., P. 59.
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Three months before the Jenkins case, the court decided Lowe v.
Dept. of Motor Vehicles.24 There, defendant's patrolman accidentally
shot and wounded plaintiff while attempting to arrest him for a speeding
violation. It appeared that the patrolman had pursued plaintiff for
several miles and after the cars had stopped, pulled his pistol and ran
toward plaintiff's car with the pistol pointed toward plaintiff. He tripped
in the darkness, causing the pistol to accidentally discharge and wound
plaintiff. The court affirmed a finding of negligence. The rationale of
the court's decisions seems to be: in intentionally and unjustifiably point-
ing a pistol at plaintiff, the patrolman violated G. S. 14-34,25 a statute
designed to protect human life. Therefore his conduct was negligence
per se.26
In both the Lowe and Jenkins cases, the patrolman exceeded his
authority in using his pistol. Although the facts are strikingly similar
and recovery was had in one and denied in the other, the cases are dis-
tinguishable. In the Jenkins case, although the patrolman undoubtedly
violated the assault statute in using his pistol, he intended to fire the
pistol and commit the injury. In the Lowe case, the patrolman's negli-
gence was based upon the intentional assault, but the injury itself was
not intended. It was rather the result of a negligent act.
The writer finds no quarrel with the court on the result reached in
either case. The difference was required by the Tort Claims Act. How-
ever, the decisions graphically demonstrate the limitations of the act,
limitations which might well be regarded as inadequacies. Thus it will
be observed that under the act, if any employee of the state is slightly
negligent and injures plaintiff, there may be recovery. But if the em-
ployee is grossly negligent or inflicts a wanton or intentional injury in
the course of his employment, the plaintiff must suffer the loss. The
Jenkins case is an express declaration of this point. It can be conceded
that immunity from civil suit is an inherent right of the sovereign state
and that any legislative concessions to allow the state to be sued for
any action is purely gratis. However it is a non sequitur to say that the
waiver should allow one plaintiff to recover and at the same time refuse
relief to the other because the tort against him arose from a more culpable
state of mind.2 7 The moral injustice is obvious. The medieval idea that
-1244 N. C. 353, 93 S. E. 2d 448 (1956).
" This statute provides that pointing a gun at any person constitutes assault.
"See, Case Survey, 35 N. C. L. Rv. 177, 249 (1957).
"' In the Jenkins case, the patrolman weighed 185 pounds and had received
training in self defense in the Marines. The deceased was intoxicated and weighed
only 135 pounds. The fatal shot entered his back as he fell to the ground. In
this regard, the court said: "Strong and appealing argument can be advanced why
compensation should be allowed in this case, upon the ground that the more grievous
the fault on the part of the agent of the State, the more readily the State should
compensate for the injury. But the court must construe the act as written." Jenkins
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the "king can do no wrong" has evolved in our enlightened age to mean
"the king can do little wrong."
Two factors are primarily responsible for the frustration of the trend
toward waiver of immunity: several states have constitutional provisions
against government liability.28 These provisions were undoubtedly
carry-overs from the highly theoretical English view that the king was
infallible. History relates and practical experience sustains the view
that the sovereign is fallible. The North Carolina constitution contains
no such restriction.2 9  Secondly, and perhaps more controlling, is a fear
by the various state legislatures and courts that the public treasury can
not afford to pay the sums demanded if tort liability were imposed.A0
This feeling was undoubtedly justified during the early growth of this
country when most state treasuries were financially instable. Today
however, the states do not have so serious a problem. Large budgets
and greater governmental spending conclusively show that government
is "big business." A policy against government liability is diametrically
opposed to the modern view that those most able to pay should pay for
the sufferer's loss; a view which prompted our Workman's compensa-
tion acts and similar legislation. The king's immunity is antiquated.
New York is more liberal than any state in allowing general liability
.in accordance with the same rules of law as applied to actions...
against individuals or corporations." 3' Of like effect is the Federal Tort
Claims Act.3 2 Had these statutes resulted in serious inroads upon the
public treasury, it would seem to follow that they would have been re-
pealed long ago. The fact that they remain on the books is convincing
evidence that they not only represent a growing social view toward
compensation for the innocent victim of tort, but also that they are
practical of operation.
It is not contended that the State should be liable for the torts of its
employees under all circumstances. It is obvious that such liability
should be restricted to acts within the principle of respondeat superior
and the New York and Federal acts, supra are so limited. In the
v. North Carolina Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 244 N. C. 560, 565, 94 S. E. 2d 577, 581(1956).
"8 Some of these states are West Virginia, Illinois, Arkansas and Alabama. Most
state constitutions provide that the legislature may waive liability. See Leflar and
Kantrowitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N. Y. U. L. REv. 1363 (1954).
" The only pertinent provision provides: "The Supreme Court shall have
original jurisdiction to hear claims against the State, but its decisions shall be
merely recommendatory; no process in the nature of execution shall issue thereon;
they shall be reported to the next session of the General Assembly for its action."
N. C. CoNsT. ART. IV, § 9.
"0 See, Gellhorn and Schenck, Tort Actions Against the Federal Governnwnl,
47 COL. L. REv. 722 (1947).
"N. Y. CT. CL. Acr § 8 (1939).
228 U. S. C. 2671 et. seq. (1952).
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Jenkins case, the act was clothed in the dignity and authority of the
state and would seem to fall within the principle of respondeat superior.
If the State of North Carolina were liable "in accordance with the same
rules of law as applied to actions against individuals,"3 3 the plaintiff in
the Jenkins case would have been compensated for an obvious wrong.
34
It is submitted that the North Carolina act should be amended to pro-
vide not only for the negligence of state employees, but also for in-
tentional wrongs committed by employees while acting within the scope
of the employment. There seems to be no logic nor valid reasons for re-
stricting sovereign liability to acts of simple negligence.
B. FRANK MAREADY.
Workmen's Compensation-Employees of Subcontractors-Rights
Against Owners and Principal Contractors
In Adams v. Davison-Paxon Co.' the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that an employee of an independent contractor, who operated
'the millinery department of defendant department store, could not main-
tain an action at law for negligence against the department store, but
that her remedy under the Workmen's Compensation Act was exclusive.
The Court held that the department store was an owner within the
South Carolina act,2 and the independent contractor operating the
millinery department was performing part of the "trade business or occu-
pation" of the department store so as to make the department store liable
to the employees of the millinery department for workmen's compensa-
tion.
The contract between the millinery company and the department
store gave the latter direct supervision over the operation of the depart-
ment, and stated that the name of the millinery company was not to be
used, but that it was to operate and advertise in the name of the depart-
ment store. The money from all sales was paid to the cashier of the
3 From the N. Y. Act; N. Y. CT. CL Acr § 8 (1939).
a" In view of the facts as found in the Jenkins case, the following excerpt from
a letter to the writer from the plaintiff's attorney is significant: ". . . the patrolman
who shot and killed D. C. Jenkins was tried ... upon a charge of manslaughter
.... [A]t the conclusion of the State's evidence, the court sustained the defendant's
motion for judgment as of nonsuit and directed a verdict of not guilty."
- S. C. -, 96 S. E. 2d 566 (1957).
S. C. CODE § 72-11 (1952). When any person, in this section . . .referred
to as owner, undertakes to perform or execute any work which is a part of his
trade, business, or occupation, and contracts with any other person (. . . referred
to as subcontractor) for the execution or performance by or under such sub-
contractor of the whole or any part of the work undertaken by such owner, the
owner shall be liable to pay to any workman employed in the work any compensa-
tion under this title which he would have been liable to pay if the workman had
been immediately employed by him..
1957]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
store, who would pay the salary of the employees of the millinery de-
partment, and remit the excess to the manager of the millinery depart-
ment.3
This decision is in line with previous South Carolina cases, 4 though
there is a split of authority throughout the United States on just what
is within the trade, business or occupation of an employer. The courts
seem to agree that an orchestra or band playing in a restaurant or caf6
under contract is carrying on an integral part of the business of the
restaurant or caf6,5 but an independent contractor operating a lunch-
eonette and soda fountain in a department store was held not to be
engaged in the trade, business, or occupation of the department store.0
Larson states the general test to be: ". . whether this indispensable
activity is, in that business, normally carried on through employees
rather than independent contractors."'7
The section of the North Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act
dealing with statutory employers8 differs from that of South Carolina
in that it applies only to any principal contractor, intermediate con-
tractor, or subcontractor; it thus excludes owners and principal em-
ployers.9 Although many of the workmen's compensation acts did not
originally include them, provisions are rapidly being added in the differ-
ent jurisdictions, making "principals," "principal employers," "general
contractors," etc., liable for compensation to employees of independent
contractors and subcontractors."0  Of the forty-one states which have
statutory employer provisions in their workmen's compensation acts,"
only eleven exclude owners and principal employers.' 2 One avowed
purpose of the North Carolina statutory employer provision is to fore-
' The manager was employed directly by the contractor, and was not led to
believe that he was working for the department store as was the injured employee.
"Boseman v. Pacific Mills, 193 S. C. 479, 8 S. E. 2d 878 (1940), which held
that a contractor engaged in painting the water tank of a textile mill was per-
forming an integral part of the business of the mill even though the water tank
was only used for fire prevention purposes. Marchbanks v. Duke Power Co., 190
S. C. 336, 2 S. E. 2d 825 (1939), which held that an employee of a contractor,
who had contracted to paint the transmission line poles of the power co., was en-
gaged in work which was within the trade, business, or occupation of the power co.
See Blue Ridge Rural Electric Corp. v. Byrd, 238 F. 2d 346, (4th Cir. 1956).
Malony v. Industrial Commission, 242 Wis. 173, 9 N. W. 2d 623 (1943). Cf.
Steele Pier Amusement Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 127 N. J.
L. 154, 21 A. 2d 767 (1941); Palumbo v. Unemployment Compensation Board of
Review, 148 Pa. Super. 289, 25 A. 2d 80 (1942).
6 Stratis v. McLellen Stores Co., 311 Mass. 525, 42 N. E. 2d 282 (1942).
I Larson, WOKRIMFN'S COMPENSATION LAw § 49.12 (1952).8 N. C. Gen. Stat. § 97-19 (1950).
D Green v. Spivey, 236 N. C. 435, 73 S. E. 2d 488 (1952).
" Annor., 58 A. L. R. 872 (1929).
"California, Delaware, Iowa, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
and West Virginia have no statutory employer provisions in theii workmen's com-
pensation acts.
" Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nevada, New Jersey,
New York, North Carolina, South Dakota, and Tennessee.
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stall evasion of the Workmen's Compensation Act by those who might be
tempted to subdivide their regular operations with the workers, thus
regulating them for compensation purposes to small subcontractors, who
fail to carry, or if small enough may not even be required to carry, com-
pensation insurance."' 3 It would seem that to achieve this purpose the
statutory policy should be extended to owners and principal employers
as well as contractors. Under the North Carolina act it would be
possible for an employer to let out all his work to small contractors, and
escape the payment of workmen's compensation, being liable to the em-
ployees of these contractors only as a "third party" in an action at law
based on negligence. There is little incentive for the employer to require
the contractor to comply with the act, and employees of insolvent con-
tractors would probably have no redress for their injuries. On this
point Mr. Larson states, "Some statutes, instead of covering all em-
ployers who let out work on contract, are limited to 'principal' or 'gen-
eral' contractors. This leads to some rather desperate attempts to con-
vert an ordinary entrepreneur into a 'contractor' with someone."'1 4 The
main argument against including employers is that many small business-
men might fail to require contractors to comply with the act and also
fail to take out insurance, thus subjecting themselves to a liability leading
to financial ruin.
In a case involving the North Carolina Unemployment Compensa-
tion Act, employees of an independent contractor who ran a shoe depart-
ment in defendant department store were held to be part of the "employ-
ing unit" of the department store so as to make the department store
liable for unemployment compensation taxes.' 5 Yet under the North
Carolina Workmen's Compensation Act, an employee of the shoe depart-
ment would not be considered an employee of the department store.
Georgia, which has a statutory employer provision' 6 similar to that of
North Carolina, held that employees of an independent shoe depart-
ment in a department store were not employees of the department store
for workmen's compensation purposes.17 The only basis on which North
Carolina could hold a department store liable to an employee of an in-
dependent contractor for workmen's compensation, as did the South
Carolina court in the principal case, would be the possibility of estoppel.
Estoppel was not discussed in the principal case, nor have any cases
been found applying it to a situation such as this. In the principal
case the employee of the millinery department appeared to the public
"3 Green v. Spivey, 236 N. C. 435, 443, 73 S. E. 2d 488, 494 (1952).
2I Larson, WORKMEN'S COMPENSAT ON LAw § 49.12, n. 11 (1952).
"Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. L. Harvey and Son Co., 227 N. C.
291, 42 S. E. 2d 86 (1947).
1 6 GA. CoDE ANN. § 114-112 (1935).J - M. High Co. v. Hague, 53 Ga. App. 165, 185 S. E. 141 (1936).
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to be an employee of the department store, which would probably estop
the department store from denying that she was its agent as far as third
parties who relied on this appearance to their detriment are involved.18
Here, however, the employee also actually believed that she was an em-
ployee of the dpartment store, a belief resulting from the conduct of the
department store, and its acquiescence in the conduct of the independent
contractor in concealing the actual relationship. If it had also caused
her to believe that she was covered by the workmen's compensation
policy of the department store, the cases found on this point would seem
to indicate that the store would be estopped to deny that the employee
was covered by it under the act unless the independent contractor was
also under the act.19
In the principal case the Court held that because the owner was
liable for compensation to the employee of the contractor, the owner
would be relieved of any common law liability to the employee. This
was determined under statutory language imposing absolute liability
for compensation on the principal employer, though only a secondary
liability since he could recover over from the independent contractor.
Most states have this type of act, and also relieve the employer from
any common law liability to the employees of contractors. 20
It seems that North Carolina has not abolished the common law
liability of these statutory employers. The North Carolina statute2'
makes a contractor liable for compensation to an employee of a sub-
contractor only if he fails to require that the subcontractor produce a
certificate issued by the Industrial Commission stating that such sub-
contractor has complied with the Act. Two North Carolina cases22
have held that an employee of a subcontractor was not precluded by the
Workmen's Compensation Act from maintaining a negligence action at
law against the principal contractor. In neither of the cases, however,
was it brought out whether the subcontractor had complied with the
act or whether the principal contractor was also liable for compensa-
tion.23
"82 Mechem, AGENCY § 1722 (1914). See Manning v. Leavitt Co., 90 N. H.
167, 5 A. 2d 667 (1939). Field's Inc. v. Evans, 36 Ohio App. 153, 172 N. E. 702(1929), noted in 29 Micu. L. REv. 640. Cf. Jewison v. Dieudonne, 127 Minn.
163, 149 N. W. 20 (1914), holding out as partner, two justices dissenting on the
ground that no reliance was shown.
1 Smith Coal Co. v. Feltner, 260 S. W. 2d 398, Ky. (1953). Vogt v. Borough
of Belmar, 14 N. J. 195, 101 A. 2d 849 (1954). Beck v. City of Reading, 120 Pa.
Super. 468, 182 A. 2d 732 (1936). Ham v. Mullins Lumber Co., 193 S. C. 66, 7
S. E. 2d 712 (1940).
20 Annot., 151 A. L. R. 1359 (1944), supplemented by 166 A. L. R. 813 (1947).
2 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 97-19 (1950).
"' Cathey v. Southeastern Construction Co., 218 N. C. 525, 11 S. E. 2d 787(1940). Sales v. Loftis, 217 N. C. 674, 9 S. E. 2d 393 (1940).
" In neither of these cases, nor in Mack v. Marshall Field, 218 N. C. 697, 12
S. E. 2d 235 (1940) does the court seem to have considered arguments based on
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The cases from other states, which have acts similar to the North
Carolina Act, are not in accord on this problem. New York 24 and
Wisconsin 25 have held the contractor liable at common law regardless of
whether or not the subcontractor was insured, while Oklahoma,26 Mis-
souri,27 and Florida28 have held the principal contractor relieved of all
common law liability to employees of his subcontractors.
Ohio29 and Arkansas 0 have made distinctions between the cases in
which the subcontractor has complied with the act by securing insurance,
and those in which he has not, holding the employee of the subcontractor
to be the employee of the principal contractor when the subcontractor
has not complied with the act. Thus, if the subcontractor has complied
with the act there is no employer-empiloyee relationship, and the em-
ployee can bring an action at law against the principal contractor as a
third party. If, however, the subcontractor has not complied with the
act, an employer-employee relationship exists, and the employee is pre-
cluded from bringing an action at law against the principal contractor.
It is questionable whether this distinction would be made in North
Carolina. The North Carolina Act2 ' does not say that the contractor
becomes the employer of the employees of the subcontractor, but only
says that if he fails to require a certificate of the subcontractor's com-
pliance he will be liable to the same extent as if he were their employer,
and if he does require it he will not be liable for compensation insurance
actions and benefits. Since neither of the two North Carolina cases
holding the contractor liable at common law have mentioned any dis-
tinction such as that made in Ohio and Arkansas, it might seem that
the possible policy of § 97-19 as substituting compensation for common law relief
as against a superior contractor. The language of § 97-19 relieving a superior con-
tractor who has obtained the required certificate of liability to subcontractor's em-
ployees "for compensation or other benefits under this Article" may be thought to
negative any intent to relieve from common law liability. However, the amendment
in 1945 which places compensation liability on superior contractors when the sub-
contractor has less than five employees goes far toward treating the combined em-
ployments as one single enterprise with responsibility at the top. Such policy seems
further fortified by the holding that the superior contractor also need not have five
employees to be made liable for compensation, and the reasons assigned for so hold-
ing. Withers v. Black, 230 N. C. 428, 434, 53 S. E. 2d 668, 673 (1949).
24 Sweezey v. Arc Electrical Construction Co., 295 N. Y. 306, 67 N. E. 2d
369 (1946).
"Cermak v. Milwaukee Air Power Pump Co., 192 Wis. 44, 211 N. W. 354(1926).
" Deep Rock Oil Corp. v. Howell, 200 Okla. 675, 204 P. 2d 282 (1949).
7 New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Boaz-Kiel Construction Co., 115 F. 2d 950,
8th Cir. (1940).
2 Brickley v. Gulf Coast Construction Co., 153 Fla. 216, 14 So. 2d 265 (1943).
"' Trumbull Cliffs Furnace Co. v. Shachovsky, 111 Ohio St. 791, 146 N. E.
306 (1924).
" Lanza v. Carroll, 216 F. 2d 808, 8th Cir. (1954).
2" N. C. GEN. STAT. § 97-19 (1950). See, however, Note 23 supra.
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none would be made in North Carolina.32  The argument against the
distinction is that by restoring the contractor's common law liabilty it
penalizes the contractor for requiring the subcontractor to comply with
the act. Since one of the purposes of the act is to encourage con-
tractors to require compliance with the act by subcontractors, this
distinction would seem to defeat the purpose of the act.
The holdings subjecting the contractor to workmen's compensation
and common law liability have not been without criticism.33 Larson's
Workmen's Compensation Law states, "A sounder result would seem
to be a holding that the over-all responsibility of the general contractor
for getting the subcontractors insured, and his latent liability for
compensation if he does not, should be sufficient to remove him from
the category of 'third party'. . . . The general contractor, like the im-
mediate employer is subjected to non-fault liability for compensation,
whether you call him a statutory employer or insurer or anything else;
and he ought in return to get immunity from damage suits."3 4 It would
seem that the North Carolina act might well be amended to make
clear that this common law immunity is granted the principal contractor.
ROBERT L. GRUBB, JR.
2 However, G. S. § 97-19 was amended in 1941, following these two decisiops,
to make contractors liable irrespective of whether such sub-contractor has regularly
in service less that; five employees in the same btsiness within this state to the
same extent as such sub-contractor would be liable if he had accepted the provisions
of this article. It could be argued that such additional burden on the contractor
should relieve him of common law liability to these same employees. This view
would seem more in line with other authorities, but there have been no cases on this
point since the amendment. It would seem to create an undue burden on a con-
tractor to make him liable for workmen's compensation and also liable for com-
mon law negligence to employees of a sub-contractor who does not have five em-
ployees and it is not covered by the act.
3
=Note, 39 VA. L. REv. 951, 959 (1953).
2,2 Larson, WORKMEN'S COmPENSATION LAw § 72.31 (1952).
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